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Tato disertační práce si klade za cíl předložit strategickou kvalitativní ekonomickou analýzu 
průmyslu ilegálního obchodu s drogami, jež se ve své moderní formě vyvinul napříč 
americkými kontinenty především v druhé polovině 20. století, s hlavním důrazem na Kolumbii 
a Mexiko. Následně pak provést analýzu jeho dopadu na bezpečnostní prostředí amerických 
kontinentů ve snaze formulovat uchopitelná doporučení a komplexní návrhy na jeho narušení. 
Hlavní premisou práce a vodítkem pro pozdější vyvozování konečných závěrů je, že obchodní 
transakce představuje podstatu pašování drog a jeho hlavním smyslem je tvorba hmotného 
zisku. Z tohoto důvodu ekonomická analýza tématu skýtá největší perspektivu ve smyslu 
formulace uchopitelných závěrů a doporučení. Narkoterorismus, i obecněji násilí spojené s 
obchodem s drogami, tato práce uchopuje, analyzuje a vysvětluje jako obchodní taktiku, která 
je nedílnou a klíčovou součástí obchodního modelu pašování drog. V závěrečné sekci práce 
rovněž předloží kritickou analýzu existujících strategických přístupů při potlačování obchodu 
s drogami ve snaze identifikovat nedostatky těchto přístupů a poskytnout alternativní 
efektivnější strategické postupy a nástroje pro řešení problematiky.   
 
Abstract 
This dissertation aims to provide a strategic qualitative economic analysis of the illicit drug 
trafficking industry as it evolved in its modern form across the Americas in the latter part of the 
20th century, with principal focus on Colombia and Mexico, and to assess its impact on the 
security environment in the Americas with the ultimate ambition to provide tangible 
recommendations for complex disruptive countermeasures. The key premise upon which all the 
conclusions are later formulated is that trafficking in illicit substances is primarily an 
entrepreneurial activity aimed to generate profit and economic approach to the issue therefore 
yields the most promising prospects for tangible results. Narcoterrorism in its own merit, and 
drug-related violence in general, is contemplated, analyzed and explained as one of the key 
tactics inherent to the trafficking business model. Finally, a critical assessment of existing 
counter-narcotics strategies is performed in order to outline deficiencies of these policies with 















INTRODUCTION           7 
1. NARCOTICS, THE INDUSTRY AND ITS FOUNDERS     15 
1.1. From the Coca Plant to Cocaine Hydlochloride      15 
1.2. Colombia: Birthplace of Modern Illicit Drug Trafficking Industry    16 
1.3. The Illicit Drug Industry and Its Entrepreneurs      20 
2. THE COMMODITY, THE ENTERPRISE AND THE BUSINESS MODEL  26 
2.1. Structure and Process of Cocaine Trafficking       26 
2.2. Illicit Entrepreneurs          33 
2.3. Illicit Networks          42 
2.4. Illicit Business Models         58 
3. ASSESSMENTS AND COUNTER-STRATEGIES      70 
3.1. Evolution of Narcoterrorism and the Nature of the Current Drug War in Mexico  70 
3.2. Critical Assessments of Existing Strategies       93 
3.3. Towards Complex Counter-strategy and Beyond     100 
CONCLUSION           113 





Nowadays, there are many buzzwords in the realm of international affairs with 
narcoterrorism being one of the frequently used ones. Despite the fact that many domestic and 
foreign policy decisions of various countries are linked to this term, semantically and 
analytically it remains rather ambiguous in its focus and implications depending on which part 
of the word in emphasized. Originally, the term narcoterrorism was first coined by Peruvian 
President Fernando Belaúnde Terry in 1982 to describe terrorist tactics, such as assassinations 
and car bombs, employed by drug traffickers against anti-narcotics law enforcement forces in 
Peru and Colombia in the early 1980s.1 In this context, narcoterrorists are individual members 
of drug cartels2 or other criminal enterprises, whose actions attempt to influence government 
policies by systematic threat or use of real violence. Such description takes drug trafficking 
entities as the analytical object of reference, with the illicit smuggling representing the primary 
activity and terrorism depicting optional tactics, which is occasionally deployed.  
Trafficking in illicit substances is entrepreneurial activity aimed to generate profit. In 
that sense, the only difference between cocaine smugglers and car sellers is the legal status of 
their respective products. This statement is not intended to avoid the obvious moral relativity 
implied in that example, it is to point out the core fact and inevitable key assumption upon 
which any analysis of the topics must built upon: illicit drug trafficking is above all a business 
activity. Nevertheless, there is a key and prominent feature to this business activity, which 
makes it rather unique: the use of excessive violence. I define narcoterrorism, the keyword in 
the title of this dissertation, as “the use of excessive violence as indispensable business tactic to 
secure operational environment for profit-seeking illicit drug smuggling enterprise.”  
Illicit drugs are a commodity, trafficking industry is guided by the same economic logic 
as any other commercial activity. It is the legal status that makes difference in key aspects of 
illicit trafficking business models. The main deficiency resulting from the illegal status of 
certain drugs is the absence of a legal authority enforcing rules. When there is a conflict between 
companies like Pfizer, Merck or Novartis, their disputes regarding trademarks, mergers, 
acquisitions, insider trading, employee rights, tax evasions or frauds will be handled by attornies 
and settled by respective court’s ruling. There is no such tool available for illicit drug traffickers. 
There is no central legal authority to rule over territorial disputes, trademark issues or any other 
troubles a legal enterprise might encounter in its daily operational environment. Illicit 
traffickers need to provide solutions on their own to settle disputes involved in their business 
operations. Bribery and violence have become the tactics of choice due to their universal 
applicability and effectivity. Excessive violence rose to such a prominence among illicit drug 
traffickers that the term narcoterrorism was coined quite early in the evolution of the modern 
day illicit drug industry in the Americas to describe the scope and extent of violence involved.  
Prosperity and development in the Americas have been challenged by a variety of 
security threats, traditional and modern in nature, but none so far as menacing as narcoterrorism. 
Wars, foreign invasions, insurgencies, these dangers have been present for many states ever 
                                                          
1 “Police Station Attacked Near Site of Peru Prison Break,“ UPI Archives, March 9, 1982, 
https://upi.com/4256756. 
2 Throughout the thesis, I occassionally use the term “cartel“ in its popular significance, as a reference to illicit 




since they gained independence from Spain. Natural disasters, unemployment, lack of 
education, demographic issues, weaken rule of law in many states represent some of the most 
urgent modern ones. Illicit drug trafficking belongs to both of these categories. In countries 
such as Colombia or Mexico, smuggling has long and prosperous tradition dating back to at 
least the 19th century. Nevertheless, industrial level trafficking in illicit narcotics, primarily 
marijuana and cocaine, is a phenomenon created in the 1960s and 1970s when the United States 
developed a nation-wide passion for Latin American psychoactive plants consumption thus 
creating the largest consumer market in the world. In less than a decade after the U.S. demand 
stimulated increase in supply individuals such as Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria turned from 
local petty criminals and smugglers into drug lords controlling large trafficking enterprises with 
vast international network moving tons of cocaine across Latin America into the United States 
and Europe. Among the most effective tactics used by Escobar and other illicit drug industry 
tycoons have been bribe and brutal violence aimed at anyone representing an obstacle in their 
profit-making. Tens of thousands of murder victims representing a collateral of the illicit drug 
trade across the Americas in the few decades lead to the notion of labeling Escobar and his 
modern day counterparts not as mere drug lords anymore, but rather as narcoterrorists.     
Narcoterrorism, fueled and underlined by substantial profits, is the salient feature of 
illicit drug trafficking and the most special element of the whole phenomenon. Without 
excessive violence, trafficking is more or less just another business activity with different legal 
status. The violence guarantees and safeguards the whole enterprise by reducing inherent risks 
present in its operational environment. Excessive violence inevitably attracts public attention. 
Attention dedicated to drug trafficking related violence often results in overestimating the role 
violence plays in the whole enterprise and therefore deviates attention from the real center of 
gravity: the trade. Evidence for this hypothesis can be found regularly on pages of major U.S. 
newspapers at least since 2006 under the catchy headlines usually referring to Mexican drug 
wars. But violence is a symptom here, not the core problem. Excessive attention paid to violence 
is unfortunate but to a large degree it is understandable notion since militarization of the 
vocabulary started decades ago, when the term War on Drugs was introduced to the public.   
On 17 June 1971, President Richard Nixon declared that “America’s public enemy 
number one in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is 
necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.”3 Despite the broad outline of the administration’s 
original policy, which Nixon explained in his Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control submitted on the same day4 arguing for a multilateral approach, in the 
end the Nixon’s and all subsequent administrations gravitated towards a hardline strategy 
focused primarily on suppressing the supply side of the drug trade. This ultimately international 
effort was popularized under the label War on Drugs and since 1971 unparalleled amount of 
money, manpower and resources have been spent in combating the phenomenon.  
In 2019, it is plausible to declare the War on Drugs has failed to accomplish its intended 
outcome to disrupt and disable the supply side of illicit drug trade. Today, the most successful 
                                                          
3 Richard Nixon, “Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” (speech, 
Washington, DC, June 17, 1971), The American Presidency Project, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/240238. 
4 Richard Nixon, “Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” (speech, 





transnational profit-seeking illicit networks (PSINs) in the Americas, such as the Sinaloa cartel, 
resemble international corporations such as Chevron or Monsanto. They have sophisticated 
business models, effective management structures with thousands of employees and affiliates 
across dozens of countries on different continents. Their annual profits from large portfolio of 
illegal activities, from drugs to human trafficking, are in billions of untaxed USD. Such a 
revenue enables them to shape their operational environment, providing resources to build 
private armies, to corrupt the system in seemingly any country in which they operate by bribing 
local, state or federal police officers, judges and government representatives. At this point, Latin 
American international profit-seeking illicit networks such as the Sinaloa cartel are beyond 
effective reach of any single government in the Americas with their operations corrupting 
government efforts to such extent the nation states are rendered strategically helpless. Such a 
status has never been achieved by any other illicit enterprise. This substantial qualitative and 
quantitative evolution observed under the presumed duress of war waged on them for decades 
is a great source of concern as much as inspiration for analysis. 
The inevitable first general observation, which provides the core motivation behind this 
dissertation, is that the key premise upon which the strategy guiding the War on Drugs is 
inaccurate if not completely wrong. Even a superficial study of the issue relying simply on 
media and other non-scholarly sources reveals a clear contrast between resources spent on 
eradicatation of the supply side of illicit drug trade and successful evolution of profit-seeking 
illicit networks witnessed all over Latin America. The resulting hypothesis postulates that in 
the mainstream counter-narcotics policy there has been a significant mismatch between the 
perceived and the real centers of gravity in the illicit narcotics industry, hence the mainstream 
policy failure. A different approach is therefore worth considering. 
This dissertation aims to provide a qualitative strategic economic analysis of 
narcoterrorism and more generally of illicit trafficking phenomenon as it evolved in Latin 
America, primarily in Colombia and Mexico, since the 1960s and 1970s with the main objective 
to overcome perceived rigidity and deficiencies in examination of narcoterrorism resulting from 
predominantly quantitative operational legal approach to the issue. The main objective of this 
paradigm shift is to deliver analysis which provides deeper insights, wields more explanatory 
power and has the potential to introduce changes into conceptual framework from which 
recommendations for policy makers could stem.   
Methodology 
Inherent limitations of the narrative 
The essential prerequisite for any successful enterprise, not to mention an illicit one, is 
to safeguard its business model and related operational aspects. Confidentiality and 
concealment protect the know-how. Unfortunately, for any aspiring researcher there are 
objectively existing limits to how much can be discovered about an enterprise, its strategies, 
policies, management, finances or most importantly, its decision-making processes. To provide 
a point in case, estimates of illicit drug-related profits already represent a fundamental 
challenge. 
Most studies on the illicit drug business have had difficulty establishing the exact 
earnings of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia, Mexico or elsewhere. Since the 




year and exactly how much of the product was sold in the international market. It is also difficult 
to establish the exact upstream costs to produce a kilogram of cocaine and to exact downstream 
costs to ship a kilogram of cocaine and to launder the profits. Regardless, some economists 
have attempted to calculate the net earnings from the cocaine industry in the 1980s and 1990s; 
estimates range from as low as $170 million to as high as $5 billion per year.5 In comparison, 
in 1994 the oil industry’s earnings were about $3 billion a year or 5.7 percent of Colombia’s 
GDP. It is estimated that the Medellín-based traffickers were billionaires by the mid-1980s. 
Some conservative estimates, such as the one calculated by Forbes magazine in 1987, indicated 
that Pablo Escobar was worth $3 billion.6 His associate from Medellín, Gonzalo Rodríguez 
Gacha, joined the Forbes World’s Billionaires List in 1988 with his alleged worth estimated at 
$1.3 billion.7 When PBS’s Frontline asked Juan David Ochoa how much money he had made 
from drug trafficking, he said probably some $20-25 million.8 Regardless of this discrepancy 
in trafficker’s earnings, the money fueled support for the businesses that became an additional 
sources of income and employment in Colombia.  
 When only bits and pieces of information and stories become available, often from 
dubious sources relying on a third-party testimony or simple hear and say, the only productive 
approach to analysis is factual cross-check, compare and contrast approach and cross-
referencing interviews with insiders that might yield some more general observations from 
which strategic conclusions can be drawn. In other words, focusing on the entire perspective 
rather than particularities might actually lead to some tangible results. 
Moreover, in pursuit of tangible results, this dissertation will limit its focus and research 
to the body of evidence available by the end of Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s tenure in 
2012. Arguably, setting a limit to the scope of inquiry might enable the researcher to look at the 
issue with a little bit of perspective, which is desirable for any strategic contemplation.  
Qualitative v. Quantitative Approach 
Analyses of illicit trafficking in the Latin American region often focus on quantitative 
aspects such as volume of illicit substances smuggled through the region and into the United 
States, the largest market for narcotics in the world; profit generated by drug sales or number 
of casualties suffered in the ongoing struggle to suppress this illegal phenomenon. In order to 
achieve a better understanding of this complex and complicated issue, I suggest to emphasize 
qualitative aspects such as evolution of internal organization, their business models and modus 
operandi, since qualitative characteristics of trafficking organizations and their operations 
determine quantitative outcomes such as volume of drugs smuggled or profit generated not vice 
versa.   
 
                                                          
5 Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1996). 
6 David Henry, “Pablo Escobar-Gaviria, Chief Paisa,” Forbes, October 5, 1987, 
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/eehd45ekgjj/1987-2/#11f48f196842. 
7 Erin Carlyle, “Billionaire Druglords: El Chapo Guzman, Pablo Escobar, The Ochoa Brothers,“ Forbes, March 
13, 2012, https://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2012/03/13/billionaire-druglords-el-chapo-guzman-pablo-
escobar-the-ochoa-brothers/#583934a05ef4. 





Strategic v. Operational/Tactical Focus 
In contrast to operational or tactical level analyses, strategically focused studies seem to 
be much less frequent, possibly due to a fact that illicit trafficking on a strategic level is beyond 
the reach of national governments in Latin America and transnational organizations such as the 
United Nations or the Organization of American States, which depend on the will of their 
individual members and have no jurisdiction in addressing the issue effectively.  
On a tactical level, suppressing drug trafficking is a responsibility of local and national 
law enforcement agencies. Operational level issues, such as national counter-narcotics policies, 
fall within the jurisdiction of national governments. In contrast, there is no entity with the ability 
to effectively address illicit trafficking and narcoterrorism on strategic level, mostly because 
the most powerful trafficking organizations today operate across national territories, waters, 
airspaces, across the Americas and other continents as well. Yet, strategic level focus is of vital 
importance because symmetric approach is the first prerequisite of success in dealing with 
complex and widespread illicit trafficking and narcoterrorism.   
Furthermore, strategically, the two main concepts applied in counter-narcotics efforts 
have been the supply-side and demand-side suppression. This dissertation will mostly focus on 
assessment of the former, since I believe that formulating complex, coherent and effective 
supply-side suppression strategy remains a challenge some 40 years after the Nixon’s 
declaration of War on Drugs. On the other hand, there is substantial amount of research 
conclusively proving that education, prevention and treatment are the key concepts for reducing 
demand. The resulting challenge is therefore implementation of these priorities into practice, 
which is effectively a policy matter, not a subject of scholarly analyses and assessments. 
Economic v. Legal Approach 
 In my opinion, it is safe to assume that profit is what drives illicit drug traffickers. They 
might have some other individual or collective aspirations, political or social, but ultimately the 
unifying factor is the desire for profit. In studying their profit-seeking business-related decision-
making, economics as a science focusing on wealth seems to provide the desirable framework 
for analysis. In contrast, legal perspective offers a viewpoint, where illicit trafficking is not 
analyzed in its own merit to the full extent of the phenomenon, but its features are compared 
and contrasted against existing legal definition of criminal behavior. This approach might 
provide answers as to which specific activities are illegal, but it will not provide answers to why 
are these activities happening, what motivations and ambitions they express, why and how they 
evolve.  
Nevertheless, the key motivation behind giving preference to economic approach rather 
than a legal one is the presumed universality of the former and historically demonstrated 
variability of the latter. Not only legal systems vary between various countries, there is also 
evolution of legal interpretations over time. From all the relevant examples, I will only mention 
that opium, mariahuana, metamphetamime and other now illicit substances were legally 
available in the United States in the 19th and early 20th century. This is not to say evolution and 
changes within legal systems are inherently negative, it only makes the legal approach 
unsuitable for the purpose of this dissertation. On the other hand, economics extends beyond 
the realm of wealth. Alfred Marshall defined it as a study of man in the ordinary business of 




it. Thus the study of wealth and on the other and more important side a part of the study of 
man.9 To Lionel Robbins economics is primarily about studying human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.10 Ideas and concepts 
introduced by these two and other economic thinkers discussed in this dissertation will provide 
guidance in discovering the rationale of illicit trafficker’s decision-making on individual, 
collective and business level.  
Applying this alternative approach, I aim to provide a more accurate analysis and 
assessment of narcoterrorism and the illicit drug trafficking phenomenon in order to establish a 
more suitable basis to formulate more effective strategy and policy recommendations. In doing 
so, game theory principles will be applied on some occasions. In formulating strategic 
suggestions and policy recommendations elements of social network analysis will be introduced 
and applied to support the argument.   
Structure 
Part I: Narcotics, the Industry And Its Founders 
Part I of this dissertation aims to provide the basic context for analyses presented in 
Parts II and III, introducing the elementary facts regarding the illicit drug industry in the 
Americas. Firstly, the main points in history of cocaine will be briefly summarized. Secondly, 
explanation will be offered why Colombia became the birthplace of the modern day illicit drug 
industry and why it hosted the first globally operating drug smuggling enterprises. Thirdly, a 
more detailed overview of the main players and organizations in the illicit narcotics business 
will be presented. Altogether, these three chapters will provide basic orientation in the subject. 
A more detailed insights regarding particular aspects of narcotics production, trafficking and 
consumption will be presented and analyzed in the subsequent parts of the dissertation.      
Part II: The Commodity, The Enterprise And The Business Model 
 Applying mostly subjective approach, part II discusses the key variables of what, who 
and how in the modern illicit drug industry in the Americas. First, the life cycle of cocaine 
hydrochloride will be described, from the coca-growing plantations to the end users. Secondly, 
the illicit enterprise built towards producing, trafficking and selling cocaine will be analyzed 
and explained using economic theory and logic. Finally, different business models appearing 
during various stages of the modern day illicit drug industry will be assessed based on their 
efficiency and sustainability.   
Part III: Assessments And Counter-Strategies 
Changing perspective from subjective to objective, part III focuses on strategic, 
economic, political and security impacts of narcoterrorism in order to identify and assess 
previously deployed strategies to suppress the phenomenon and its corresponding problems. 
Specific methods, such as criminalization of narcotics or supply reduction, will be evaluated 
based on relative effectiveness in achieving the strategic objective of reducing illicit smuggling 
                                                          
9 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan and Co., 1920), 1–2. 





and related violence. Subsequently, alternative strategies to suppress narcoterrorism will be 
proposed, including policy recommendations. 
Resources 
 Common wisdom holds that known illicit activity is poorly organized illicit activity. In 
other words, any successful business model in the realm of illicit enteprises relies on high 
operational security, protection of know-how and concealment against law enforcement. 
Inevitably, study and analysis of illicit activities represent a variety of challenges for any student 
and researcher in the field.  
Access to primary resources – that is narcotraffickers themselves – is scarce and limited, 
especially to those who are still active in their chosen entrepreneurial field. Equally complicated 
is obtaining information from law enforcement and generally government entities tasked to 
disrupt illicit trafficking. Their up-to-date information, knowledge and assessments are mostly 
confidential and rightfully so, since operational security is vital prerequisite of success on both 
sides.  
 All the other third party information and assessments carry inevitable bias and 
interpretations added by respective authors, be it an article in respected academic journal or 
newspaper article in well-established outlet. Naturally, these outputs still maintain their 
validity, although it is vital to process them critically and with necessary caution.  
 Special category among the resources available for investigations represent law 
enforcement and public officials tasked to mitigate the influx of narcotics and suppress illicit 
drug enterprises. These individuals often possess invaluable first-hand knowledge experience 
about the subjects of this dissertation, ranging from detailed knowledge of organizational 
structure of trafficking enterprises and their daily operations to money laundering and other 
financial schemes. Unfortunately, there are objectively existing limits on access to this 
information. Law enforcement agencies rely on confidentiality as much as the subjects of their 
interest. Therefore, serving or retired officers will not comment in detail on questions regarding 
current or past operations. Those information that do become available, such as official reports 
released by the law enforcement operations, often have a narrow focus limited to single 
operation, single illicit enterprise or its entrepreneurs, or it is too general assessment of 
complicated issue. Moreover, this kind of information is mostly tactical or operational in nature 
and strategic conclusions need to be reached independently. Facing this challenge, I decided to 
draw my own conclusions from the data collected and later consult those with law enforcement 
officers with the ambition to receive feedback indicating whether my conclusions reflect 
correctly the state of affairs analyzed in this dissertation. 
 Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration is that of standard historical 
research, which improves its quality as the time passes and more information, resources and 
data for analyses become available to reflect on periods concluded. Therefore, more information 
is available on drug trafficking in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, on illicit entrepreneurship in 
Colombia at that time, than there is on drug trafficking enterprises operating today. This factor 
will also reflect on analyses presented in this dissertation. 
 Bearing in mind all these inherent practical limitations to the research, there is still a 




operational and tactical analyses and assessments, which represents the ultimate ambition of 
this thesis. There were various scholars and authors, whose published works and ideas provided 
guidance and inspiration for my own conclusions. Many of their key insights and original 
thoughts are cited and referenced throughout the chapters below. To name the most important 
authors, the works of Francisco Thoumi, George Grayson and Moisés Naím proved extremely 
useful in the study of evolution of the modern day illicit drug trafficking industry in Colombia 
and Mexico. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Phil Williams and Klaus von Lampe were 
indispensable for understanding the complexities of illicit network analysis. Nathan Patrick 
Jones provided key insights on the structure and functioning of profit-seeking illicit networks, 
including their business strategies and capacities in reference to organizational resiliency. 
Benjamin Lessing and his economic assessment of the drug war in Mexico, combining game 
theory with observed economic rationalizations of profit-seeking illicit network behavior and 
business practice, helped significantly to shape my own perceptions on the issue. Tom 
Wainright delivered much appreciated fresh perspective on many traditional problems within 
the assessments of the illicit drug industry and gave an impuls to formulate more economically 
reasonable proposals regarding countermeasures.      
 

















1. NARCOTICS, THE INDUSTRY AND ITS FOUNDERS 
 
1.1. From the Coca Plant to Cocaine Hydlochloride 
The consumption of psychoactive substances dates as far back as human desire to alter 
individual conscsiousness aiming to achieve more pleasant, rewarding or elevated state of mind 
for variety of motives ranging from inducing excitement to supressing physical or emotional 
pain and religious or cultural purposes. Archaeological evidence indicates the use of 
psychoactive substances dating back at least 10,000 years, and historical evidence of cultural 
use over the past 5,000 years.11  
Today as much as in the past psychoactive substances represent an integral part of our 
daily lives. The most significant changes over the centuries are in establishment of industrial 
level supply chain and varying legal status of individual substances. In the pages to follow, the 
primary subject of concern and analysis will be industralized supply of illicit psychoactive 
substances in the Americas, mostly cocaine. This study will materialize along three main 
interconnected axes: establishment and evolution of cocaine-based illicit drug industry, 
changing nature of the operational environment, and development of Colombian and Mexican 
enterprises dedicated to trafficking in illicit drugs. 
By no means cocaine has been the single article in most trafficker’s portfolio, but it is 
closely connected to the formation and evolution of the modern day illicit drug industry not 
only in the Americas, but globally. Therefore, the story of narcoterrorism cannot be told without 
the story of cocaine. But here I describe it only as a cultural phenomenon, cocaine as a 
commodity will be subject to analysis in Part II.  
Although some research suggests that chewing of coca leaves in Peruvian society dates 
back over 8,000 years ago, cocaine remained unknown product to the most of the world outside 
Latin America well into the 19th century.12 Within the next hundred years, by the 1980s, it was 
a highly profitable commodity produced for mass market consumption.  
Thousands of years before cocaine achieved its worldwide fame, the coca leaf was 
recognized in the Andean region for its medicinal and mystical values and used, mostly by 
nobility and priests, in religious ceremonies, sacrifices and medical practices.13 Occassionally, 
it served the native population to reduce hunger and fatigue. After the Spanish conquest, the 
native population was often forced to work in silver and gold mines chewing on coca leaves 
helped to alleviate the harsh physical effects of mine work.14 Colonial rule resulted in collapse 
of restrictions on coca use in Inca society, which contributed to its transformation into an 
accessible drug used by the great mass of the poor indigenous population. However, Spanish 
colonists did not acquire the taste for coca themselves so the leaf remained relatively unknown 
outside of Andean region. 
                                                          
11 M.D. Merlin, ”Archaeological Evidence for the Tradition of Psychoactive Plant Use in the Old World,“ 
Economic Botany 57, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 295–323;  
Louis Teresi, Hijacking the Brain:How Drug and Alcohol Addiction Hijacks our Brains - The Science Behind 
Twelve-Step Recovery (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2011), 53. 
12 Jason Palmer, “Coca Leaves First Chewed 8,000 Years Ago, Says Research,” BBC News, 2 December, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-11878241.   





In I860, Albert Friedrich Emil Niemann, a German chemist, published his findings about 
identifying and isolating the principal alkaloid of cocaine and sparkled interest in the substance 
among medical and scientific communities.15 Coca soon became prescription drug designed to 
cure a number of maladies from shyness to stomach ailments. Sigmund Freud, among others, 
found interest in the drug and came to praise it as an invaluable treatment for fatigue, 
nervousness, even a cure for morphine addiction and alcoholism.16 When John Pemberton 
formulated the original receipt for Coca-Cola, it contained the active alcaloid of cocaine, hence 
the name of the beverage. Coca also found its use as anesthetic in surgery, which remains one 
of its only enduring legal uses.17 The popularity of cocaine peaked in the early 20th century 
when there was a re-examination of many patent medicines in the United States. Medical 
research began to document cases of dependency and psychological disturbances linked to 
cocaine abuse. The public’s acceptance of cocaine gradually faded and it was banned in the 
United States under the Harrison Act in 1914. The demand stayed low until the late 1970s when 
the marihuana generation in the United States re-discovered cocaine and the story of the modern 
day illicit drug industry in the Americas began. 
Contrary to manufacturing of legal products, in the cocaine industry the value added at 
each stage of its manufacturing process is in direct proportion to the amount of risk attendant 
upon that stage. In consequence, the value added to cocaine increases substantially at each stage 
of its manufacture commensurate with the risks involved in that stage and does not correspond 
to factor opportunity costs. In other words, the high value added in cocaine industry is due to 
its illegal nature and the risks this imposes. As a result, farmers in coca producing countries 
such as Bolivia or Peru gain a minor share of the final sales price because their risk is 
comparatively low. The price increase takes place at the marketing and distribution end of the 
business, in the United States or in Europe, where the risks are much greater.  
Since the manufacturing process is relatively footloose and free of being tied to any one 
location within the coca growing areas of the Andes, this stage of the industry tends to gravitate 
toward the location presenting the lowest risk for traffickers. And this is where Colombia’s 
story as the birthplace of modern day illicit drug industry begins. 
1.2. Colombia: Birthplace of Modern Illicit Drug Trafficking Industry 
In the early stages of a trans-american cocaine-smuggling industry, Colombia offered a 
set of conditions which, (a) minimized the cocaine industry‘s risks, (b) attracted the refining 
stage of cocaine, (c) allowed Colombians to control the marketing of coca leaves in Bolivia and 
Peru, and (d) involved them in the United States cocaine market. In a way, Colombia developed 
momentarily an absolute advantage in those aspects of the industry and provided ideal 
circumstance for Colombian traffickers to seize the opportunity when the cocaine consumption 
boomed in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Geography is often mentioned as a key asset when analyzing Colombia’s comparative 
advantage. The country is strategically located between the coca-producing nations of Peru and 
Bolivia and the routes through the Caribbean and Central America that lead to the lucrative 
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North American and European markets.18 However, MacDonald identifies additional factors 
underlining Colombia’s critical role in the illicit drug trafficking: (1) Colombia‘s vast forests 
allowing for easy concealment of laboratories and landing strips; (2) Colombians‘ 
entrepreneurial skills; and (3) the presence of a numerous Colombian community in the United 
States, providing the basis for developing proper distribution infrastructure. Moreover, 
MacDonald suggests that these factors were able to interact as a package, concluding that “other 
nations have some of these factors, but not all, the most important being the lack of geopolitical 
location. Only Mexico in Latin America may come close.“19 Whynes concured stating that the 
geographical location of Colombia as a point of infiltration by air and sea into the USA was, 
and still remains, ideal.20 From the onset of the transcontinental illicit drug trafficking the 
difference between the production costs and the wholesale prices obtained in the end market is 
in thousands of per cents. Also, cocaine has a very high value per unit of volume and weight. 
Therefore, neither physical distance between sources of supply and the end market nor 
transportation costs are major considerations in determining the locus of its manufacture.  
The geopolitical argument has its merits, but it does not adequately explain why the 
refining process was lodged mainly in Colombia, due to its relative simplicity it could have 
been located just as easily near its raw material sources. This argument also fails to explain why 
it was Colombians who controlled the marketing and transportation of both coca paste and 
cocaine. Colombia is not a primary point for transshipment of cocaine as is true of some of the 
countries in Central America and the Caribbean. Cocaine differs from marijuana in terms of 
shipping logistics, since the latter is bulky to transport, making Colombia less suitable for this 
purpose than the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico providing closer proximity and better 
access to the U.S. market. 
Gradual delegitimation of its governmental system, which resulted in a weakening of 
the state and its institutions, was Colombia‘s principal comparative advantage as location for 
illicit drug production. Dramatic changes marked Colombian society throughout the 20th 
century. As the country evolved from a traditional rural society into an urban economy based 
on industry and services that required new institutions and a new system of labor relations in 
order to function without conflict, society lagged in meeting the new demands being placed 
upon it and failed to develop the institutions needed fast enough to adjust to the changing 
conditions, which resulted in profound institutional crisis.21  
Colombia‘s traditional political system based on political parties controlled by 
agricultural economic elites, whose own power was based on political and economic control of 
the peasants working on their haciendas, failed to accommodate the new groups which were 
coming into existence. The existing elites struggled to keep their power and maintain the status 
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quo as the society gradually modernized. They only managed to retain control at a cost of  
gradual delegitimation of regime and high levels of violence.22  
Colombia has a long history of political violence, in which the period known as La 
Violencia represents a particularly gloomy chapter as undeclared civil war which extended from 
the late 1940s to the early 1960s infamous for its widespread violence, extreme cruelty, and 
wanton killings (estimated at 2-3% of the country's population).23 La Violencia saw both Liberal 
and Conservative parties supporting their own guerrilla groups, with the Conservatives using 
their current power status by augmenting their forces with both the police and the army in 
fighting the Liberal-supported guerrillas. Origins of the conflict were tied to differences among 
the ruling elites over the adoption and implementation of measures introducing more 
progressive labor relations and reform land tenancy practices. Liberal governments sponsored 
these measures during their tenures 1930 – 1946. However, the post World War II period saw 
substantial changes in Colombian society such as growing urbanization, industrialization, and  
accompanying infrastructure development. These changes tended to undermine the power of 
then ruling Conservative hegemony and strength of the traditional rural interests. It was in this 
climate that La Violencia erupted. In 1953, a military government was installed with an implicit 
mandate to end the exhausting violence.  
By 1958 the changed environment not only weakened the traditional rural interests, it 
also served to blur the differences between the two party elites, who also feared losing power 
to the military. These fears led the parties to establish the National Front, an agreement securing 
rotation in power, division of most government positions between the two parties and 
alternation of the the presidency, a deal which lasted some 16 years. This agreement diminished 
violence as a tactic in the power struggle between the two main parties, at the same time this 
power monopoly excluded all other parties who held different political views. The military 
government of the 1950s, granted amnesty to the guerrillas in exchange for giving up arms. 
However, the newly introduced exclusionary political system led some to continue their battle 
once they found legitimate avenues to power blocked. By the mid-1960s, organized guerrilla 
organizations took control of isolated country regions where the power of the central 
government had been weak and they had established quasi-governmental entities taking over 
many of the state functions. They collected contributions from local peasants, protection 
payments from large landlords, and provided health, education, and security to the peasantry. 
Over time, these movements took more class-oriented stance, providing the base from which 
Marxist guerrillas gradually emerged.  
Besides being exclusionary, this political system also developed clientelistic practices 
in which politicians became intermediaries between the citizens and the government, 
exchanging public services and employment for votes. With the Colombian economy grewing 
more complex, the government assumed more functions, while at the same time, it became less 
effective in fulfilling them and inefficiency began to snowball. Government bureaucracies 
becoming more inefficient they also became less accountable and less responsive to the public 
they were supposed to serve and corruption in both the private and public sectors increased. 
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The delegitimation of the state produced a widening gap between the written laws and socially 
acceptable behavior and the illicit economy expanded greatly.  
The process of delegitimizing and weakening of the state was not unique in the 
Americas, but in comparing the Colombian experience with that of those other countries there 
are two important differences: the delegitimation process began earlier in Colombia and it had 
been characterized by a much higher level of violence than witnessed in other Andean countries. 
La Violencia and the delegitimation of government left legacies which not only permitted,  but 
encouraged the development of the cocaine industry. Although the state had never had a strong 
presence in those areas of country where it gradually lost control, the guerrillas demonstrated 
that the central goverment could not assert control in those areas even if it desired to do so. 
Morevoer, the experience of La Violencia diminished the value on human life and its legacies 
was that Colombians are quick to resort to violence in dealing with conflict, which turns out to 
be a very practical attitude in a high-profit, high-risk, and conflict-prone enterprise. In the 
1970s, willingness to resort to excessive violence served the Colombians in dealing with their 
Bolivian and Peruvian competitors, particularly during early stages of the illicit drug industry's 
development. Delegitimation of the state authority contributed to Colombia's advantage over 
other states in hosting the illicit drug industry in yet other ways.  
Colombia has a long tradition of illegal goods import, which came particularly useful 
when the demand for cocaine in the U.S. offered a new incentive for local smugglers. In the 
mid-1950s the import of many contraband consumer goods was practically institutionalized by 
developments like the creation of free zones to set up export-assembly plants and to store 
imports while import licensing and nationalization processes were concluded, have also 
facilitated contraband which could be brought into these zones and then smuggled out of them. 
The institutionalization gave contraband trade legitimacy helped to destroy any social stigma 
that might once have been attached to it. Similarly important is that Colombia also had a history 
of export contraband. Throughout time, it smuggled manufactured products and livestock out 
of Colombia into Venezuela and Ecuador. Coffee had been smuggled out in order to bypass the 
quotas imposed by the International Coffee Agreement. Workers in government mines would 
steal the emeralds and sell them to smugglers. In some case, the smugglers themselves 
developed illegal, wildcat mining organizations. This experience in smuggling contraband 
could later be applied to the export of narcotics since it provided the know-how of selling in the 
international black markets. Many emerald smugglers became involved in exporting marijuana 
in the mid-1970s and later on they went on to became cocaine exporters.  
The contraband trade helped to establish links between Colombian and foreign 
smugglers, it also enabled Colombians to gain experience in money laundering and other shady 
transactions involving international capital. Colombia had been the only country in the region 
which had exchange controls and tariff restrictions from 1931 to mid-1991. in 1967, foreign 
exchange and import-licensing control systems were tightened. Together with high tariffs on 
imports, these provided strong incentives for the development of a black market in foreign 
exchange, originally supplied by the export of emeralds, worker remittances, tourism, and other 
contraband exports.  
The foreign exchange black market provided the money laundering expertise as well as 
the channels for drug profits and capital to be brought into the country. Colombia was not the 




the Colombian state was evident by the late 1940s, it did not materialize in Peru and Bolivia 
until the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, Colombians engaged in the illicit drug smuggling gained 
a head start and competitive advantage over their neighbors.  
Given the weak presence of the national government many of Colombia's 
geographically isolated regions were forced to become fairly self-sufficient and the set up of 
facilities to manufacture and refine illegal psychoactive drugs offered an opportunity in this 
regard. Moreover, Colombia's large size, relative to some smaller countries in Central American 
and the Caribbean, attracted illicit entrepreneurs for two reasons: the larger the territory, the 
easier it is to avoid detection; and because bribery of local officials, often an integral part of 
illegal enterprise, is cheaper and less risky.  
Colombian capitalism has always operated on the expectation of very high, short-term 
profits, with an entrepreneurial class based on production-speculation. That is, who invested 
little in long-term capital equipment, focused its activities on trade, expected a quick turnover 
and high, short-term profits.24 In the 19th century, several economic booms combined with 
substantial obstacles to internal transportation produced extremely segmented markets with 
widely differentiated prices, which favored and fueled speculation. After World War II, as 
modernization and structural changes in the economy took place, some entrepreneurs began to 
invest into longer-term and more stable economic activities, but many continued to pursue their 
traditional rent-seeking path. During the 1970s, liberalization of the capital market under the 
Pastrana administration (1970–74), strengthened by the López goverment (1974–78), and the 
coffee boom (1975–78) reinforced the production – speculation mentality. Capital market 
liberalization led to financial speculations, high short-term returns, and a series of major 
bankruptcies in the 1980s. The coffee boom provided both very high profits and the expectation 
of high gains.  
Last, but not least, important factor had been a large legal and illegal Colombian 
migration to the United States. Emigrant groups in major urban areas provided an excellent 
base from which to recruit and organize illegal exports distribution network. The large 
emigration from Colombia preceded that from the other Andean countries, contributing to the 
Colombian headstart and providing another comparative advantage.  
In summary, the combination of these factors gave Colombia, and those of its citizens 
engaged in illicit drug traffickig, an overall advantage in the manufacture and international 
distribution of narcotics, most importantly cocaine. The widespread use and acceptance of 
violence in Colombian society notionally provided drug traffickers with effective tactics to deal 
with opponents and they were indeed unusually quick to use force in eliminating competitors 
in this trade, which enabled them early on to control the purchase of the raw material as well as 
the channels for distribution of the final products in the United States.  
1.3. The Illicit Drug Industry and Its Entrepreneurs 
 The increase in cultivation and drug production during the 1980s can be to some extent 
attributed to the historical weakness of the states in the Andean region, which often failed in 
their atempts to stop illegal activity and the quality of life declined as drug traffickers 
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established themselves in the rural society. The Colombian experience shows how the remote 
and increasingly ineffective government has been unable to deal with spiraling poverty and 
crime and how it failed to integrate the lower classes in the countryside into society. During 
this period almost half of the Colombians lived in poverty and most of rural areas did not have 
adequate schools or medical facilities.25 Unsuccessful land reforms in Colombia, Peru and 
Bolivia prevented improvements in the rural economy and thwarted further development. 
Structural adjustment programs initiated in the 1980s to reduce debt only exacerbating the 
problem of rural poverty. After the oil crisis of the 1970s, the cuts in social spending were 
severe, which negatively impacted on the rural and urban poor. Budget cuts occurred mainly in 
social welfare, basic foods subsidies and other essential commodities and services.26 Drug 
traffickers managed to take advantage of these actions and manipulate outcomes to their benefit. 
Drug traffickers established a foothold as informal and illegal activities flourished while the 
rural economy deteriorated. Hyperinflation, unemployment and declining living standards, and 
unemployment forced many to seek alternative ways of earning an income. Most people then 
became involved with the informal economy, legal or illegal. Drug traffickers offered easy 
money to alleviate the effects of declining living standards in several ways. First, earnings from 
the drug trade were paid in U.S. dollars and were not subject to the hyperinflation afflicting  
local currencies.27 Secondly, the drug trafficking was a booming industry with the demand for 
marijuana and cocaine growing to the point that by 1987 cocaine exports were equivalent to 10 
– 20% of Colombia’s legal exports, 25 – 30% of Peru’s, and 50 – 100% of Bolivia’s.28 Many 
people were either coerced into compliance or they were simply offered employment as drug 
traffickers were able to provide much desired source of income. In the countryside, participation 
in the drug trade became more attractive alternative to the formal economy, which could not 
provide adequate income. Economic underdevelopment enhanced the rationality of narcotics 
trafficking, which had a softening effect alleviating the effects of extreme poverty in rural areas 
caused by the spiraling national debt and deteriorating standards of living.  
Economic incentives aside, drug trafficking has also been successful because of the 
states’ inability to effectively enforce the rule of law. Rural bandits, guerrillas and smuggling 
have all existed in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru for decades, yet these states could not eliminate 
the social conditions that enabled crime, or control the influence of organized criminal activity. 
In 1980s, guerrilla groups became inherent features of these countries. In Colombia, FARC and 
14 M-19 increased their anti-govemment operations.29 In Peru, Sendero Luminoso grew in 
strength in the 1980s until an all-out war was declared by President Fernando Belaunde.30 In 
both countries, the battling military and guerrilla groups turned the countryside into a warzone. 
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In these areas of prevalent poverty and crime the possibility of the state losing total control was 
inevitable. During the 1980s, the drug traffickers filled the void left by the state and established 
an extensive group of coca growers and producers. Poverty in rural areas provided traffickers 
with the opportunity for a deal of convenience with segments of the peasantry, while the weak 
law enforcement allowed the traffickers to become entrenched in the local economy.  
Stronger position in the countryside allowed the drug traffickers to increase the scope 
of production and distribution of cocaine. Economic problems in the 1980s pushed legal 
industries to layoff workers, in these people the drug trade later found a pool of loyal and eager 
workers who were willing to grow coca. For instance, in Bolivia some of the displaced miners 
in the late 1970s left for the Chapare region, where the number of settlers increased by 40,000.31 
Many of the newly arrived settlers became involved in the informal economy, more hectares of 
land were devoted to coca and marijuana cultivation, which resulted in more coca leaves 
available for refining. Similar scenario took place in Peru. Growth in coca-leaf production 
lowered the price of street cocaine thus making it affordable to more people. Increase in sales 
stimulated demand for coca leaves and the cycle continued for years, generating larger profits 
than the formal economy. Growing demand for coca leaves would stimulate further 
economically motivated immigration until the number of settlers in the Chapare region reached 
200,000 by 1987.32  
With coca leaf yields growing, the price of street cocaine decreased with positive 
consequences for the drug trafficking. Cocaine consumption remained low until the 1970s when 
freebasing cocaine became popular. Freebasing consists of separating hydrochloride from the 
cocaine and then dissolving the cocaine in a solvent like ether, in which the cocaine was 
crystallized. Due to its lower melting point the free base cocaine can be smoked giving the user 
a faster and more potent intoxication.33 Even then the practice remained limited to a small 
percentage of the general population and subsequent profits were not even close to the profits 
of the early and mid 1980s. Nevertheless, freebasing showed that a viable market existed in the 
U.S. for cocaine as the number of freebasers reached about 4 million by the end of 1970s.34 Still 
the cost held demand low and crisis occurred as it failed to reap huge dividends.  
Development of crack cocaine combined with decrease in the street prices had almost 
immediate impact on the market. Crack offered both advantages of easily manufactured and 
strongly addictive product and potential for high revenues. As more coca leaves were available 
for processing cocaine prices dropped, which allowed for access to a larger market. By 1988 
prices for a kilo of cocaine decreased from $47,000 to $70,000 to a range of $11,000 to 
$34,000.35 Another positive feature was the relative simplicity of crack production. Crack could 
be made virtually in any place with access to boiling water, cocaine, an additive such as 
Novocain, baking soda and ice water. Furthermore, refining could be outsourced, which would 
also make any attempts at detection and disruption more difficult. Instead of creating the final 
product in South America small amounts of raw cocaine hydrochloride could be smuggled into 
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a country and distributed to thousands of smaller laboratories. This innovation transformed the 
illicit drug industry because shipping of smaller quantities to larger number of cells for cocaine 
processing decreased the amount of losses in the event of an arrest and at the same time it 
expanded the distribution network over a wider area.  
In the 1980s hardly any commodity could compete with profits from cocaine sales, 
particularly crack, which broke down high quality cocaine into smaller amounts and could be 
sold at a price from $2 to $5. Now, 4 ounces of street cocaine could serve over 1,000 crack 
users.36 Low prices made crack accessible to all segments of society, it crossed economic 
barriers and became available to anyone. Given the highly addictive nature of crack, there was 
a solid prospect for high volume sales. Eventually, it became available almost everywhere, it 
appeared first in Los Angeles and New York and then found its way through smaller cities and 
towns to inner city neighborhoods. The combination of availability, low price and high profit 
margin helped make crack cocaine more lucrative commodity than ever. 
Now the drug traffickers had a profitable commodity for sale and lucrative markets 
available, but they needed a network to provide the critically important link between producers 
and consumers. Colombian smugglers demonstrated the necessary wits and talents in 
undertaking that task. Historically, Colombian traffickers supplied narcotics to organizations 
like Cosa Nostra or Cuban and Mexican gangs.37 In the 1980s, the profitability of cocaine  
motivated Colombian traffickers to branch out and set up their own smuggling and distribution 
networks.38 In the end they managed to gain access to all corners of the globe and have also 
been able to spread drug trafficking responsibilities to local groups and organizations.  
Colombian smugglers‘ capabilities later expanded with the increase in demand. 
Trafficking originally began on a limited scale, with individual smugglers moving small 
amounts of cocaine into the United States. But the larger demand for cocaine forced a 
development of smuggling methods. The Colombian trafficking enterprises began as a way to 
consolidate transportation of cocaine. They established an insurance system that used different 
forms of transport to deliver cocaine. Pablo Escobar pioneered the insurance system in the 
Colombian town of Medellín. Suppliers would pay a premium of some 10% of the U.S. 
wholesale cocaine price; if a dealer’s shipment was seized, Escobar would replace it at the 
purchase price of cocaine in Colombia.39 Chance of seizure was around 10%, which resulted in 
enormous profits from cocaine smuggling for Escobar and his fellow traffickers.40  
Taking advantage of Colombia’s geographical significance, its traffickers were able to 
create international smuggling networks through bribery and extortion. The weakness of the 
Colombian government and its law enforcement was easily exploited through intimidation and 
bribery and the power of traffickers expanded rapidly. Illicit entrepreneurs like Escobar would 
bribe law enforcement officers, judges, politicians, bankers, the military, in other words anyone 
who could intervene in their profitable trade. Throughout the 1980s illicit smuggling grew 
substantially and through astronomical revenues drug lords were able to influence those in 
positions of authority and secure their own powers and influence. Massive corruption and 
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money laundering became integral to the business operation. Violent enforcement became 
commonplace by the mid-1980s as death squads were hired to protect the interests of drug 
traffickers. Groups like the right-wing Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS) protected drug dealers 
from local guerrilla groups and eliminated those who stood in their way.41 For those who 
refused bribes, the punishment was severe. The most common retribution was murdering the 
individual or his family members and friends. The murder of presidential candidate Senator 
Luis Carlos Galan in 1989 served as a notice to all those who opposed the drug traffickers. 
Galan had been the leading candidate in the 1990 presidential polls and called for tougher 
sanctions on drug traffickers.42 His murder was a clear message to others who might attempt to 
intend to supress the drug trade.  
The vast profits of drug trafficking had to be laundered and legitimized to ensure there 
would be resources available to maintain the smuggling enterprise, to bribe officials and to 
show to the rural poor the economic benefit of growing coca. The economic uncertainty 
impacting Latin America during the debt crisis of the early 1980s created conditions that 
allowed money-laundering to become so prevalent. When Mexico defaulted on its foreign loan 
payments in August 1982, foreign investment in the region terminated immediately.43 Many 
other governments were also caught between paying debt obligations and facing declining 
export earnings. To cover interest rate payments, countries had to pay the equivalent of over 
5% of their GDP.44 This economic hardship also affected private institutions such as banks and 
other corporations in Latin America. As hyperinflation set in, numerous private institutions 
desired an influx of liquid assets the drug traffickers were ready to provide. In Colombia illicit 
trafficking profits were often diverted into a professional soccer teams and political parties.45 
The easy cash drug traffickers provided was often accepted without any questions because 
companies were desperate for any source of investment regardless of its origin. Since 
investments usually came in American dollar, they were even more popular because it was more 
stable than any of the Latin American currencies. However money-laundering had not been 
limited to South American countries. Estimates mentoned that as many as two dozen banks in 
the Miami were suspected of involvement with laundering drug profits during the 1980s.46 The 
relative stability of the American banking system, their substantial resources and Miami’s Latin 
American presence were all sources of South Florida’s attraction for ilegitimate banking. Miami 
alone received some $5-6 billion in flight capital in 1982 from various Latin American countries 
escaping the regional economic uncertainty initiated by Mexico's declaration of bankruptcy.47 
As businesses and governments directed their investments to Miami, the banking industry 
willingly accommodated these large inflows of cash without any reservations. 
The so-called Medellín and Cali drug trafficking organizations became widely 
recognized entities in public perception due to high profile of their activities in the 1980s and 
attention paid to them by mass media, law enforcement and national governments across the 
U.S. and Americas throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The term cartel became the popular 
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public label despite the fact that the organization had limited capability to dictate cocaine prices. 
Semantic inconsistencies aside, the Medellín and Cali-based traffickers in illicit narcotics were 
the founding fathers of the modern day illicit drug industry in the Americas. The Medellín and 
Cali kingpins ended up overseeing an extensive international network of cocaine refinement, 
production, transportation, wholesale distribution, and money laundering operations.  
In the late 1960s, when the marihuana generation in the U.S. discovered cocaine, 
Mexican drug trafficking organizations were unable to satisfy the new demand because they 
lacked connection to the coca growers in Bolivia and Peru strong enough to establish necessary 
logistics. Thus, from the mid-1970s until the early 1990s, Mexicans with their unique position 
in the neighborhood of the largest world market and highest demand for narcotics had to bow 
before Colombian traffickers headed by Pablo Escobar in Medellín and the Rodriguez brothers 
in Cali. 
By the mid-1990s Mexican drug traffickers were back in the position of dominant 
suppliers to the U.S. market controlling the flow of both marijuana and cocaine into the country. 
Moreover, their former bosses in Colombia were either dead or in jail, which enabled Mexicans 
to strengthen their position on the supply side of the business, too. By the mid-1990s Mexicans 
were on top of the drug industry in the Americas controlling import, distribution and sales in 















                                                          





2. THE COMMODITY, THE ENTERPRISE AND THE BUSINESS MODEL 
 
2.1. Structure and Process of Cocaine Trafficking 
The structure of cocaine’s life cycle is fairly simple. At the beginning there is coca 
cultivation and refining; smuggling and distribution brings cocaine to the consumer; 
consumption and profit laundering are the final components of the cycle.  
Cultivation 
Cocaine hydrochloride begins its journey to millions of consumers around the globe at 
the foothills of the Andes, where the home of the coca plant can be found in extensive 
cultivation areas extending over parts of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and Bolivia. The plant 
is exklusive to that part of the world, giving the Andean countries a monopoly on supply. The 
Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru is the geographic center of coca production. 
Growing coca plants is a labor intensive process that requires a large amount of people. 
Aside from the elementary fanning jobs, coca cultivation needs individuals to protect the fields, 
prevent detection, ship coca leaves to refineries and manage the whole operation. Coca growers 
recruit from among the poor rural population. Hardly any members of the lowest level of the 
drug regime move beyond fanner to the higher, well-paid levels in the smuggling networks. 
Despite the vital role in the initial stages of cocaine production, few profits trickle down to the 
farmers in the Andean rural areas. 
Compared to some other natural commodities such as oil, coca production has not been 
able to spur regional development or improve economic status of indigenous population. The 
Huallaga Valley remains very poor, despite millions of USD beeing earned from the area's 
crops. Similarly, cocaine production has little effect on the overall GDP of these countries. The 
portion of the narcodollars returning to Peru and Bolivia is too small for this money to create 
spin-off effects in the economy. Some estimates suggest that for every USD earned in the drug 
trade, 10 to 20 cents return to wholesalers and traffickers in transit countries, about 1 cent 
returns to coca growers in the Andes.49 In comparison to oil production, the regional economic 
presence is minimal. Among the Persian Gulf countries, oil profits represent substantial part of 
the national income. Instead, revenue from the cocaine trafficking is generated through the 
smuggling, distribution and sales of the commodity, not the initial stages of product 
development. In those later stages value is added and prices increase. Once laundered through 
legal enterprises the majority of revenues stays in the hands of the few top level traffickers. 
Regardless of the profit sharing scheme, traffickers are able to exploit existing poverty in the 
countryside, keeping operational costs low. 
Refining 
As for industrial production, the manufacturing process of cocaine hydrochloride, or 
C17H21NO4, is not capital-intensive and uses a very simple technology. Among the many 
varieties on the coca plant the alkaloid content of the leaves varies significantly, with the 
Bolivian and Peruvian type yielding a substantially greater amount of cocaine than the rest. In 
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order to release the alkaloid content, the coca leaves are placed in a plastic bag and mixed with 
sodium carbonate. The mix is then transferred to a container together with gasoline and sulfuric 
acid dissolved in the water. Some 12 hours later, the coca paste is obtained by pressing the 
contents of the container. This paste is later converted into coca base through a process that 
involving ammonia, potassium permanganate and some filters to remove impurities. Chloridic 
acid, ether and acetone are then applied to the base in a process that requires only some 
processing to transform it into cocaine. In terms of necessary workforce, chemists are one group 
of the skilled freelancers necessary in the refining process. There is also some unskilled labor 
to provide most of the assistance in mixing coca leaves with chemicals, unpacking bundles of 
leaves and packaging cocaine hydrchloride. 
The coca plant cultivation is highly responsive to such factors as location and climate. 
Due to the bulk and volume of coca leaves in their natural state it is beneficial to process them 
into paste as close to the source as possible. Once the paste is obtained, it is easy to transport 
and can be then manufactured into cocaine anywhere. In consequence, the manufacturing stage 
takes on the characteristics of a footloose industry not tied to any particular location. Refining 
is the first value-added stage where the price of the commodity rises considerably. 
Colombia is the largest producer of the world's cocaine. Historically, the Colombian 
traffickers have been successful in bribing state and law enforcement officials to prevent 
interference from the government in executing their illicit entrepreneurial activities. The 
refineries vary from small scale operations to large ones. These laboratories are generally 
located in the remote rain forest areas and eastern lowlands of Colombia and supplied by coca 
from Peru and Bolivia through the dense forest or by small aircraft. Installation of US-built 
radar systems at Leticia and Araracuara in Colombia, Lago in Ecuador, and Yurimaguas in Peru 
later motivated traffickers to increase in-country procurement of intermediate cocaine 
products.50 Shortening supply lines and widening the range of refineries consequently reduced 
the risk of detection and cost of transporting leaves to the refineries. Besided reorganizing the 
refinery structure, traffickers responded to law enforcement’s attempts to reduce purchase of 
essential chemicals by substituting alcohol for gasoline, which actually increased the extraction 
rate of cocaine base. They also intorduced a recycling program that re-uses chemicals and 
reduces waste. At this point, when the raw material is transformed into a nearly finished 
product, the drug traffickers force the price of cocaine upwards to compensate for potential 
losses.  
Smuggling, Distribution and Consumption 
The most critical link in the drug smuggling enterprise is the ability of traffickers to 
deliver their product to the consumer. At his stage the highest value is added to cocaine's price. 
The cost of smuggling and corrupting state and law enforcement officials is transferred over 
into the cost of the good, making cocaine extremely valuable. Many networks operating today 
are a legacy of the 1980s cocaine boom. The explosion in coca demand stimulated re-
organization of trafficking and distribution networks. In the early days, cocaine used to be 
smuggled in smaller quantities into transit and destination countries often by individuals or 
small-scale transport.51 With the steep rise in demand, aircrafts and other large capacity vehicles 
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capable of carrying hundreds of kilograms of cocaine at once became the standard mode of 
transport. Nowadays, smugglers use diversity of creative, flexible and relatively safe methods 
to avoid detection. Illicit trafficking requires the coordination of various related activities, such 
as land, air and sea transport; aircraft use and maintenance; cargo loading, unloading and 
storage; delivery of bribes to appropriate government and law enforcement officials in transit 
countries and lately also intensive collaboration with trafficking organizations in transit 
countries.  
The inflow of narcotics in the Americas moves from the South to the North, passing 
through Central America, or the Caribbean, into the U.S. and other end-user countries. In 
contrast, the organization of smuggling networks is not defined by proximity to the consumer 
markets. Instead, there is strong preference for areas with minimal detection and disruption 
risks. New Orleans, for instance, is an important port of entry into the U.S. market despite its 
very limited market share. Quite often Mexican traffickers transport cocaine into the United 
States through a large variety of methods ranging from individual carriers to trucking and 
aircraft delivery. Particularly in land-based commercial trucking they are able to exploit the 
high volume of traffic across the border and use it to their advantage in avoiding detection. The 
sheer number of both vehicles and individuals crossing the border on daily basis make it 
impossible to thoroughly search everyone and everything. During the 1980s, Central America 
became a major drug transit route. Officials had been generously paid and bribed, many actively 
participated in the trade. In times of General Noriega virtually the whole of Panama became 
complicit.  
Experience shows there are no shortages in smuggling destinations or methods. Drugs 
sent through the Caribbean usually travel on smaller speed boats, sometimes even on semi-
submersibles and submarines.52 The smaller faster drug-cargo carrying vessels leave the 
northern coast of Colombia, keeping close to the Venezuelan coastline, heading to the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti or Puerto Rico, or other islands until they reach the United States. 
One important advantage speed boats offer is to travel along the island chain and to blend in 
with other vessels, minimizing the chance for detection. Given its geographical proximity to 
the United States, Cuba has been an important spot in the Caribbean for traffickers. In the 1980s, 
the business ties between the Medellín drug bosses and high ranking officials in the Cuban 
government developed to the point where narcotics were smuggled through the island to the 
United States.53 Cuba remains important today by providing fuel for boats, landing strips for 
aircraft and accommodations for smugglers. Once they pass through the Caribbean, narcotics 
arrive to Miami or New York City, from here they are sent to distribution centers in major 
metropolitan centers across the U.S. and Canada.  
In contrast, narcotics sent through Central America rely mostly on land and air transport. 
Often times aircrafts drop bales of partially processed cocaine in southern Mexico, which are 
retireved by local traffickers and prepared for further land transport. Most of narcotics enter the 
United States in trucks, or other private vehicles, at major ports such as San Diego, California, 
or El Paso, Texas. Cocaine destined for European markets is usually sent on freighter ships in 
large containers hidden among other legal cargo. Proper screening of maritime containers for 
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illicit cargo is a time-consuming process, which is another factor contributing to successes of 
this transporation method. On the other hand, the larger distance to Europe and smaller market 
share make it less attractive for the drug traffickers since they cannot exercise as much control 
over smuggling and distribution operations. Moreover, Colombians are less eager to engage in 
trafficking across Europe because of difficulties they face cracking the domestic markets, they 
are also easier targets for European law enforcement agencies. In response to challenges in their 
operational environment the traffickers have formed strategic alliances with Italian criminal 
groups to distribute cocaine across Europe.54 
Once delivered to the United States territory, cocaine is sent to major metropolitan 
centers for further distribution. Usually, within each city there are a number of distribution cells 
that operate as networks. The distribution cells are coordinated by managers either in Colombia 
or Mexico who issue sales coordinating orders and ensure profits are handled properly. Major 
bulk cocaine distribution centers in the United States include southern California, Los Angeles 
and San Diego, southern Florida, primarily Miami, Phoenix, Arizona, southern Texas and New 
York City. From the main distribution cells in these large cities, narcotics move to lower level 
distribution groups in the U.S. and Canada. In the end, cocaine reaches its consumer after 
passing through the chain of local distribution points. Street gangs in particular have been 
effective in spreading cocaine across the country and making it available to consumers. In the 
United States, locally operating Cuban, Dominican, Haitian, Jamaican, Mexican and Puerto 
Rican gangs and criminal groups controlled cocaine and crack sales at the retail level.55  
Financing 
The profits from the drugs sales are collected by cell managers from corresponding cities 
and towns and consolidated for direct transfer to Mexico or Colombia or other laundering 
sites.56 Money laundering is the critical nexus between the financier, the seller and the market. 
This role has been filled by banks, particularly in Miami and Latin America. Banks can blur the 
boundaries between the legitimate and illegitimate businesses by creating substantial gray areas 
in the economy. While sales are often in US dollars, the money is usually converted to another 
currency because the American and Canadian governments have cracked down on money  
laundering. In practice it is a complex financial process involving numerous corporations, 
banks, and individuals. Cash from cocaine sales re-enters Colombia and Mexico through 
various channels. Law enforcement agencies have responded by imposing high tariffs on 
American money entering Colombia to diminish the availability of US dollars. In turn, 
traffickers ordered American dollars into Venezuela, exchanging them for Venezuelan bolivars, 
then smuggling the cash into Colombia.57 Money orders, drafts and other negotiable securities 
are among many other ways of laundering the profits. Houses have been purchased with bags 
of cash and casinos have been used to launder profits. With the technological advancement of 
internet access, traffickers have been able to layer their deposits across a number of different 
countries, in several financial institutions, masking the origin and final destination for sums 
transferred. For large scale international money laundering, more complex and detailed 
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processes are required. Front companies often have vital importance in the schemes. Falsified 
export documentation, lading bills, or invoices for goods shipped out of Colombia and to the 
United States are used to justify large payments sent to Mexico and Colombia. Price of gold, 
emeralds and other precious stones in general are difficult to estimate accurately and therefore 
lend themselves to invoice manipulation.  
Large scale laundering operations involving millions of US dollars require the 
cooperation, or rather co-optation, of lawyers, bankers, businesses and even politicians. 
Sophisticated money laundering schemes draw in a number of legitimate individuals and 
companies since profits from narcotics sales can be channeled through businesses unknowingly. 
However, compliance has been prevalent because the skilled ad hoc labor, such as lawyers, 
bankers, accountants, gains generous compensation for collaboration. Since profits laundering 
is indispensable for traffickers, they are generally willing to offer large bribes. Without financial 
liquidity the illicit enterprise would lack resources to conduct its daily operations, every step 
from compensating agricultural workers to hired legal counsels and bribed officials.  
Enforcement 
Drug trafficking enterprise follows the laws of supply and demand just like any other 
profit seeking business. Illicit nature of the merchandise means that standard regulatory 
measures are unavailable and enterprises need to provide for themselves. Enforcement is 
therefore present at every stage of the drug trade, from a street dealer to a kingpin.  
Over the few decades, different styles of enforcement. The Medellin drug traffickers in 
the 1980s attacked Colombian political institutions and its political elite. The government 
supressive campaign after the assassination of Liberal leader Luis Carlos Galan spurred an 
absolute war. Pablo Escobar pioneered the tactic of indiscriminate terror attacks against the 
Colombian state and the society in general. Besides execution-style assassinations and 
excessive brutality bombing became widespread with car bombs killing hundreds of people 
during the most turbulent phase of his war against the Colombian state between 1989 and 1993. 
The objective here was to cripple the state and people to the point where they would reduce 
supression efforts. In contrast, the Cali-based traffickers persecuted non-state actors who 
threatened their interests. Bribery has been the preferred method of persuasion. Mexican 
traffickers demonstrated willingness and ability to resort to any tactic that will bring the 
desirable result, be it corruption of brutal sadistic violence.  
Unlike most organizations, drug traffickers’ actions affect national and often even 
international politics. Operating outside the legal Framework exposes drug traffickers to 
persecution from countless actors associated with the state. Both institutions and individuals 
posing a threat to drug trafficking become subjects to enforcement even though they are not 
formally participanting in drug trafficking. This includes, but is not limited to, politicians, 
judges, the judicial system in general, customs officials, military officers and others in similar 
positions of authority. The drug trafficking enterprises therefore extend their influence beyond 
cocaine production and sales. Ocassionally, enforcement reaches to the public when it is 
necessary to protect illicit businesses and their interests. Although enforcement plays integral 
role in drug trafficking operations, the ideal state of affairs would be de-regulation of law 





The Role of Trafficking Enterprises 
It would be difficult to argue that drug trafficking constitutes an explicit regime, but 
there is an organizational structure that has been previously unaknowledged. The leadership 
role has been played by the Colombian and later Mexican trafficking organizations, which have 
been successful in forging alliances between trafficking groups. At the same time, it would be 
false to assume that the control exercised by the top level drug lords extends all the way down 
the chain of drug trafficking. The illicit enterprise monitors key aspects of production, 
smuggling into markets and profits laundering, in other words, the most lucrative parts of the 
drug trade. However, as cocaine goes deeper into the distribution network, the connection with 
the drug lords is lost. The cellular distribution network is designed to prevent law enforcement 
from tracing back up the chain to the upper echelons. For the trafficking enterprise, it is far 
more important to control supply and finances than micro-management. Control over these 
components has let them keep economic control over the trade and power is centralized in their 
hands. Competition is prevalent among different groups in drug trafficking and the top tier drug 
lords are able to use their extensive resources to their advantage. Abundant financial resources 
let the Colombian and Mexican traffickers coerce other actors into submission or compliance. 
They have the means and the power to force other groups under their leadership. As cocaine 
proceeds through the trafficking chain, the influence of the leadership diminishes. However, 
the laws of the market influenced by the top tier drug lords‘ control over price and supply 
determines the actions of lower level traffickers. 
Politics of Cocaine 
Political ambitions have been used to wield power, secure business deals and gain 
preferential treatment. In Colombia, Pablo Escobar and his associates used politics as a tactic 
to further unify their drug trafficking operations. In a rare example of direct political 
involvement, in June 1992 Escobar was elected as an alternate deputy to the Colombian 
Congress from the parliamentary list of Jairo Ortega Ramirez. During his tenure, Escobar 
sponsored civic programs including donations of several hundred new housing units to 
economically disadvantaged and construction of numerous illuminated sporting facilities in 
Medellín. With the exception of Pablo Escobar, Colombian traffickers have used their vast 
reserves of funds to support candidacies of various officials rather than running for office 
themselves. The presidency of Emesto Samper, for instance, had been tainted by rumours that 
the campaign was in part funded by drug traffickers. Cali drug money was allegedly channeled 
through Samper’s Partido Liberal.58 Colombian drug lords eventually extended their reach 
throughout the Caribbean. Lynden Pindling, the Prime Minister of the Bahamas in the 1980s, 
was found guilty of colluding with Colombian traffickers.59 Similarly, partnership with General 
Noriega and high ranking government officials in Cuba corrupted these governments and gave 
the traffickers a chance to consolidate smuggling networks.60 Since the Colombian and then 
Mexican traffickers have been able to promote and foster institutional corruption, they have 
                                                          
58 “Cali Drug Leader Caught, Making It 6 Now In Jail,” New York Times, August 7, 1995. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/07/world/cali-drug-leader-caught-making-it-6-now-in-jail.html. 
59 “Bahamas Leader Tied To Drug Bribe,“ New York Times, January 14, 1988, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/14/us/bahamas-leader-tied-to-drug-bribe.html. 
60 Larry Rohter, “Former Smuggler Ties Top Officials Of Cuba and Nicaragua to Drug Ring,“ New York Times, 





been able to attract other constituent parts of the drug trafficking process because they can 
guarantee a profitable return. However, these particular examples of high level political bribery 
and corruption are not the preferred methods of trafficker's political involvement. In contrast, 
low-level bribes, attacking political institutions and leaders are typical forms of the trafficker's 
activities. In drug trafficking cases brought to the courts of the mid-1980s, judges were offered 
the choice between bribe, if they set aside the charges filled against traffickers and their 
associates, or death, if they convict. In Colombia, the term used for this tactic is plata o plomo, 
silver or lead. This simple but effective method rendered the justice system practically useless 
since only few judges, facing such dilemma, chose to convict defendants. This practice remains 
unchanged to date across the Americas. Furthermore, political leaders have been targeted for 
assassination, which decreased the government's initiative to crack down on the drug trade. 
Essentially, the top tier traffickers have infiltrated and corrupted Colombian and Mexican 
political machinery. In doing so, they have been successful in bending the rules to their favor, 
winning concessions from governments and they are able to act relatively independent from the 
rule of law. In his time, Pablo Escobar successfully coerced Colombian Supreme Court justices 
who in turn nullified the extradition treaty with the United States.61 By creating a relative safe 
haven in Colombia, the traficking chiefs have been able to exercise control over other parts of 
the drug trade. This has let the Colombian drug lords operate freely within their own country 
as they exercised a great deal of power and maintained loyal followers. 
A part from fighting governments, traffickers have also fought the left in Latin America. 
In Peru and Colombia, drug traffickers fought with local guerrilla groups in rural regions. 
Smugglers formed alliances with landowners, the military and other regional power groups to 
assist in the supression of left-wing guerrilla groups.62 Cooperation based on shared priorities 
with the military or traditional elite are favored when they benefit traffickers. They usually 
employ a strongly pragmatic approach to business, which opens up a number of possible actions 
from bribery to murder, considering the illegality of the trade. Despite the fact this kind of 
cooperation is usually temporary, it is indicative of the collusion that extends beyond the 
division of the legal and illegal realm of business. Drug traffickers can and are willing  to 
operate with legitimate groups in society against a common enemy. Particularly during the latter 
stages of the Cold War, the drug traffickers contributed to the U.S. foreign policy of 
containment by attacking guerrilla movements at their roots. 
On the international level, the Colombian drug trafficking enterprises have been willing 
to outsource various components of the drug trade to external specialists. In the mid-1990s, 
Mexican traffickers, for instance, have taken the mission of smuggling product into the United 
States as Cali smuggling routes had been hit by law enforcement efforts and intensified 
surveillance. Similarly, the drug chiefs negotiated agreements with other illicit enterprises and 
criminal groups to ensure the continued viability of the cocaine trade. The Colombian and 
Mexican entrepreneurs still maintain a virtual monopoly over the world‘s cocaine supply 
because they have been able to reach agreements with regional groups.  
2.2. Illicit Entrepreneurs  
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Description and analyses of drug trafficking enterprises will develop along a few main 
lines. The basic and to some extent the most important element of an enterprise is the 
entrepreneur who represents the will and the intent behind the business operations. Therefore, 
the first part of this section will focus on the most famous captains of the illicit drug business 
in the recent decades. There short biographies will provide basis for an analysis focusing on 
association and networking in illicit businesses, in other words, on the process when a group of 
entrepreneurs comes together to create a larger scale enterprise on international level and to 
conduct all necessary business-related activities such as production, transportation, distribution 
and profits laundering.  
Exploitable ties and illicit networking 
Despite the dependent variable of invididual talents skills, ambitions, there is also a 
systemic variable of exploitable ties, which plays a vital role in formation and development of 
illicit enterprise. As a path to better understanding of the phenomena commonly designated as 
organized crime Klaus von Lampe proposed the concept of criminally exploitable ties.63 
Despite the focus on organized crime and criminal ties, many aspects of this concept offer 
broader applicability, which can be applied to a more general level of illicit association.  
Von Lampe’s approach takes the relations between actors as a fixed point of reference. 
Regardless of whether the debate centers on certain activities, such as drug trafficking or 
money-laundering, on certain collectivities, such as cartels, or on systemic conditions, such as 
corruptive alliances of businessmen, politicians and public officials, in every instance the 
participants are connected through criminally exploitable ties, which in turn combine to form 
illicit networks.   
The network approach to the analysis of illicit activities is not new, it has been used by 
law enforcement organizations as an investigative tool, and also by many scholarly analyses as 
a means to overcome the shortcomings of traditionl organization theory with regard to the fluid 
character of illicit microstructures. The relevance of the network perspective will be discussed 
within three basic contextual levels: the level of individual illicit networks, the level of illegal 
monopolies, and the level of intersection between licit and illicit structures. 
The elementary unit of both licit and illicit cooperation is the exploitable tie linking two 
actors. Using the term exploitable emphasizes that in the debate the focus is not exclusively on 
manifest structures, but also on latent ones, which are activated only sporadically when 
opportunities arise. In order for a link between actors to be exploitable, it needs to show two 
main characteristics: corresponding ilegal dispositions and a common basis of trust. 
The first prerequisite of collaboration between actors is their willingness to engage in 
the same type of illegal behavior, be it smuggling of contraband, investment fraud or any other 
illicit enterprise. The question where these dispositions originate continues to be a matter of 
general criminological investigation. In a simplified terms, actors need to share their illicit 
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interests and preferences for them to cooperate, drug traffickers and bank robbers might not be 
gravitating towards each other as much as drug traffickers and money-launderers.  
Simple intersection between illicit interests and preferences is unlikely to provide 
sufficient basis for completion of an endeavor, a more common basis of trust is needed among 
the actors involved. This assumption stems from the general notion that social interaction tends 
to be embedded in social relations.64 Trust is needed to minimize risks inherently present in 
illicit interaction. Among them the possibility that one of the parties involved might be a covert 
police informant, or personal negligence resulting in violation of illicit agreement upon which 
the endeavor depends. Trust plays even larger role considering that illicit entrepreneurs cannot 
submit a complaint related to breach of contract to legal courts. 
Necessary basis of trust can be found in bonding relationships, such as family affiliation, 
childhood friendships or prison acquaintances, but also in the armed forces or intelligence 
services.65 The aspect of individual affections in such relationships aside, there is a high degree 
of behavioral predictability as a result of the long-term testing of personal characteristics. 
Nevertheless, such a bond between actors does not have to be a direct one, connection can be 
through an intermediary who maintains a bonding relationship with other actors individually.66  
Actor’s past conduct, or his existing affiliations, can stimulate generalized expectations, 
which might provide a common basis of trust. This trust based on recommendation, reputation 
or previous accomplishments in certain fields, can be observed in recruitment of younger 
members into illicit enterprises or in vetting of potential business partners.67 Still, in every step 
of such process considerations about correlation between degree of inherent risks in illegal 
interaction and the strengh of existing bonds would play a vital role. Ideally, extremely risky 
interactions will be based on trust that has been built over time. Considering usually shorter 
time horizons of illicit interactions and substantial risk of damage resulting from failure of a 
continuous illicit cooperation, pre-existing bonds and ties are likely to be preferred whenever 
available.  
Trust, as desired basis for cooperation, might not always be available in establishing an 
illicit enterprise and alternative guarantees might be pursued, such as promise of material gains 
or threats regarding use of violence. Peter Reuter argued this might be the case, but only at a 
high cost not incurred by positive non-economic ties.68  
In summary, for an individual actor his portfolio of criminally expolitable ties represents 
the social space in which illicit cooperation is objectively and subjectively a viable option. 
Actor’s action scope then depends on prexisting bonds of trust rather than cooperation 
purposefully developer through the use of violence or financial rewards. 
                                                          
64 Mark Granovetter, “Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis,” Acta 
Sociologica 35, no. 1 (1992). 
65 Peter A. Lupsha, ”Networks versus Networking: Analysis of an Organized Crime Group,” in Career 
Criminals, ed. Gordon P. Waldo (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 59–87. 
66 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1981), 83. 
67 Peter H. Reuter and John Haaga, The Organization of High-Level Drug Markets (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
1989), 45. 





Biographies of Colombian and Mexican illicit entrepreneurs provided below serve as 
evidence in support of the concept of criminally exploitable ties, and more generally the 
network approach to analysis, providing important leads to understand upon which basis the 
illicit traffickers built their smuggling enterprises.  
Captains of the illicit drug industry 
 Despite the strategic focus of this dissertation, further assessments require adoption of 
more operational outlook to provide necessary data, particularly to underline the importance of 
individual traffickers for creation and management of a larger illicit network. In the following 
pages the relevant biographical and professional histories of founding fathers of modern drug 
trafficking industry in Colombia and Mexico will be summarized, to demonstrate some key 
characteristics of successful illicit entrepreneurs. 
Colombia: Medellín  
The main actors in the Medellín-based illicit trafficking association became Pablo 
Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, and Carlos Lehder. It is important to 
emphasize that these individuals managed their trafficking enterprises, but often times worked 
together to pursue common economic and political interests.   
Probably the most famous drug trafficker in history, Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria, was 
born in 1949, in Rionegro, Antioquia, to a peasant father and a public school teacher. Because 
of La Violencia the family moved often throughout the 1950s and in 1961 it settled in 
government housing in Envigado, a town south of Medellín. Escobar finished high school and 
later attended the Universidad Autónoma where he took accounting classes but never 
graduated.69 In his early criminal years Pablo worked with his cousin, Gustavo Gaviria, mostly 
stealing cars and even reselling tombstones. Later he became involved in smuggling. The first 
organization Pablo went to work with was run by Don Alberto, later he became a gunman for 
Alfredo “El Padrino” Gómez López.70 Gómez López’s organization imported American 
cigarettes and appliances into Colombia, it also had connections among emerald smugglers in 
Bogotá, who exported to Mexican markets.71  
For Pablo Escobar it was the wealth of early smugglers that lured him into the business 
in spite of violence inherently present in this business. Working as a cargo escort and a gunman, 
he learned about the profitable drug trade, he became familiar with smuggling routes and he 
used violence for intimidation on daily basis. He also learned how to manage the underground 
economic structure for smuggling goods, to payoff customs officers, police and military, as well 
as the use of local politicians to transport illicit cargo through Colombian highways.72 
Competing for influence and profits, Pablo also learned how to intimidate his rivals. 
Smugglers gained favor of many in the Colombian society by bringing in affordable 
imported goods desired by all social circles, especially the middle class that could afford them.  
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Moreover, the ability to generate enormous profits, sufficient enough to bribe the authorities, 
provided smugglers with an aura of invincibility because they provided a service to top level 
clients. Authorities in their own part were willing to participate because smugglers provided 
them with alternate sources of income.  
Economic power and social recognition gave Colombian smugglers a unique status 
within the rigid class system in which they operated. They had the ability to create jobs and 
provide otherwise unavailable goods at acceptable prices while undermining the government’s 
import tariffs. Ultimately, making the profitability of their trade publicly visible, smugglers 
provided an avenue for upward mobility to many poor Colombians like Pablo Escobar himself. 
By the late 1970s, Pablo Escobar and his cousin Gustavo became fulltime cocaine 
traffickers and they developed a business strategy that involved procuring coca paste from Peru 
and Ecuador, refining it and then shipping it through some 20-30 routes to their distribution 
points in the United States.73 In 1977, Escobar was twenty eight years old, a millionaire and a 
rising star among Medellín’s drug traffickers.74 Escobar became wealthy at a young age, but 
his rise within the drug business circles was not accidental. He learned the illicit trade from 
trafficking pioneers Don Alberto and Alfredo Lopez Gomez, he took advantage of the 
ruthlessness he practiced as a professional hit man. He also developed important business 
contacts that allowed him to reach the U.S. markets, leveraging the high profit margin for 
trafficking cocaine. He took advantage of the ineffective law enforcement in Colombia and 
elsewhere. 
Jorge Luis, Juan David, and Fabio Ochoa were another prominent representatives of the 
Medellín-based illicit trafficking enterprise. Given the family’s economic status, they had more 
comfortable upbringing than that of Pablo Escobar. Some accounts suggest the Ochoa brothers 
were introduced into the trafficking business by their uncles, Hernando Restrepo Ochoa and 
Fabio Restrepo Ochoa, themselves pioneers of the marijuana drug business of the 1960s and 
early 1970s.75 
In the early 1980s, the Ochoa brothers connected with Pablo Escobar, Jose Gonzalo 
Rodriguez Gacha and Carlos Lehder trying to consolidate the upstream and downstream stages 
of the cocaine trade. Rodriguez Gacha managed the coca paste acquisition, Escobar controlled 
cocaine refinement. In the downstream stages, the Ochoas and Lehder would organize 
transportation of cocaine to the Caribbean and into the United States.76 The division of labor 
and mutual cooperation allowed them to manage large shipments of cocaine into the U.S. by 
ship or plane. This marked a clear progression and difference in scale between the cocaine 
traffic of the 1980s and the marijuana traffic of the 1970s that heavily relied on the use of mules. 
While mules could only traffic a couple of kilos at a time, airplanes and boats  could transport 
tons of cocaine from the late 1970s onward.    
Another important figure among the leaders of the Medellín cocaine enteprise was José 
Gonzalo ‘El Mexicano’ Rodriguez Gacha. Scarce information is available on his upbringing, 
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besides the fact he was born in 1946 in Pacho, Cundinamarca, a small town in between Bogotá 
and the emerald mines of Muzo. Gacha began his career as a gunman for Alfonso Caballero, an 
emerald smuggler selling his contraband to customers in Mexico and Miami. Mexican 
connections later helped Gacha rise to prominence among the Medellín-based traffickers.77 
In 1976, law-enforcement authorities registered Rodriguez Gacha’s involvement in the 
narcotics business alongside Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers, who worked with him in 
upstream and downstream aspects of drug trafficking. In the early 1980s Rodriguez Gacha had 
already amassed numerous properties was pioneering the cultivation and refinement of coca in 
the jungle regions of southern Colombia. Some of the most famous industrial-sized refinement 
complexes were constructed around 1982 in the jungles of the Caqueta department, among them 
Villa Coca, Coquilandia, and the infamous Tranquilandia. These were all destroyed by the 
Colombian authorities in 1984.  
Rodriguez Gacha establshed a security apparatus to protect trafficker properties in rural 
areas, such as the El Magdalena Medio region of Colombia, where land was relatively 
inexpensive because guerrillas, specifically the FARC, operated in the area. Rodriguez Gacha 
also became important because he was instrumental in creating counter-insurgent paramilitary 
groups in the 1980s, which later evolved into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), 
which remained an important force until 2004.  
The last among leaders of importance was Carlos Lehder Rivas, born in 1950 in the city 
of Armenia, Quindio, into an upper middle-class home. Eventually, Lehder’s parents separated, 
his mother moved to New York City and brought Carlos Lehder with her when he was in his 
teens.78 In 1974, Carlos Lehder was convicted of dealing marijuana and stealing cars in New 
York, offense that earned him 16 months in prison. After completion of his sentence, Lehder 
returned to Colombia and later, in 1978, he bought properties in the Bahamian Island of 
Norman’s Cay, which included a house, a marina, a yacht club, a hotel, and most importantly: 
an airstrip. In 1979, avoiding arrest for trafficking cocaine to the United States, Lehder returned 
to his hometown of Armenia, Quindio a millionaire.79    
Lehder’s rise to prominence within the international cocaine trafficking industry 
resulted from various factors such as the shift in demand from marijuana to cocaine, the fact 
that the established smuggling networks left by the marijuana trade that were used for cocaine 
distribution, visible lack of enforcement regarding counter-narcotics laws in the Western 
Hemisphere, and ultimately the unsatisfactory money laundering controls in the United States. 
These external factors provided Carlos Lehder with an economic incentive to enter the cocaine 
trade. His political influence in Quindio’s local politics resulted from tolerance of the political 
elites towards drug traffickers and also the lack of controls on how politicians financed their 
electoral campaigns both at local and national level.   
The above-mentioned characteristics of the Medellín-based leadership suggest that they 
were all entrepreneurs with little formal education, but a strong ambition to become wealthy. 
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All the major figures were contemporaries, born between the late 1940s and early 1950s. Their 
know-how and business ideas resulted mainly from practical experience, which they obtained 
at an early age. By the time they entered their thirties, all Medellín-based trafficking leaders 
were multi-millionaires. That was partially due to a high-profit merchandise and also to the fact 
there were relatively few traffickers in the business at the time.  
All of the leaders, with the exception of Carlos Lehder, had a clear link, sometimes even 
through their families, to illegal activities early in life. Once the Medellín-based traffickers 
became leaders in their own right they started industrializing their cocaine smuggling 
operations. Instead of using mules to carry drugs, they went to create huge refineries and to use 
small airplanes for distribution.    
One noticeable difference found in individual backgrounds of the Medellín leaders, 
which influenced their respective attitudes towards the use of violence, was the nature of their 
initial experiences in the business. Pablo Escobar and Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha were 
originally performing as gunmen in smuggling organizations, hence there inclination to use of 
violence on regular basis. Carlos Lehder and the Ochoa brothers used violence whenever 
necessary, but primarily within trafficking circles to resolve business conflicts. Each of the main 
trafficker‘s socio-economic background combined with attitude towards the use of violence had 
implications for their individual operations and efforts to influence political agenda. The 
Ochoas brothers were reasonable and thoughtful, operating discreetly with the tendency to co-
opt the political establishment. They seemed to have no ambition to acquire direct political 
power. Although Carlos Lehder was in charge of the Muerte A Secuestradores (MAS) political 
propaganda, he never gravitated towards targeting Colombia’s traditional political 
establishment. A white supremacist, Lehder saw himself a member of elite due to his German 
heritage and also because of his entrepreneurship successes. Rodriguez Gacha was ruthless 
towards leftist guerrillas and became responsible for the decimation of the Union Patriotica 
(Patriotic Union), the FARC’s legal political party. He became a sworn enemy of insurgents 
and forged alliance with cattle ranchers who violently opposed guerrilla harassment in the 
Middle Magdalena region. In contrast, Rodriguez Gacha was not as ruthless as Pablo Escobar 
in warring with the political elites. Pablo Escobar’s stellar and rapid success as an entrepreneur 
led him to believe that he deserved a role in the political and economic establishment of 
Colombia. He used violence on political elites and innocent people to obtain desirable results. 
He was responsible for some of the most shocking displays of violence ever witnessed in the 
drug-related affairs. Pablo Escobar was the first narcoterrorist.  
After establishing himself among the Colombia’s top tier drug traffickers, Escobar 
sought to enter the political life and to hold elected office. In 1982 Escobar was elected as an 
alternate member of the Chamber of Representatives of Colombia, as part of the Colombian 
Liberal Party. Nevertheless, many deputies were opposing his participation in the legitimate 
political process and made public inquiries into origins of his wealth in order to discredit him 
through disclosure of his trafficking activities. Once the prospects for his political career faded, 
Escobar went to exercise his political ambitions by means of bribery and violence. Especially 
after the Colombian government decided to cooperate with the U.S. authorities in establishing 
extradition treaty that allowed for Colombian drug traffickers to be prosecuted in U.S. courts 




Pablo Escobar’s ruthlessness was legendary. His rise was opposed by many honest 
government officials, judges, journalists and policemen, who did not like the growing influence 
of this street thug. Escobar popularized the Colombian way of dealing with enemies, plata o 
plomo became one of his key business principles. Executions were often obscenely violent with 
the shock effect intented to prevent further resistence to Escobar’s will, which often included 
families and relatives of his targets among judges and law-enforcement. The exact number of 
honest men and women killed by Escobar remains unknown, but it likely went well into the 
hundreds and perhaps into the thousands of victims. 
 In combating the Extradition treaty of 1979, which came into effect in 1982, Escobar 
was even rumored to be behind the 1985 attack on the Supreme Court, carried out by the M–19 
insurrectionist movement in which some 10 Supreme Court Justices were killed. Later, in 1989, 
he ordered the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán and on November 27, 
1989, Escobar ordered to plant a bomb on Avianca flight 203, killing 110 people. In addition 
to these high-profile assassinations, Escobar and his organization were responsible for the 
deaths of countless magistrates, journalists, policemen and even criminals inside his own 
organization.  
By the mid-1980s, Pablo Escobar was one of the most powerful men in the world. 
Forbes magazine listed him as the seventh-richest man in the world. His empire included an 
army of soldiers and criminals, a private zoo, mansions and apartments all over Colombia, 
private airstrips and planes for drug transport and personal wealth reported to be in the 
neighborhood of $24 billion. He could order the murder of anyone, anywhere, anytime. 
Colombia: Cali 
The Cali Cartel became the popular title referring to a loose association of independent 
drug trafficking organizations operating out of the town of Cali, Colombia. Its origins could be 
traced to a small criminal gang known as Los Chemas, founded in the early 1970s by Gilberto 
Rodríguez Orejuela and José Santacruz Londoño. Initially, Los Chemas engaged in 
counterfeiting and kidnapping, but eventually they expanded into the smuggling of cocaine base 
from Peru and Bolivia, which they later refined into the final product, cocaine.  
From simple criminal roots, the Cali-based trafficking enterprise had grown into one of 
the most powerful international drug smuggling organizations in history. Towards the mid-
1990s, it was responsible for supplying most of the cocaine consumed in the United States and 
in Europe. Every year, the the organization smuggled hundreds of tons of cocaine into the 
United States and Europe and launders billions of dollars in drug profits.80 
Despite the fact each of the major Cali trafficking groups were separated and 
independent enterprises, they were known to share some resources when their interests 
coincided. It was common for two or more Cali groups to combine cocaine shipments for 
transport to the United States. Similarly, different Cali groups could cooperate in drug money 
laundering operations.  
Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela and his younger brother, Miguel, controlled what might 
have been the most powerful of the Cali organizations. Gilberto was believed to be responsible 
                                                          





for the organization's long-term strategic planning and he seemingly distanced himself from the 
daily operations of the organization. Miguel, on the other hand, used to micro-manage business 
activities insisting on being involved in the minuscule details of the organization's daily 
operations. The Rodriguez Orejuela organization was involved in all aspects of the cocaine 
trade, including production, transportation, wholesale distribution, and money laundering. In 
protecting their business they attempted to avoid the indiscriminate violence unlike their 
Medellín-based colleagues, at the same time they showed no restraints about engaging in 
kidnapping and physical threats or even murders to intimidate business associates and 
competitors.  
The Rodriguez-Orejuelas used a wide variety of sophisticated transportation and 
smuggling techniques to deliver its cocaine to the United States. Tons of cocaine were smuggled 
into Mexico each year by way of aircraft and vessel for subsequent shipment across the U.S. 
southwest border. The Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers usually contracted the services of an 
independent Mexican drug transportation groups to smuggle cocaine from Mexico to the United 
States via land vehicles. Southern Florida was also used as a key point of entry for cocaine 
smuggled aboard vessels. After the cocaine was smuggled into the United States, wholesale 
distribution operations were carried out in Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, and 
other U.S. cities. The Rodriguez-Orejuela organization also ran money laundering operations 
in these major U.S. cities.  
Benefiting from the fact that wholesale prices for cocaine were higher in Europe than in 
the United States, the Rodriguez-Orejuelas also became active throughout Western Europe. 
Wholesale prices for cocaine in Europe generally ranged from $30,000 to $50,000 per kilogram, 
compared to $10,500 to $40,000 per kilogram in the United States. The Iberian Peninsula served 
as a key entry point for the organization's cocaine destined for the major cocaine markets in 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
The Cali Cartel leaders exerted direct command and control authority over all major 
aspects of the international wholesale cocaine trafficking. Cali-based organizations were 
importing cocaine base from Peru and Bolivia, converting it into cocaine HCI at clandestine 
laboratories in Colombia, and smuggling the final product abroad for wholesale distribution. In 
1994, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report estimated the world's total potential 
cocaine production in 1993 to be between 770 metric tons and 805 metric tons. The Cali Cartel 
organizations were trafficking the vast bulk of this production. 
Mexico 
Mexican drug trafficking organizations started to regain prominent position of the main 
supplier of illicit narcotics to the U.S. in the early 1990s when increased political, military and 
law-enforcement anti-drug effort closed the Caribbean for illicit trafficking and forced the 
Colombians to seek more inland routes into the U.S. market.81 Mexicans were thus given the 
opportunity to increase profits and strengthen their position in the illicit drug trade by taking 
larger part in the cocaine delivery to their northern neighbor. As the volume of cocaine 
trafficked through Mexico increased local organizations originally hired to smuggle cocaine 
across the border and leave it in nearby warehouses for Colombian distributors managed to take 
                                                          




over the distribution process themselves developing capability to deliver the cargo anywhere in 
the United States.82  
At that important moment drug traffickers from the Mexican state of Sinaloa were in 
the best position to take advantage of recent developments. They established contacts with 
Colombians in the 1970s and some 20 years later they were about to profit from that connection. 
Probably the first major Mexican exporter of Colombian cocaine was Cuban born Alberto 
Sicilia Falcón, introduced to Pablo Escobar by Honduran trafficker Juan Ramón Matta-
Ballesteros.83 After Sicilia Falcón’s arrest in mid-1970s Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo took his 
position as a leading figure of what became later known as the Guadalajara cartel.  
Two years before his arrest in 1989 Félix Gallardo, former officer of Mexican Judicial 
Federal Police, who became the most powerful narcotraficante in the country and founding 
father of modern Mexican drug trafficking, decided to divide the originally large illegal 
enterprise into various successor organizations led by his lieutenants less known to law-
enforcement authorities in order to facilitate the illicit trafficking and avoid detection.84 
Trafficking routes around the border town of Tijuana were given to Arellano Félix brothers 
whose organization became known as the Tijuana cartel, or simply AFO. The territory, or la 
plaza in the trafficker’s jargon, of Ciudad Juárez went to Carrillo Fuentes family that 
established the Juárez cartel. The Sonora cartel under Miguel Caro Quintero controlled the 
Sonora corridor. The city of Matamoros in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas became plaza of 
Juan García Ábrego and the Gulf cartel. Joaquín Guzmán Loera and Ismael Zambada García 
became the leading figures of the Sinaloa cartel that inherited the Pacific coast of Mexico. Félix 
Gallardo maintained control of the Guadalajara cartel serving as an umbrella group for the other 
organizations and managed relations with the top men in Colombia until his arrest.85  
Mexican trafficking in this phase was small in terms of the number of individuals 
involved and did not require heavy firepower or large enforcement apparatuses because it could 
rely on the state for protection and mediation of internal disputes. Traffickers were so 
cooperative in this period that they would pool money together to buy large loads of cocaine 
and share in the profits.86  
The beginning of the 1990s brought other important changes to the illicit drug 
trafficking industry in the Americas. First, Juan García Ábrego concluded a critical deal with 
his partners in Cali. It was agreed that in the future Colombians wouldn’t pay their Mexican 
counterparts in cash, but leave them in possession of half of the drug cargo and Mexicans will 
not only take all risks of further distribution and sale but will also keep all the profits.87 Second, 
increased political, military and law-enforcement effort brought upon Medellín and Cali cartels 
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forced these organizations into gradual decline that culminated with Escobar’s death in 
December 1993 and numerous arrests of Cali cartel top leaders in 1995.  
2.3. Illicit Networks 
The following segment focuses on various forms the association of illicit entrepreneurs 
might take. Illicit networks and organizations will be described and assessed as they appeared 
in the modern day drug industry with an analysis identifying priorities, modus operandi, best 
practices as much as deficiencies of those business structures. Subsequently, business models 
designed by illicit drug traffickers will be analyzed with particular emphasis on key tactics 
deployed, such as corruption and the use of violence.   
Illicit Network Analysis  
In recent decades the illicit global economy, that is the system of transnational economic 
activities that are criminalized by states in importing or exporting countries,88 has become a 
subject of increasing public and academic interest with corresponding growth in literature.  
Furthermore, taking into consideration the robust research on organized crime and network 
theory as applied to both states and criminal actors, it is important to define examination of 
existing sources both in scope and limits. Within the framework of this dissertation, the key 
interest is therefore on the structure of drug trafficking organizations or profit-seeking illicit 
networks. Large segment of literature on international relations focuses on the positive aspects 
of networks, yet the main focus here is on “illicit” or “dark networks.”89 Arguably, 
understanding international organized crime and terrorism in terms of networks has become a 
widely accepted paradigm in the field of international relations.90 Illicit network structure 
triggers different reactions from states as will be argued later. An assessment of what particular 
characteristics of illicit networks have been identified in the literature on illicit networks is thus 
critical.  
The available literature on illicit networks can be divided in the following manner: (1) 
research focused on the internal structure of illicit networks, (2) research focused on the  
structure of the illicit network in relation to its host state and (3) research aimed at the global 
structure of illicit networks which analyzes the structure of illicit networks based within the 
context of globalization, which takes into account broader political  and economic arguments. 
This particular organization of resources allows for the subsequent analysis to be 
executed on three main levels: (1) tactical – assessing the lower levels of trafficking business 
like traffickers, producers, distributors and enforcers; (2) operational – how state responds to 
the illicit network, whether by implementing policy of collusion, tolerance or confrontation; 
and (3) strategic – assessing the impact of globalization on illicit networks and their 
implications for international relations.  
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Despite the fact that many scholars and authors do not explicitly follow any of the above 
mentioned levels of analysis, their invididual focus places them implicitly at some of these 
levels. The following pages will present some ways in which the various analyses can be 
synthesized to complement each other. I will describe areas and points of convergence where 
concepts presented by these three levels of analysis can be combined and perceived as 
complementary, not as mutually exclusive. 
Tactical Level of Analysis: The Internal Structures of Trafficking Organizations  
Academic scholars, government and NGO researchers conceptualized  the internal 
structure of drug trafficking organizations in various manners. Large segment of existing 
research tends to perceive organizations and networks as mutually exclusive categories, while 
they are rather flexible concepts each with important ideas for understanding the relationship 
between structure and resilience as the following pages will demonstrate.91  
Networks  
In Advent of Netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt conceptually defined networks as the space 
between markets and hierarchies.92 Implicitly, this definition postulates a continuum, where one 
extreme is represented by the ideal of market place with buyers and sellers provided with perfect 
information, where price mechanism is driven exclusively by supply and demand, and the other 
extreme represents the perfect hierarchical bureaucracy, with various management layers 
organizing available resources towards singular objectives, which are not necessarily addressed 
by markets. Between these two ideal forms is reality; which are networks.93 
Both in licit and illicit business, networks can be described as relationships between 
nodes or actors which can reduce transaction costs and resolve collective action problems in 
the absence of central authority.94 Additionally, filial networks based on trust can provide illicit 
networks with protection from rival and state law enforcement infiltration.95  
In the field of network theory, some reject the clear distinction of markets, hierarchies 
and networks, claiming hierarchies are simply highly centralized networks, while markets are 
network nodes with no ties.96 Page and Podolny define networks in the following manner:  
Any collection of actors (N≥2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one 
another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes 
that may arise during the exchange.97  
Survival of networks reflects both evolution and market principles. When a  particular 
node is removed from existing network, another one eventually assumes its functional place or 
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the entire network restructures itself to accommodate accordingly. Specific network nodes can 
be either individual actors or organizations in networks and their degree of internal hierarchy 
may vary from tightly to loosely coupled formations. Nevertheless, in their relationships with 
other nodes in illicit networks, they tend to be “loosely coupled.”98 Individual nodes as much 
as entire networks that do not adapt to external factors, such as the challenge represented by 
states or rival drug trafficking organizations, are excluded from the system in evolutionary 
fashion and then replaced by networks with higher resiliency.99  
Mark Granovetter points out that nodes with weak ties to other segments of the larger 
system can serve as “bridges” between different parts of a network, a function which can be 
vital in the world of illicit activities, where profit opportunities are often based on contacts with 
other criminal networks supplying desired services, such as trafficking, distribution, 
enforcement or money laundering.100 Explaining relative importance of individual nodes within 
a network, Burt labels “structural holes“ those actors in networks who possess “social capital”, 
which makes them important “non-redundant nodes.”101 This idea is important when explaining 
why some nodes gain substantial importance or lose their status. 
In his analysis focusing on the 9/11 hijackers, Krebs describes the difficulties in 
unveiling covert networks. His conclusion states that there are four aspects to focus on in an 
attempt to understand illicit networks: (1) trust, (2) task, (3) money and resources, and (4) 
strategy and goals.102 
Organizations  
Despite the intuitive familiarity with the term, definition of organized crime represents 
a systematical challenge. Mexican government provides the following definition: 
When three or more people make an agreement to organize or form an organization to engage, 
in an ongoing or reiterated fashion, in activities that by themselves or together with other 
activities have as a goal or a result the commission of any or several crimes (…) they will be 
legally classified and penalized because of these actions as members of organized crime.103 
Karl Weick defines organizations as collections of individuals trying to make sense of 
the world around them, going through an iterative learning cycle in the process of doing so. 
Ability to learn and make sense of their environment is the key prerequisite for organzitation’s 
capacity to adapt. For example, ability to break through rigid hierarchical relationships, such as 
rank, to be more adaptable, could be listed among the factors which can prove the ability to 
survive disruptive events. Weick uses the Mann-Gulch disaster and the case of fire fighters 
trying to escape a massive fire to demonstrate the characteristics and failures of a resilient 
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organization.104 Weick’s work is foundational for the High Reliability Organization (HRO) 
literature and is relevant to the study of illicit networks and their resilience. Chabot adds two 
important environmental variables to Weick’s complex circular model: “a vast consumer-base” 
in the United States and “diminished societal rule of law”, both of which substantially 
strengthended the drug trafficking enterprises in Mexico.105  
Despite the relative importance Weick places on cognition and the ability to learn, 
organizational survival in the aftermath of disruptive events also depends on the organizational 
architecture, especially in those cases when an organization is embedded within a larger 
network of alliances for service and resources.106  
Among the most important arguments in the scholarly work on networks is that flatness 
in networks contributes to resilience.107 Although Carzo and Yanouzas argued in their 
experiment involving different groups with various degrees of hierarchy that there was no 
statistically relevant difference between the speed of decision making among those 
organizations, Norman Hummon pointed out flaws in their experimental design, thus preserving 
the validity of the argument identifying flatness as important variable in network’s success or 
failure.108  
Networks or Organizations? 
Examining various theoretical concepts, I personally tend to perceive organizations as 
individual nodes within larger networks. Observing the formation and functioning of various 
drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and Colombia provides evidence to support the claim. 
For example, the various organizations of Mexican traffickers represent a transport and 
protection node within a larger drug production scheme, which starts with illicit narcotics 
production in the Andes and ends with consumers in Europe and the United States. In many 
ways they represent a central node of the network, both geographically and relationally; 
commanding a dominant and central network position.109  
In the realm of policy, often time false dichotomies are drawn between networks and 
organizations, as demonstrated by the 2006 Congressional Research Services report:  
Traditional vs. Modern Networks. Definitions of transnational organized crime often 
differentiate between traditional crime organizations and more modern criminal networks. 
Traditional groups have a hierarchical structure that operates continuously or for an extended 
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period. Newer networks, in contrast, are seen as having a more decentralized, often cell-like 
structure.110  
Practical examples often stand in conflict with the above mentioned description. For 
example, characteristics of many Mexican drug trafficking enterprises comply with both 
definitions provided, therefore they can be seen as networks and organizations simultaneously. 
First, they tend to exist for extended periods of time, when they form, dissolve and restructure 
in relationships with other entities in the illicit industry to traffic drugs and engage in other 
criminal endeavors. Second, Mexican trafficking enterprises have evolving relationships with 
the Mexican state, which depends upon political party currently in power, the existing degree 
of democratic consolidation and ability to bribe local and state authorities.111 Third, internally 
trafficking enterprises organize themselves along network lines. While some of them have 
several layers of management, they are also decentralized in decision-making and further 
compartmentalized into individual cells. The bifurcation between networks and organizations 
therefore makes little sense for the drug trafficking businesses.112 
Somehow better understanding of drug trafficking enterprises can be developed from 
recognition that organizations represent nodes in networks. Geographically, the illicit networks 
under scrutiny here extend from the Andean coca-growing region of South America, to its final 
consumers in the United States, Europe and other world as much as increasingly Latin 
American domestic markets. Functionally, these enterprises include a variety of actors: coca 
growers, extortion rackets at all production stages, transportation and distribution managers, 
processing laboratories, various trafficking nodes, landing-strip managers in Mexico, 
communications managers, enforcers, traffickers who specialize in trafficking at the US border, 
distributors and street-gangs within the United States territory.113  
Phil Williams finds the practice of bifurcations drawn between hierarchies and networks 
as problematic, despite the practice’s dominance in law enforcement and academia. Williams 
defines networks in broader terms to include organizations that may be hierarchical. In his view, 
a network can be perceived simply as a series of inter-connected nodes. These nodes can be 
individuals, organizations or companies, so long as they are connected in significant ways.114 
Furthermore, Williams argues that the traditional hierarchical model usually associated with 
Mafia families in the United States, does not need to be jettisoned. In the end, it is possible to 
have networks of hierarchies, hybrid organizational forms with some hierarchical components 
and a significant network dimension, possibly even a network of networks.115 Seemingly, 
Williams finds the explanatory power of social network analysis in business and sociology in 
its emphasis on the relations between nodes.116  
Among challenges within the network analysis is determining the limits of a network. 
That is to define its beginning and end, in other words, the criteria of its membership.117  In a 
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hypothetical scenario, where ordinary citizen is forced to commit a crime on behalf of an illicit 
network, which threatens to assissinate his family members, if he does not comply, is this 
invidual part of a network, or is he simply a mean to an end? Moreover, in making an 
assessment, is the focus on individual nodes or the networks in general? A simple statement 
that networks survive or reform themselves despite the actions of state law enforcement seems 
rather tautological in nature, especially when considering the powerful supply and demand 
forces involved in illicit trafficking. Furthermore, are specific individuals the nodes or actors 
of a network, or are these the entire organizations?  
This analysis considers trafficking nodes and the organizations that control them as its 
level of analysis. Individual nodes will be assessed internally for flatness or degree of hierarchy 
measured in terms of management layers. Despite its intended focus, this analysis is also aware 
of trafficking nodes’ position in larger global networks.118  
Networks often allow for flatter organizational structures by bringing organizations 
together in ”loose couplings“ that are quite flexible and adaptable.119 Every node in the network 
has a degree of hierarchy based on its particular needs and the tasks it must perform.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt do not perceive nodes within criminal networks as hierarchically 
organized. This analysis of internal structures of the individual nodes discovered that there are 
indeed varying degrees of hierarchy. Arquilla and Ronfeldt are generally correct in their 
assesment that network nodes are not hierarchical, but as the empirical evidence will 
demonstrate, this is not always the case. Williams argues, there can be “networks of 
hierarchies,” of such cases the core node in a wheel model network can be a good example.120 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt identified three ideal network topologies which they call: (1) 
chain, (2) star or hub (wheel) network; and (3) the all-channel network. (1) In the chain network, 
people, goods, or information move along a line of separated contacts, and where 
communication has to travel through the intermediate nodes. (2) In the star or hub network, a 
set of actors are tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node or actor, and has to go through that 
node to communicate with each other. (3) In the all-channel network everybody is connected 
to everybody else.121 
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Figure 1. Network typologies by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and 
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 8. 
These 3 network structures can represent a challenge to the state in various different 
ways. The all-channel network is unfitting to the illicit world due to its lack 
compartmentalization.  Removing a single node in the network might enable discovery of the 
entire network.  Therefore, the all-channel network is better suited for licit action groups within 
civil society, which utilize technology to challenge democratic states in a legal fashion through 
control of message and public opinion, rather than illicit traffickers or insurgencies.122    
In contrast, chain networks are seemingly the most logical starting point for the 
inception and development of illicit networks and empirical evidence suggests that many such 
networks indeed begin their activities in the formation.123 Eventually, chain networks 
consolidate into wheel networks by core nodes providing protection and enforcement services. 
Ultimately, wheel networks might be dismantled by the state and remaining nodes will usually 
reform into chain networks.124   
A prototype model for this process is represented by drug trafficking in Colombia. The 
Medellín and Cali illicit entrepreneurs consolidated Colombian trafficking into two large wheel 
networks during the 1980’s and 1990’s.125 Provided with assistance from the US military, the 
Colombian government dismantled the core nodes of these networks in 1993 and 1995 
respectively.126 As a result, the Colombian trafficking model evolved into smaller specialized 
cartelitos more reminiscent of chain networks.127    
A statement that Medellín and Cali cartels represented wheel networks is supported by 
Michael Kenney, who provided evidence via interviews with jailed Colombian smugglers. 
Assessing the smuggling aspects of the drug trafficking business, Kenney‘s key finding is that 
despite the description of these cartels by law enforcement as hierarchical and menacing, in 
reality they were very flat at 3 – 4 management layers. This analysis differs from Kenney’s 
previous research in that it considers a broader range and volume of these organizations, which 
includes enforcers that are layer of management intensive. Kenney’s earlier work also described 
how core nodes in a wheel network can be easily targeted by governments for removal. 
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Therefore, Kenney argues that wheel networks, while efficient and profitable, tend to be 
vulnerable to attack.128 
Structural Flatness as a Positive Factor of Resilience  
Flatness can  have positive impact and increase resilience of illicit networks in various 
ways, which includes reducing decision-making times, mitigating the need for doctrine, 
increasing learning capability, adaptability and scalability through alliances.129    
First, flatness reduces the duration of decision-making cycles. Fewer management 
layers enables flat nodes or networks to make decisions faster and then to implement them 
quickly throughout the network. Efficiency in implementing decisions is further enhanced by 
penalties for failure or insubordination, when illicit networks often exercise harsh punishments 
not only to individuals responsible but to their families as well. On the other hand, hierarchies 
tend to struggle with flexibility in their highly centralized bureaucratic structures and 
implementation of new procedures might prove more challenging for hierarchies.130 However, 
institutionalizing procedures can be more difficult for flat networks or nodes because they have 
short memories and lack formal mechanisms like publications.    
Second, there is no need for flat networks to formalize their operations through doctrinal 
handbooks and manuals.131 Some networks, for example Al Qaeda, do create manuals and  
distribute them on the internet and elsewhere, but such a case is more of an exception.132 In 
contrast, organizations like the military must go through an extensive learning process to create 
new doctrine. However, this process often results in failure due to differences within the 
bureaucracy. Various management layers, which must approve the changes in doctrine, and the 
cognitive dissonance about the founding principles of the institution are a source of 
stagnation.133    
Organizational learning ability often contributes to flatness in structure. Networks 
willingly opt for flatness and compartmentalization as they learn from the failures of other 
criminal organizations. Flatness and learning are therefore “mutually constitutive” elements.134  
Flatness can cause faster learning and adaptability due to the ability to make decisions quickly 
and respond to changes in the external environment of the organization. Learning organizations 
will also flatten themselves through the practice of compartmentation.135   
  Experience, historical lessons and learning often result in tendency towards flatter 
structures. Among these experiences the key ones are learning the importance of 
compartmentalization and shift towards a low-profile strategy. Profit-seeking drug trafficking 
networks are more likely to adopt this strategy, since their primary objective is profit and not 
threatening the state, which is a goal pursued by terrorist networks. High profile in conducting 
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business results in drawing attention to illicit network activities, which in turn results in attacks 
from the state authority attempting to supress the network. In contrast, low profile strategy 
allows for risk and threat mitigation, which is beneficial for effectively conducting illicit 
commercial activities. Furthermore, diffuse and flatter networks can execute enforcement 
through ostracism.  In other words, network nodes or actors drawing too much attention to 
network operations are removed simply by not being contacted again.136    
Networks perceived as “loosely coupled” organizations also have the ability to 
decentralize decision-making, which improves information gathering and better understanding 
of their own decisions.137 This is mainly due to a fact that information does not have to be 
filtered vertically toward a central bureaucratic hierarchy with numerous layers, consuming 
time along the way. Instead, individual specialised nodes in the network can and in fact are 
expected to make on site and timely decisions immediately, as they are organized in a 
decentralized fashion.    
Diffused flatter networks are also capable of creating alliances and may indeed rely on 
partnerships to minimize the levels of hierarchy by minimizing their management needs.138 This 
mostly results out of necessity since individual smuggling cells must be contracted to become 
part of larger networks.  Mexican  profit-seeking illicit networks often rely on “loosely coupled” 
street gangs in the United States and contract their services including a supply of individuals 
for enforcement, executions and assassinations on US soil, street level drug dealing and 
occassionally even retail distribution.139 On the production level, some of the Mexican 
traffickers established alliances with entities like the FARC to provide security, regulate prices 
for coca farmers in Colombia and to ship cocaine to Mexico.140 To provide examples outside 
of Latin America, for comparison, according to US officials, Pakistani militants have merged 
through their use of alliances into networks with no coherent leadership structure to attack.141  
Trust more than name brand recognition seems to be the dominant motive for smaller network 
nodes to engage in business dealings with other network actors. 
Structural Flatness as a Negative Factor in Resilience  
Equally to legitimate businesses, many criminal enterprises fail. Kahler points out there 
is a tendency to study successful criminal and terrorist networks, but not many studies examine 
failed networks.142 In consequence researchers might overestimate the resilience of flat network 
structures.143 Moreover, truly successful criminal networks remain virtually invisible and thus 
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they are impossible to study. Survival of criminal networks is an evolutionary process. Some 
manage to adapt successfully to their changing operational environment and survive, some fail 
to assimilate and then they are removed from the system. It can be postulated that on average 
flatness does contribute to increased resiliency, at the same time it might have the opposite 
effect for illicit criminal networks as demonstrated by the following four arguments. 
First, it can be argued that a small scale organization or network with a few individuals 
is quite easy to dismantle by arresting all of its members in one raid. It can also seize to function 
as a result of a conflict with a rival criminal group. Seemingly, flatness and smallness often 
correlate with each other. Larger organizations with larger membership are less likely to fall 
that easily because law enforcement entities might be unable to destroy the entire organization 
at once. Moreover, criminal networks composed of “loosely coupled” and highly 
compartmentalized cells are most difficult to dismantle due to larger complexity of their 
operations and thus they become most resilient to disruption.144  
Second, it can be argued that compartmentation can damage resilience as much as it can 
help it. I tis important to realize that compartmentation can reduce flows of information within 
the network. Poor sharing of information, or the lack o fit, can subject a criminal organization 
to variety of operational hazards. When inidividual cells within an illicit network fail to share 
information and intelligence concerning hostile law enforcement acivities, members of the 
network can be arrested, their merchandize can be seized or their assests might be 
confiscated.145 Failure in coordination among compartmentalized cells could result in situation 
when different cells take offensive action against other cells in the same network thinking they 
are in fact targeting competition instead of their own partners.146  
Third, illicit networks quite frequently suffer from poor decision-making and excessive 
risk-taking. More hierarchical networks can turn into flatter networks as a result of a leadership 
removal. This can result in younger, but less experienced leadership. Young leaders might have 
a higher propensity for violence due to their lack of experience in nonviolent dispute resolution 
tactics. Drug use, eccentric lifestyle, desire to make their mark in illicit worlds and other 
character feats among new and young illicit network leaders can also lead to erratic, impulsive 
and violent decisions and the failure of new illicit networks.147 
Fourth, there is a limited scalability in illicit networks. The ability to expand in size, 
resources and capabilities through lateral relationships may be overrated as a process towards 
higher resilience. Social trust and ethnic or kinship ties have proven necessary in securing 
sustainable scalability. Without these ties illicit groups often splinter if they try to expand 
themselves too far.148 
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Structural Resilience in Hierarchies  
Hierarchies survived and became the dominant governance structure in the international 
system, which is due to several reasons. First, hierarchies have a capacity to organizing 
substantial resources. Militaries are the quintessential hierarchies, with rigid structures 
represented by openly displayed ranks. Despite the fact that militaries can be fraught with 
bureaucratic inefficiencies, they can be some of the most remarkably efficient and resilient 
institutions.  Hierarchies provide clear command and control over the organization and clearly 
understood divisions of labor.149 
Second, all hierarchies have the ability to network themselves. To continue with the 
military example, An officer in a theater of war does not need to ask superiors all the way up to 
his President, or other commander in chief, to order an artillery strike against enemy positions. 
Instead, he can radio a target coordinations to a central communications hub and then 
corresponding artillery unit or air-support is contacted to execute the fire mission. Hierarchies 
can network themselves through standard operating procedures within more generalized rules 
of engagement.150  
Third, resilience in hierarchies is partially given by their clear lines of succession. In a 
situation when a leader is removed or killed, his replacement is immediately known and the 
hierarchy is therefore able to regenerate quickly. Hierarchies begin to malfunction only under 
sustained duress or coordinated attacks. Privette observes that the Cosa Nostra was a resilient 
network because of its hierarchical structures. It had clear lines of succession when leaders were 
removed or killed and their replacements were ready to assume the command. Only in situations 
when the larger network was targeted for disruption at the same time could the authorities claim 
to disrupt Cosa Nostra, despite the fact it continues to exist in much more limited fashion.151  
Fourth, collective action problems in hierarchies can be solved through centralized 
command structures. Taking advantage of their hierarchical organization states can tax and 
invest in infrastructure which markets do not provide on their own. Charles Tilly argues that 
states in Europe were actually founded on their ability to wage war and collect taxes.152 Even 
nowadays with still increasing privatization of security, most private military and security 
contractors compete for state contracts rather than seeking self-funding sources like controlling 
oil fields or diamond mines. 
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Weaker Structural Resilience in Hierarchies  
It is also important to point out that hierarchies can lack adaptability in some cases. First, 
rigidly enforced standard operating procedures might not be optimal in certain situations.153 
Situation might develop to the point when established rules of engagement restrain soldiers in 
the field and can produce circumstances harmful to themselves as much as to their mission. In 
cases such, adjusting rules of engagement is necessary. This process sometimes requires the 
commander‘s approval and usually plenty of time as well, since the information must be first 
processed upward and then the command decisions and new strategies must proceed downward 
to soldiers in the field.154 
Second, many hierarchies tend to have deeply ingrained institutional biases that 
complicate adaptation and learning. Authors like Nagl or Downie demonstrate how the US 
Army’s conventional war bias resulted in refusal to learn from its unconventional war 
experience in Vietnam and use it as a lesson learned in future conflicts.155 
Operational Level Analysis: The Domestic Structure of Illicit Networks 
The next level of analysis examines the interaction between the state authority and illicit 
networks. Astorga and Shirk define “complicity,” “confrontation” and “tolerance” as the types 
of relationships traffickers can have with a state and make policy suggestions accordingly.156 
Analyzing the municipal level of Tijuana police and organized crime Sabet reaches similar 
conceptualizations as he categorizes the relationship between organized crime and local law 
enforcement as “collusion,” “confrontation” or “tolerance” in Tijuana.157 
In comparison, Gootenberg portraits a more complex picture of the relationship between 
the state and drug traffickers, where the relation looks more symbiotic than the zero-sum idea 
that governments ban and fight illicit narcotics and that evil narcotics dealers in turn subvert 
states and rule of law. Much has been written on this topic since drug-focused literatures are 
characteristically state-centric. Local U.S. police department, with diminishing federal aid, can 
live off proceeds of confiscated drug dealers property, with scant concern for the constitutional 
due process for the policy’s victims. Similarly, Anglo banks in Miami or Houston are relatively 
immune from legal prosecutions.158 In other words, while most states have rather strict counter-
narcotics policies, they might actually benefit from their trade on some occassions.  
Similarly, Menno Vellinga observes varying relationships between traffickers and the 
state which include more complex symbiotic relationships. Vellinga identifies cartel strategy 
among the most significant factors explaining the relationship between traffickers and the state. 
Describing the Medellín cartel’s confrontational relationship which challenged Colombian 
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political elites, he compared the Cali cartel‘s focus on corrupting the state, while maintaining 
the ability to react to the state with violence.159 
After the large Colombian drug trafficking enterprises were dismantled by the state, the 
empty space was filled by smaller, lower profile informal trafficking groups with looser 
connections, which took over the drug trafficking from the Andes to Europe and North America. 
Another aspect Vellinga assessed was the internal structure for these organizations in terms of 
size and business practices. He observes that the larger organizations continue to flourish in 
Mexico and they tend to respond to the government‘s efforts to supress them with more violence 
than those smaller organizations and networks, which Garzón refers to as “cartelitos.”160 
Chestnut takes an interesting perspective on the symbiotic relationship of profit-seeking 
illicit networks and the state power by analyzing the motivation of the North Korean regime to 
engage in state sponsored illicit activities, and when the state began outsourcing to illicit 
networks like the Chinese Triads. She described how North Korean regime moved toward the 
use of illicit activities in moments of economic desperation and weakened domestic political 
control. For Chestnut, North Korean illicit economic activities including counterfeit dollars, 
counterfeit cigarettes, opium cultivation and narcotics trafficking were key mechanisms used 
for the regime‘s survival.161 
Using the specific cases of Mexiko and Burma to study relationship between the state 
and drug trafficking organization, Snyder and Duran Martinez offer a political-economic 
argument which suggests that Mexico’s increase in drug related violence in recent years is due 
to the decentralization of the Mexican security apparatus in combination with the 
decentralization among Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations and Mexico’s won proces of  
democratization. Democratization and decentralization weakened the state’s ability to  
negotiate with traffickers because it cannot make credible long term promises.162 
Strategic Level of Analysis: Globalization and Illicit Networks  
The last category of the scholarly literature review focuses on publications which 
analyze the illicit network structures which benefit from the increasingly globalized 
international system. They challenge the essential building block of the international system, 
“the territorially sovereign state,”163 its prospects, its dependence on borders and the basic 
premise that it has “a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.”164 Some, like Schendel, argue 
that “illicit flows” and “borderlands” erode the reality and the concept of “the territorially 
sovereign state.”165 Others, like Andreas, argue that the state’s response to illicit networks 
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serves to reinforce it. Adler and Schendel present models to conceptualize state pressure on 
orders which can be combined with our understandings of the internal organizational structures 
of these networks to provide a better understanding of the structure and resilience of these 
networks at multiple levels of analysis.166  
Building upon Lupsha’s views, Fukumi perceives transnational organized crime as a 
feature of an international capitalist market economy where the key motivation is to maximize 
profits with minimum risk.167 
Effects of Globalization  
Globalization consists of complex processes which possess key characteristics majority 
of social scientists agrees on: (1) the spread of markets, (2) privatization and deregulation, (3) 
the spread of human rights, and (4) the spread of democratic values.168 Most authors agree that 
the current period is not the first era of globalization. Starting with the opening of silk roads, 
which connected east and western civilizations, nation states in the 19th century expanded 
markets and resource extraction world-wide through colonialism.  
In Power and Interdependence Keohane and Nye described “complex interdependence“ 
during the 1980’s and argued that the processes had begun in the aftermath of the World War 
II.169 The current epoch intensified after the fall of the Soviet Union, the opening of the eastern 
bloc states and their economies, the failure of communism to provide a viable alternative to 
capitalism,170 and the advancement in communications technologies.171  
Many authors have pointed out positive aspects of globalization, but others like Naím 
have brought attention to the “dark side of globalization” manifested by illicit networks.172 
Particularly in Latin America the middle classes are under intense pressure resulting from  
competition with cheap Chinese labor, which benefits from currency manipulation.173 Grayson 
described how globalization created conditions for cheapening of communications 
technologies, which exposed the disadvantaged youth in developing states to the extreme 
opulence globalization occassionally provides, which is legally unattainable for these 
impoverished youngsters without education.174 Such situation increases their sense of “relative 
deprivation” and raises the likelihood for them to join drug trafficking organizations in an 
attempt to gain the wealth they have been exposed to.175  
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Weak State Authority and Alternative Governance  
Gambetta views the state as a protection racket.176 Tilly seconds this argument in his 
analysis of the rise of the modern state in Europe, where he observes that “war made the state 
and the state made war.”177 Clunan and Trinkunas argue that weakening or failing states become 
gradually challenged by “alternate governance structures” such as organized crime, 
corporations, which can arise to fill the gap or exploit the state’s weaknesses.178 The subsequent 
paragraphs summarize ideas of some of the key authors who have addressed the issue of weak 
states and the rise of organized crime.  
According to Skaperdas organized crime arises to provide protection where there is a 
vacuum of state authority. Analyzing the conditions under which warlordism arises he has 
provided extensive descriptive formal models on the phenomenon. Various mafia-style entities 
can also be perceived as alternative governance structures. They are typically organized along 
hierarchical lines according to Skaperdas‘s analysis of the American Cosa Nostra and similar 
organized criminal groups. These organization arise or become stronger when state authority is 
weak eventhough they provide protection at much higher costs than we normally associate with 
modern governance.179 Skaperdas demonstrates, and many other scholars agree, that by 
implementing prohibitionist policies state chooses to remove some of its own power to regulate 
flows of illicit commodities. The basis of illicit drug trafficking is the prohibition regime 
represented by the almost 50 years long War on Drugs declared by President Nixon in 1971.180 
Chabat argues that the complexities as much as the costs of the drug war can be significantly 
reduced if legalization, medicalization or decriminalization policies were implemented in drug 
consuming states, which would allow for the authorities to focus on drug consumption not as a 
criminal but rather as a public health issue.181  
In a similar fashion Andreas argues that states repeatedly engage in increased border 
enforcement in order to appease domestic constituencies. The nature and location of the 
trafficking of labor and drugs shifts in response to increased enforcement and complicates the 
task of law enforcement agencies enforcing the borders. In Andreas’s view global prohibition 
on drugs is the root cause of trafficking as much as it is responsible for the discord between 
neoliberal economic policies and the prohibition of the free flow of labor and illicit goods.182  
Illicit Network Resilience  
The term “illicit networks“ represents a large variety of entities from terrorist networks 
like Al Qaeda to Mexican drug trafficking organizations like the Sinaloa cartel, prison gangs 
like the Aryan Brotherhood and street gangs like MS–13.183 Illicit networks represent a threat 
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to the states‘ security by directly challenging the authorities, governance and explicit legal 
norms. Globalization has strenghtened illicit networks, profit-seeking illicit networks in 
particular, by offering advanced communications technologies to private entities and increasing 
economic interdependence to the international state system.184 Nation states have allocated 
substantial resources in their effort to supress and dismantle these networks to limited effect 
thus far.185 Observing and analyzing this effort some important questions arise, specifically how 
do illicit networks, and PSINs in particular, structure themselves to achieve such a high level 
of resiliency; what is the best strategy to suppress them; and also why nation states tend to 
attack some illicit networks rather than others?  
Extensive body of scholarly literature considers illicit networks to represent a substantial 
security threat and identifies the network structure as critical element in understanding why 
these networks survive in their operational environment. For instance, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
argue that flatter structures without explicit leader, or with a leadership consisting of several 
individuals, will be more resilient and more likely to survive because these types of structures 
are less impacted when their leadership is eliminated.186 It is worth mentioning that illicit 
networks must deal with severe threats to their survival. There is the state authority with its 
ability to eliminate leadership figures as a regular constant in this line of entrepreneurial 
activity. There is a threat of violent competiton from rival networks, which try to enforce and 
expand their market shares in the illicit business world.187  
The following pages explain, the relationship between the structure of profit-seeking 
illicit networks, defined in terms of degree of hierarchy (independent variable), and their 
resilience (dependent variable).188 At the beginning there are two key hypotheses: (1) flatter 
structures would increase resilience; and conversely, (2) more hierarchical structures would 
reduce resilience.  
In the course of his research, Nathan Patrick Jones identified the PSIN’s business 
strategy as a key explanatory variable and founded his argument of profit-seeking illicit 
network‘s resilience on how the state reacts to PSINs on its territory.189 Jones argues that when 
illicit networks fragment, they tend to do so along the lines of varying business strategies. In 
cases when those business strategies are territorial or extortion-based in nature, the state, civil 
society and rival illicit networks unite against them in order to eliminate the threat they 
represent to the business and security environment.190  
Individual nation states usually maintain significant potential economic advantages over 
PSINs, but they can only mobilize them when the states‘ political will and social outrage are 
united against illicit networks. In case of Mexico, its GDP is somewhere around 1 trillion 
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dollars, while estimated total profits from drug trafficking are approximately at 18-39 billion 
dollars.191 With properly organized and funded security institutions, the Mexican state should 
be able to defeat profit-seeking illicit networks in country. An attempt will be made here to 
explaining why the Mexican state and nation states in general tend to target some profit-seeking 
illicit networks and not others. 
Typology of Illicit Networks 
Jones identifies three ideal types of illicit networks: (1) insurgent, (2) transactional, and 
(3) territorial profit-seekers: 
The Insurgent Network  
The insurgent type network is characterized by insurgency, which is defined in general 
terms as a political movement attempting to topple a state through the unconventional use of 
force. This type includes both Al Qaeda, and other similar terrorist groups, which uses terrorism 
as a logic of action, as well as more traditional insurgencies that perceive terrorism as a method 
of action while retaining their mass base of support. In defining insurgent illicit networks the 
presence of political ideology is an essential, but not a unique characteristic, since this type 
includes religious and ethno-nationalist networks.  
Qualitaively, the relative significance of the political ideology must be assessed in 
relationship to the illicit network’s commercial activities on a case-by-case basis. 
Quantitatively, the relative strength of various cells is also important to the evaluation of 
insurgent type of illicit networks. Yet this dissertation focuses on profit-seeking networks, not 
the insurgent type.  
Insurgency directly threatens the state since insurgents aim to overthrow the state 
authority through the use of violence thus effectively challenging the state’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force.192 Insurgent networks seek to delegitimize the state by questioning its 
sovereignty, which is the main reason for state’s attack on insurgent networks.193 A particular 
model of the state authority, democratic or authoritarian, is largely irrelevant to a severe state 
response to an insurgency. Instead the insurgency’s success will be more dependant on its 
strength versus the power of state authority. In comparison, the state’s interaction with 
predominantly profit-seeking illicit networks is far more complex and therefore the question 
why the state attacks some profit-seeking illicit networks and not others is more complicated. 
2.4. Illicit Business Models 
Profit-seeking illicit networks generally deploy one of the two types of business 
strategy: “transactional,“ or “territorial“.194 Relying on sophisticated businessmen, and college 
graduates in general, the transactional business strategy focuses primarily on trafficking, avoids 
unnecessary violence and seeks to maintain a low operational profile. In contrast, the territorial 
business model focuses primarily on taxing the territory the PSIN‘s control. Territorial 
networks also engage in smuggling narcotics, but they further diversify into other areas of 
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criminal activities such as human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, arms trafficking,  taxation 
of other organized illicit activities on their territory, etc. These two models with their respective 
characteristics represent the ideal types and real world illicit networks can be often perceived 
as being on different points along the continuum between the extremes representing ideal types 
according to the proportion of various activities conducted as part of the network’s business.  
The Transactional PSIN Type  
In its ideal form, the transactional profit-seeking illicit network focuses exclusively on 
the business of drug trafficking and laundering the corresponding profits.195 Transactionally 
operating smugglers tend to hide their wealth behind legitimate front businesses. In its extreme 
manifestation a transactional network is a single, flat, trafficking or money-laundering unit with 
only one layer of management. Transactional PSINs are the most difficult to identify and 
examine because they can project entirely licit public appearance.  
Transactional PSINs usually aim to corrupt higher levels of government, targeting top 
tier officials. They also tend to be selective in their use of violence, which is mostly perceived 
as a tool to fend off rivals and not directed at local population. Naturally, even transactional 
illicit PSINs display some territorial characteristics due to their need for specific trafficking 
routes, but they do not target local population in order to extort money, although they do extort 
local other illicit actors while trafficking drugs through the region.  
When bribing authorities, transactional PSINs aim to bribe top level officials in the 
military or federal police, while territorial PSINs focus more on state and local police since they 
are more likely to interact on municipal level. Following the logic of this argument, the arrest 
of illicit network members is expected to be higher among territorial PSINs that are unable to 
establish relationships with the state authority because of their often times excessively violent 
territorial business strategies. To continue with this logic, members of transactional PSINs 
should be arrested at lower rates and should bribe higher level government officials. 
Although transactional PSINs may effectively dominate a territory, they do not make 
profits through the predatory extraction of taxes from that particular area. Instead, they rather 
profit from trafficking illicit drugs through the territory. They might implement some form of 
taxation for this service, but that taxation normally does not extend into the licit world. In 
contrast, territorial PSINs possess a comparative advantage in the provision of violence and 
extract taxes from their territory. As a result, territorial PSINs tend to utilize territory in a more 
predatory fashion. Transactional PSINs in Mexico might also assist local legitimate enterprises 
in exchange for piso. These are not extortion schemes per se, but actual business services 
including the obtainment of government permits, protection from bribe-seeking police officers, 
business network connections and many other potential forms of assistance.196 The violent 
externalities generated by transactional PSINs are located primarily in consumption states and 
among drug-abusers in the transit country. These externalities are not inherently violent, but 
rather corrosive of democratic institutions and the rule of law.   
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The Territorial PSIN Type  
In a fashion similar to the state itself, territorial PSINs focus on controlling a territory 
that can generate profit through taxation. While these profit-seeking illicit networks traffic 
narcotics through territory under their control, they may also impose taxation on other 
traffickers using their plaza, use extortion, kidnapping or tax legal and illegal businesses in 
order to generate extra profit. Generally, territorial PSINs often expand and further diversify 
their activities. These territorial networks display more hierarchical structures because they 
must protect their territories to prevent other smugglers from trafficking in the area without 
paying the fee. In consequence, they need more enforcers and managers. For territorial PSINs, 
the primary source of revenue is the control of taxable territory.197 The negative externalities 
generated by territorial PSINs have impact primarily in the domestic context through violence 
and extortion.  
Instrumentally, territorial PSINs use violence to demonstrate that the state authority 
lacks effective control over territory and is therefore incapable of governing. Alternatively, they 
use it to send messages to their competition in the illicit business. They exercise symbolic 
violence often using arranged mutilated bodies with narco-mensajes to convey messages to 
rival traffickers, state agencies and also to the local population. They tend to stage public violent 
acts, which do not result in profits, the sole purpose is to demonstrate a lack of government 
control.198  
Structurally, PSIN’s business strategy is determined by its structure and degree of 
hierarchy, business knowledge and connections, business acumen, comparative advantages in 
violence and other characteristics of the individuals comprising the illicit network. In a way, 
PSINs often do not choose business strategy consciously, rather they intend to exploit certain 
advantages they possess. The business strategy has certain level of interconnectivity with 
degree of hierarchy in PSINs because the high number of enforcers to supervise a territory 
requires higher number of managers and therefore more degrees of hierarchy.199 In 
consequence, territorial PSINs tend to display higher levels of their organizational hierarchy, 
whereas transactional PSINs tend towards flatter hierarchies. 
Among the most demanding tasks territorial PSINs face is to gather enough enforcers 
to exercise effective control over their territory. Selection and training process for enforcers 
centers on the same qualities as the selection process in the police and military emphasizing 
hierarchy and discipline. In deployment of enforcers the PSINs tend to replicate the structure 
and style of organization from which they buy training and know-how by means of corruption, 
that is the police, military and mercenaries. In order to maximize profit, transactional PSINs 
can employ limited number of highly trained and skilled individuals to prevent further expenses, 
it can corrupt the state apparatus to buy hierarchy. They can subcontract additional labor 
whenever the necessity arises.  
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Majority of Mexican PSINs has at least five layers of management and they usually 
represent central nodes in wheel networks.200 Despite the fact that PSINs with the same level 
of hierarchy can be found selecting both business strategies, transactional PSINs with multiple 
layers of management tend to be more robust in size than similarly structured territorial PSINs. 
For instance, the Sinaloa cartel represents primarily a transactional type network in character 
but uses many intermediaries to protect the core members within the network. Arguably, it has 
a higher level of hierarchy, which is due to its vast size in comparison to other PSINs in 
Mexico.201 Transactional PSINs usually increase degree of organizational hierarchy in response 
to challenges raised by territorial PSINs, rather than opting to increase their hierarchy in a 
vacuum.202  
Despite clearer distinctions in the theoretical concepts, most of real world PSINs 
represent hybrids between the territorial and the transactional types with varying proportions of 
each category. The table below represents a comparison of key business strategies in territorial 
versus transactional PSINs. 
 
Business Strategy in 26 
Areas 
Territorial Traffickers Transactional Traffickers 
1. Treatment of Territory Focus on control and taxation of 
territory 
Emphasis on trafficking over territorial 
control 
2. Degree of Hierarchy More hierarchical due to need for 
enforcers 
Flatter structures, but can be 
hierarchical. A smaller number of 
highly sophisticated individuals 
3. Profile Flashy lifestyle (Gold Plated Guns) Lifestyle low profile (No conspicuous 
consumption). Or lifestyle is explained 
by front-businesses 
4. Extortion as a source of 
profit 
Extortion of illegitimate and 
legitimate businesses used en 
masse. Extortion of petit 
bourgeoisie. 
Extorts illicit businesses but profits 
mostly from trafficking drugs. 
Establishes norms of paying piso 
extortion tax regularly for illicit 
businesses. 
5. Kidnapping Kidnappings of citizens uninvolved 
in underworld. Lower intelligence 
on targets. Targets held for short 
periods of time. 
Kidnappings limited to enforcing drug 
debts and those involved in crime. 
Sometimes utilized when network is 
profit starved always high profile 
targets. 
6. Violence against police Killing police officers in large 
numbers 
More emphasis on corrupting police or 
evading altogether. Pays off high level 
commanders. 
7. Use of symbolic violence Symbolic violence use very heavy. 
Cutting off heads. Youtube.com 
postings, public hangings of bodies 
from bridges. 
Focus on bribery of officials over 
symbolic violence or threats but will 
use symbolic violence in 
confrontations with territorial 
traffickers. 
8. Political campaigns Some funding of local political 
campaigns 
Greater funding of political campaigns 
especially the federal and state levels, 
but also local. 
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9. Management Typically younger leadership often 
more violent (Ephemeral) 
Experienced managers. Typically have 
or hire some business, law, accounting 
degrees, etc. 
10. Use of enforcers More enforcers Fewer enforcers more smugglers and 
intelligence. Enforcers focus on 
bodyguard and security operations. 
11. Size Larger organizations in terms of 
numbers of individuals involved 
Large organizations but higher profit 
margins due to relative numbers 
involved 
12. Violence toward society More violence toward society and 
rival traffickers. More likely to 
have street gun battles and come 
into conflict with police or local 
turf battles. 
Less violence toward society, some 
violence directed at rival traffickers, 
more likely to use intelligence to tip 
state security apparatus off to rivals. 
13. Where profit comes 
from 
Profits primarily from: 
Kidnapping/extortion and taxing 
small smugglers for use of territory 
Profits from trafficking drugs, money 
laundering, financing drug production, 
high profile kidnap victims, legitimate 
businesses, front-businesses, 
government contracts, etc. 
14. Retail drug sales More retail drug sales in their 
territory 
Fewer retail drug sales in their home 
territories 
15. Domestic use of street 
gangs 
More use of local street gangs 
domestically 
Lower use of local street gangs 
domestically 
16. Crime rates Higher crime in areas controlled by 
these groups 
Lower crime rates in areas controlled 
by these groups 
17. Corruption/Bribes Tend to bribe lower levels of 
government (Local Cops) 
Tend to bribe higher levels of 
government (Federal/State) 
18. Adaptability Less adaptable in smuggling 
methods but able to diversify 
activities to compensate. 
Highly adaptable in smuggling 
methods. 
19. Alliance Stability Fewer alliances; less stable. More 
likely to annex local street gangs 
and change their identity. 
More alliances with other groups. 
Alliances more stable and based on 
business interests. More likely to create 
"federations" with other transactional 
cartels. 
20. Trafficking Method 
Sophistication 
Sophistication of trafficking 
dependent upon smuggling group 
being taxed 
More sophisticated trafficking 
methods, sea-submersibles, ventilated 
tunnels, air transport, all of which may 
require large initial investments, etc. 
21. Capital Reserves Less capital reserves resulting in a 
diversification of criminal activity 
to cover overhead of enforcers 
when drug profits drop due to 
market forces or border 
enforcement. 
Greater capital reserves, less need to 
diversify criminal activity. 
22. Violence toward state, 
society and political elites 
Highly violent threat to state, 
society and political elites 
Lower violent threat to state, society 
and political elites. Dangerous 
corrupting influence 
23. Investment in local 
population 
Invest heavily in local population Invest heavily in local population and 
central government corruption 
24. Use of Firepower Heavy emphasis on firepower Lower emphasis on fire power 
25. Assassination 
Strategies 
Random assassination strategies 
(Bounties for killing any police 
officers, etc.) 
Strategic assassinations targeting 





26. Terror Bombings More likely to engage in terror 
bombings 
More likely to ally with state than use 
terror 
 
Table 1: Territorial Versus Transactional Business Strategies by Nathan Patrick Jones, (Nathan Patrick 
Jones, “The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience,“ (PhD. Diss., University of California, Irvine, 
2011), 83–84.) 
 
Definition of Structural Resilience   
Resilience can be described as “the ability to survive a disruptive event.”203 Drug 
trafficking PSINs with international business operations face disruptive events potentially on 
daily basis. For instance, the elimination of key leadership figures through apprehension, arrest 
or even killings can destabilize an organization just as seizures of large drug shipments can 
cause financial bankrupcy of PSIN‘s core nodes. It is insufficient to recognize that disruptive 
events are almost inevitably occuring feature in a life of this type of PSIN. It is important to 
define the variable as well as the circumstances under which a network can be shown to be 
more or less resilient, even if only ex-post facto evaluation of disruptive events is available. 
In existing literature resilience is mostly treated as a simple either-or variable; the 
organization inspected either survived or it did not, and this represents a significant conceptual 
weakness as much as problematic gap in theoretical framework.204 Instead, there is rather a 
significant degree of variance between levels of survival. Just like individuals in cases of 
traumatic events, networks and hierarchies have different responses to disruptive events 
displaying various levels of resilience.205  
In order to include variance and increase validity of the concept it is essential to better 
formulate and explain the variable. Nathan Patrick Jones contributes to the existing scholarly 
literature by introducing a continuum based typology of levels of resilience.206 Jones identifies 
four basic types:  
1. Surviving Intact represents the highest level of resilience, when after a disruptive incident an 
organization is able to survive in its original form without requiring major reorganization. This 
level is mainly characterized by contingency theory designs, which claim that organizations 
maintaining highly adaptive structures as a matter of their standard operating procedure will be 
most adaptable and therefore resilient. In these settings, any reorganization in response to a 
disruptive incident is therefore a regularly occuring process and as such does not represent a 
major restructuring of the organization. Adaptivity represents the main advantage of these 
amorphous organizations, at the same time they can be less successful in responding to 
predictable threats that a more solid hierarchy is capable of combating very efficiently.207  
2. Restructuring represents the second highest level of resilience, when a disruptive incident 
results in the need to restructure. An organization might recognize internally that major 
reconstruction is essential to withstand similar events more successfully or to prevent them 
from occuring in the future. Alternatively, restructuring can be the result of a substantial 
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disruption within the organization. In case of Mexican PSINs disruptive incidents can include 
apprehension, arrest or killings of key management figures. This type of events can 
subsequently force a restructuring of PSINs, or even a violent fragmentation of the illicit 
network.208 
3. Fragmentation represents a lower lever of resilience than orderly restructuring and it applies 
to situations when disruptive incident leads to an internal splitting of the PSIN into smaller 
segments. This fragmentation usually occurs along functional lines within the organization.209 
Such fragmentation usually takes a violent forms of internal conflict with various factions 
within the organization fighting for overall control of the enterprise. 
4. Dissolution represents the lowest level of resilience, when central nodes within the network, 
or potentially entire PSINs, can be dissolved. Such an outcome can be caused by a complex and 
sophisticated law enforcement operations directed at dismantling a node or network as 
demonstrated by various historical examples of effective operations directed at organized crime 
networks in the United States.210 
Resilience of Profit-Seeking Illicit Networks  
State authority responds to different PSIN structures and business strategies differently. 
Predominantly territorial PSINs with business strategies emphasizing kidnapping and extortion 
over drug trafficking will be more likely targeted by state authority, which will effectively lower 
its resilience. States remain as central reference units in the international system and their 
relative power is proportionate to economic size, moral legitimacy and the resources they 
posses. Therefore, seemingly the most critical factor for PSIN’s survival is its relationship to 
the host state.211 
Usually, territorial PSINs require more hierarchical structures due to a fact they need 
more people to patrol their claimed territory. When regular profit flows decrease, territorial 
PSINS must diversify their criminal portfolio in order to sustain payments to its members. Often 
times this includes to rely on mafia style extortion activities.212 Besides the fact that territorial 
PSINs represent a challenge to the logic of the territorially sovereign state, they also provoke 
societal backlash through their extortion activities, which prompt a resolute response from the 
state authority. States tend to perceive territorial PSINs as universal menace, a fact which 
increases the probability of cooperation among nation states against this challenge to the 
predominant unit within the international system.213  
Level of resilience varies between illicit network, but none of them is perfectly resilient. 
PSINs in Mexico demonstrate high levels of resiliency as they continue to survive under intense 
state pressure. Theoretically, should  there be sufficient state resources directed against PSINs, 
they could collapse. In practice, nation state rarely deploys the necessary amount of resources 
against PSINs and is seriously limited in deploying them efficiently. Decreased efficiency is 
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partly due to PSINs business strategies which allow for a modus vivendi with the state through 
corruption.214 
The Life Cycle of Profit-Seeking Illicit Networks (PSINs)  
The figure below, describes the inputs of the various business strategies, the nation 
state’s response to them, and the final output of the level of resilience. It illustrates how the 
state reaction is weak against transactional networks, which then results in the survival or 
reorganization of the illicit PSIN. Strength of state institutions as well as intensity of the state 
reaction determine Whether the PSIN survives intact, reorganizes, fragments or dissolves.  
 
Figure 2: The State Reaction and Profit-Seeking Illicit Network Resilience by Nathan Patrick Jones (Nathan 
Patrick Jones, “The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience,“ (PhD. Diss., University of California, 
Irvine, 2011), 28.) 
 
Usually, large PSINs contain both territorial and transactional segments within their 
structures. Under attack from the state authority or competition via decapitation strikes, they 
tend to fragment along internal transactional and territorial lines and the process repeats. The 
surviving networks will then again provoke a strong or weak state reaction depending on their 
new business strategies and the process proceeds in an evolutionary fashion. 
The lower half of the chart illustrates the path of the territorial PSINs. These PSINs 
provoke a stronger state reaction, which in turn reduces their resilience. Capabilities of state’s 
security apparatus determine whether the reaction will be strong enough to dissolve or fragment 
the PSIN. The chart above also depicts the theory’s iterative nature. Each PSINs resilience is 
constantly being tested in its fight or collusion with the state authority and other rival illicit 
networks.  
The upper half of the chart illustrates the path of transactional PSINs. Depending on the 
state reaction against these PSINs they will be either pushed to restructure or they might survive 
intact. Similarly to the case of territorial PSINs, the final outcome will be heavily influenced 
by the quality of the security and judicial apparatus. 
                                                          




The theory here focuses on how the hosting state reacts to PSINs, it does not include the 
reaction of other states impacted by the drug trade like the consuming nations where the 
negative externalities of drug consumption materialize. The degree of agressivity these states 
deploy against territorial PSINs depends upon the how much their business strategy relies on 
territorial extortion. It is democratic consolidation that reduces the nation state’s threshold for 
tolerance towards even primarily transactional PSINs. Nevertheless, with transactional PSINs 
forebearing extortion and violence even democratically consolidated nation states will focus 
primarily on territorial PSINs that engage in taxation over a given territory by means of 
extortion, kidnapping and murder. All of these violent activities also provoke responses from 
media and civil society, thus further galvanizing the states’ hardline attitude to territorial PSINs. 
How the Public Reaction Stimulates the State Response  
Territorial PSIN violence is caused by multiple factors including young and 
inexperienced leadership figures, a comparative advantage in violence, and limited drug 
trafficking connections. They have a comparative advantage in violence because they take with 
them low level enforcers in their splits with larger PSINs. Their labor force makes any decision 
to become transactional structurally unattainable and thus they are structurally limited to the 
extortionist business strategy until they can establish strong transactional trafficking and 
political contacts.  
Intra and inter-cartel conflict produces violence in form of homicides, kidnappings and 
generally increased crime rates, which creates an intolerable situation for society. Various 
interest networks within the civil society pressure the government to react against territorial 
PSINs for their engagement in extortions and kidnappings because these represent high impact 
crimes the civil society is falling victim to. It is very likely that the violence will be mostly 
concentrated along trafficking routes but the overall homicide rates and media attention will 
push national as well as local governments to respond. Once extortion and kidnappings reach 
into the professional classes and political elites, the critical mass of civil society will begin 
exerting strong pressure on the state and ask it to react. Occasionally, targeting political elites 
for kidnapping is enough to encourage the government apparatus against particular PSINs 
despite their predominantly transactional compositions as was the case of Colombia’s state 
resolute response to the Medellín illicit enterprise in the 1990’s.215 
Often time the victims of kidnapping and extortion are among state employees, 
polititians and officials as much as local businessmen, which increases the state’s willingness 
to respond to the territorial PSINs. Another important factor to realize is that state and civil 
society are often supported by rival PSINs which are taking advantage of additional attention 
brough upon their rivals and which might be in conflict with those territorial PSINs. This 
competition is likely composed of transactional PSINs, since their leadership is likely to have 
closer social ties to public officials and civil society in networks of complicity as well as 
genuine networks of trust and kinship.216 Maintaining and developing this relationship between 
the state authorities and transactional illicit networks represents the valuable capital reserves 
and huge profit to membership ratios these networks can achieve to bribe public officials and 
the state apparatus in general. Moreover, these transactional PSINs have a clear incentive to 
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supply actionable intelligence to the state‘s coercive apparatus against their territorial PSIN 
competitors.217  
Once territorial PSINs begin to realize that the coercive state apparatus has turned 
against them, they are likely to grow even more desperate in their attempts to shift that 
relationship. Having proportionally limited profits and lower capacity to corrupt at their 
disposal, they often decide to deploy terror tactics against the law enforcement and the military. 
This in turn causes further galvanization of the state, civil society and provokes increase in 
coercive response against the PSINs. With violence being the only skill in their management 
toolbox, territorial PSINs overhelmingly rely on bombings of police and military and symbolic 
violence against the general population to force both groups into submission. Facing the 
combined forces of the state’s coercive apparatus, rivaling PSINs and sometimes foreign 
governments and ther supranational entities, territorial PSINs suffer from lower resilience, 
which results in fragmentation or possibly dissolution.  
The only scenarion where territorial PSINs demonstrate higher levels of resiliency is 
when the state is proportionally weaker and the PSINs on the other hand strong enough to 
replace the state. Occurence of this particular scenario is rather rare but ultimately possible in  
failed states like Haiti or Somalia where territorial and insurgent PSINs assume governing 
characteristics and effectively replace the state.  
The critically important factors here are the strength of state institutions and the level of 
democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation has ameliorative impacts on the state’s 
ability to effectively control organized crime. In comparison, weak states on the verge of failure 
or failed state might find themselves in a situation where extortionist PSIN might represent a 
viable alternative structure of governance.218 Such cases are rare, but possible. In consolidated 
democracies there is much less tolerance for PSINs of any kind and the states are more likely 
and more willing to reach across national borders to target the PSIN‘s leadership. This outreach 
is politically feasible due to the public‘s support for strong anti-criminal efforts in consolidated 
democracies where the state is also willing to act with resolution and aggressivity and violate 
other state’s sovereignty when their own national security is threatened through acts like 
targeted killings of law enforcement and the military.219 One example of a PSIN killing a state 
law enforcement official is the 1985 killing of DEA agent Enrique Camarena that triggered a 
powerful response from the United States government. That reaction resulted in the 
dismantlement of the Guadalajara Cartel or the loose federation that had dominated Mexican 
trafficking. Moreover, state bureaucracies in all these states are also more inclined to increase 
and institutionalize collaboration with foreign governments when facing the threat represented 
by violent illicit traffickers thus increasing the spread of democratic values at the bureaucratic 
level.220  
Nation states maintain the preponderance of power in the existing international system. 
Many states, among them Mexico, have relatively large GDPs and substantial tax bases to 
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bankroll their own coercive apparatuses in its mission to eliminate illicit networks.221 But the 
modern states have many other social responsibilities such as providing for education, health 
services, pensions and infrastructure.222 In the end, PSINs operating with proportionatelly less 
overal earnings than the state have actually upper hand in diverting larger resources towards 
intelligence collection and combating government efforts since the PSINs are free of the other 
social expenses that states must cover.  
Rivalry Among PSINs as an Alternative Explanation  
Possible counterargument to Jones‘s state reaction argument of PSIN resilience is that 
rival illicit networks may be even more relevant to destruction of other PSINs than the nation 
states. Such an argument would be certainly relevant to Mexico where drug-related violence 
strongly correlates with inter-cartel warfare. PSINs might substantially contribute to defeat of 
their competitors by successfully forging alliance with the state authorities. This might explain 
why the levels of violence across Mexico usually correlate with the deployment of the Mexican 
armed forces and inter-cartel warfare.223 We can observe transactional profit-seeking illicit 
networks corrupting the state authority and then directing the state’s coercive apparatus towards 
the territorial PSINs. Therefore, Jones’s state reaction argument addresses rival illicit networks’ 
impact on resilience by including corruption as intervening variable attributed to transactional 
illicit networks and their assistance to the state coercive apparatus.224 
Theoretical Implications of the State Response to Profit-Seeking Illicit Networks 
If territorial PSINs display lower resiliency due to the state authority’s response to them, 
then surviving PSINs will be likely more transactional in their business model and lacking in 
political agenda, besides what is essential to achieve their business goals. The surviving 
transactional PSINs, while maintaining a lower profile, will incorporate themselves into the 
state apparatus and create territories of plural authority within the state largely in areas mostly 
related to law enforcement and trafficking routes.225 In areas, where these PSINs will display 
suffcient size and strength as well ability to accumulate resources in core nodes of wheel 
networks is sufficient, then the PSINs will have the capability to influence both national and 
local politics. The key ability necessary to effectively combat these PSINs might not be the 
military capability, rather it will be improved and empowered judicial institutions, prison 
system and other related aspects of the working legal system usually associated with 
consolidated democracies.  
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The overall profits of PSINs enable them to fund political campaigns and influence the 
political system. There is an interesting observation that corruption can actually serve to limit 
the trafficker’s ability to influence elections. In developing countries, government contracts 
tend to be much larger than the real costs of the given contract. A part of the markup is then 
directed to bankroll political campaigns in an effort to secure contracts in the future. In such 
design, it is actually government money funding elections, which mitigates the effects of drug 
money on the political processes as it decentralizes the sources of corruption. 226  
As noted earlier, states and territorial profit-seeking illicit networks are enemies, 
because they are so much alike. They are both territorial, hierarchical, resilient, prone to 
violence and funded by taxation. Thus, states will target territorial illicit networks first by 
reducing their resilience. Territoriality leads to the diversification of criminal activities like 
extortion, kidnapping, oil theft, retail drug sales all of which increase societal pressure on 
democratic states to eliminate the threat. For instance, by 2008 kidnappings of middle-class 
professionals such as doctors and engineers in Tijuana became so widespread that they 
threatened a strike.227 A societal backlash reduces territorial PSIN intelligence gathering 
capabilities and weakens them vis-à-vis the state and other illicit networks. 
Exchanging periods of PSIN’s fragmentation and confrontations with the state 
facilitates the process of natural selection between transactional and territorial PSINs. Once 
illicit networks fragment along their functional lines, the resulting outcome is a fighting 
between newly formed territorial and transactional factions. In these circumstances, especially 
young and inexperienced leadership will often decide to respond to violence with further 
violence and in the end will face a continually increasing threat from the state.228 If the territorial 
PSINs demonstrate enough strength, they will be able to endure the state’s attack. If the state is 
sufficiently weak in the scenario, the territorial PSIN can provide a viable alternative structure 
of governance.229  
With all likelihood, transactional PSINs will not fight through these conflicts 
undamaged, but they will have larger cooperation with the state authority through corruption 
and tactics focused on laying low. The surviving transactional illicit networks can even observe 
increase in their profits since during the fighting they have reduced the enforcer ranks and 
revived focus on illicit trafficking and money-laundering activities. When state institutions are 
strong, transactional PSINs are more resilient than their territorial counterparts because they 
represent a lesser challenge to the state and they are more capable of corrupting state authorities 
to create a mutually acceptable modus vivendi.230 At the same time it is important to realize that 
territorial PSINs are usually larger and more hierarchically organized networks with higher 
capability of directly challenge the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.231 
Therefore, territorial illicit networks are the biggest threat to the state and, in turn, they are least 
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resilient when state is strong. Nevertheless, in developing states and in states during democratic 
transition institutions are often weak, but they often receive assistance from neighboring states 
in their efforts to protect their borders and fight illicit non-state actors.232  
It is also important to realize that the territorial and transactional business strategies 
represent the ideal types and most PSINs contain elements of both models. Therefore, a 
thorough understanding of these illicit networks must be acquired by rigorously assessing their 
behaviors, structures as well as how strongly they correlate to these typologically ideal models.  
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3. ASSESSMENTS AND COUNTER-STRATEGIES 
 
3.1. Evolution of Narcoterrorism and the Nature of the Current Drug War in Mexico 
In contrast to the definition I provided in the very first paragraph of Introduction, that 
narcoterrorism represents “the use of excessive violence as indispensable business tactic to 
secure operational environment for profit-seeking illicit drug smuggling enterprise,” the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) of the United States, focusing on the latter part of the word, 
provides a definition of narcoterrorism as “characterized by the participation of groups or 
associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug 
trafficking endeavours in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities”.233 The DEA‘s 
definition switches focus from narcotics to terrorist organisations, emphasizing the fact that 
terrorist organisations occasionally use illicit drug trafficking as a source of revenue for their 
activities. 
Seemingly inevitable ambiguity then results in duality of meaning with varying 
emphasis placed on either the narcotics related dimension or terrorism. Within this context it is 
important to aknowledge that recognotion of the term’s duality complicates rather than 
facilitates discussion on the two concepts involved. 
Weinberg argues that terrorism conceptually suffers from ‘stretching’ as it is lately often 
attached to other phenomena, such as cyber-terrorism and narco-terrorism, which results in the 
risk of adopting the term to a variety of different concepts and thereby the diffusion of its 
definition.234 Some authors avoid usage of term completely when contemplating the 
convergence between criminal and terrorist entities.235  
Recognizing the conceptual ambiguity of narco-terrorism, with the ambition to provide 
more nuanced perspective of the concept with regard to the academic and policy spheres, I 
provide a theoretical framework, which draws upon the crime-terror continuum model 
introduced by Tamara Makarenko.236 Her model perceives organised crime and terrorist 
organisations as extreme points on a crime-terror continuum, where most illicit enterprises can 
be represented depending on their inclination towards one of the extremes and the nature of 
their operational environment. Makarenko identifies four different categories of relationships 
between the two types of organisations, specifically: alliances, operational motivations, 
convergence and the ‘black hole’.237 This model takes into account possible changes in 
motivation that governs the group action, which results in fluid rather than fixed position of 
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each organization on the continuum.238 Moves along the continuum can be stimulated by 
internal changes within the organisation or by changing operational environment.  
Makarenko claims that drug trade represents the most common criminal activity for 
terrorist organisations.239 If the crime segment of the continuum would be perceived as solely 
illicit drug trade, the crime-terror continuum itself can be used as a tool to clarify the concept 
of narcoterrorism. Despite the fact that such a simplification fails to account for certain 
occurences, it provides better understanding and more practical depiction of interaction between 
crime and terrorism and as such it contributes as a theoretical complement to the definition of 
narcoterrorism.  
The above mentioned observations lead to a conclusion relevant for this dissertation, 
specifically, that narcoterrorism might be perceived as a business tactic, one in the variety of 
methods in illicit entrepreneur’s tool box, which can be deployed when necessary. The 
following pages will demonstrate that drug trafficking enterprises do not exercise brutal 
violence for ideological reasons, but their deliberations are practical, logical and economically 
rationalized.   
Soon after his election as Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched Operation 
Michoacán at the end of 2006 in an explicit effort to further militarize the state anti-narcotics 
efforts. Since then much of Mexico has become a war zone where government violently clashes 
with cartel over control and this development has attracted increased attention from scholars, 
journalists as well as general public. Newspapers in the U.S., Mexico and around the globe 
started to produce regular coverage of the drug war developments providing vivid descriptions 
of horrific personal stories, murders and brutal executions as well as impacts on Mexican 
economy or the deteriorating rule of law across the country. Moreover, the mainstream culture 
embraced the topic and in the recent years many TV shows and movies have been produced 
depicting lives of famous narcos. Due to regular widespread media coverage, many spectators 
became household experts and armchair strategists on illicit drug trafficking. Yet, more 
attention paid to the phenomenon does not necessarily translate into deeper insights since 
entertainment is not equivalent to analysis-based understanding and in consequence few can 
still make sense of what is happening in Mexico. 
What is the nature of the Mexican drug war? With its focus on cartel-state conflict, the 
“criminal insurgency“ approach might prove helpful in providing explanation, but its 
perspective on  insurgency as an effort to weaken the state elides substantial differences in goals 
of rebels and cartels. While rebellion engages a state to seize mutually valued territory and 
resourses, cartels fight the state aiming to constrain the state’s behavior and to influence its 
policies. In consequence, ultimate victory in the struggle plays vital role in most cases of civil 
war, but is rather undesirable in wars of constraint. “Criminal war“ theory must then explain 
how sustained coercive violence can be a preferred alternative to pacific strategies. Benjamin 
Lessing identifies two coercive logics of cartel–state conflict: violent lobbying and violent 
corruption.240 Since the lobbying alternative offers more universalistic benefits, turf war among 
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cartels should make its occurence rarer than that of violent corruption. Both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence from Mexico and Colombia supports this prediction. 
Since 2006, drug-related violence has claimed some 150,000 lives in Mexico and 
roughly 34,000 people went missing.241 Such a heavy body count significantly surpasses the 
standard of 1,000 battle casualties per year in common definition of a civil war. Indeed, in the 
scholarly analysis of warfare “criminal“ might well be the new “civil“. Furthermore, direct 
comparison with civil war data, see the figure below, demonstrates that the drug war in Mexico 
is, by many standards, the most violent sub-national conflict of the 21st century. Still, from the 
historical perspective, Mexican drug war represents only the most recent chapter in the 
phenomenon of inter-cartel and cartel-state conflict in Latin America, alongside the Colombian 
drug war period between 1984–1993. Militarized drug wars have heavily afflicted three largest 
countries in Latin America, arguably replacing revolutionary insurgency as the prevalent form 
of conflict in the hemisphere.  
Public figures as well as scholars have described Mexico’s conflict as a civil war, 
sometimes as an epithet, but mostly to convey the gravity of the situation.242 To some extent 
the classification of drug-related conflicts as civil wars represents a potential barrier to 
understanding the phenomenon. From the political perspective civil war is usually represented 
by high degree of instability and loss of state control243 with potential consequences for 
international intervention.244 From the analytical perspective, there is a popular narrative in 
current conflict studies which promotes greed as one of the key motives for rebels, sometimes 
it even perceives insurgency as organized crime.245 Nevertheless, the fundamental question in 
the effort to understand the drug war, neither the intensity nor the particular motives driving the 
parties involved, primary focus should be on its dynamics as these resemble or differ from other 
kinds of wars. Tangible conceptualization of criminal war should stem from observable 
characteristics that underline differences in prevalent logics of violence. Disregarding 
fundamental differences can result in state policies which are not only ineffective, but 
potentially counterproductive.   
The fundamental difference between drug wars and revolutionary insurgencies is that 
drug trafficking organizations do not aim to overthrow the government and seize power 
themselves. Without viable conceptual alternative, the prevailing tendency has been to perceive 
Mexican drug war as a criminal subtype of insurgency.246 The benefir of this approach consists 
in its focus on the traffickers‘ willingness to directly confront state power with lethal force, a 
characteristic which separates Mexican, and previously Colombian, traffickers from the other 
organized crime groups on the continent. Unlike trafficking in illicit narcotics and corruption 
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of state authorities, which occur commonly in many places, conflict between cartels and state 
power is far more unique.  
Despite its initially promising outlook, the “criminal insurgency“ approach ultimately 
overreaches in its ambition, when the concept of insurgency is stretched to include revolution 
and secession as well as intimidation and degradation of state forces.247 In consequence,  
insurgency as “competitive state-building“248 is replaced with much broader notion of “state-
weakening.“ Omitting substantial differences between the aims of rebels and drug traffickers 
results in failure to clarify the fundamental question, which is why to challenge the state by 
force if there is no ambition to overthrow it or to secede from it. The seemingly obvious answer, 
which is to prevent government intervention into their activities, does not qualify because many 
criminals and organized crime groups would like to secure that outcome, but very few of them 
resort to violence against the state power to achieve it. A notable exception was the Sicilian 
mafia’s brutal assassination of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in the early 1990s. 
Once there are reasonable prospects for victory, insurgencies decide to fight the state to 
overthrow it and to establish their own régime. Similarly, drug trafficking enterprises engage 
their competition in order to achieve tangible results, extending market share or expanding their 
territory. Insurgencies and turf wars follow the same guiding logic of tangible outcomes, mostly 
in a form of conquest. The theory claims that in the context of weak institutions, actors will 
engage in violence to establish physical control over mutually valued territory or resources 
when satisfactory outcomes cannot be secured by bargaining.249 Moreover, conquest can be 
decisive, resulting outcomes could be definite and difficult to reverse. 
Less obvious are tangible results, which might be achieved by violently challenging the 
state, since open contest usually generates more state repression. Furthermore, cartels do not 
seek to topple the regime so there is virtually no chance of decisive victory, at least in a form 
that would justify the costs of the conflict. For this particular reason, criminals and illicit 
entrepreneurs globally prefer to avoid direct confrontation with authorities, choosing 
anonymity, low profile and corruption as concealment techniques to prevent exposure to law 
enforcement. 
Arguably, when illicit traffickers choose to openly fight the state, their strategic goal is 
not to overthrow the state, but to constrain it, to change its behavior, which effectively means 
to change its policies. The function of violence in these wars of constraint is coercive, that is to 
make people, or the government, to avoid certain behavior.250 War of conquest, on the other 
hand, is usually synonymous with deployment of brute force aimed to seize property or 
territory. Occasionally, insurgency may resort to coercion, but only within the context of its 
larger objective, which is ultimately conquest. Potentially, insurgents might be willing to accept 
compromise, but this outcome is likely temporary at best, since the desired prospect of final 
conquest undermines any negotiations short of victory.251 In contrast, parties to wars of 
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constraint do not aim for decisive defeat of the opposing side and they use brute force more 
tactically, in service of their larger objective, which is essentially coercive. 
Lessing further develops this conquest versus constraint distinction into a broader 
typology of conflict, in which he provides new perspective on some of the issues neglected in 
Blattman and Miguel’s debate on “greed versus grievance”252 and Kalyvas’s “old versus new 
wars” theory.253 While distinguishing psychological motivation from ideological beliefs 
represents a conceptual as much as empirical challenge, distinction between conquest and 
constraint is clearer, although not always directly observable. Furthermore, deeper strategic 
differences become visible when focus is placed on the structure of the contested rents. The 
objective in the wars of constraint is not physical appropriation, because neither of the 
beligerents desires what the opponent holds. Therefore, decisive victories become less likely or 
even undesirable as the logic of coercive bargaining prevails.  
Addressing this challenge, Lessing delineates two main logics of antistate violence 
driving cartel–state conflict. The first is violent lobbying, when drug trafficking organizations 
target political leaders aiming to change existing de jure policies. Such was the case of Pablo 
Escobar’s total war on the Colombian government between 1984 and 1991. The second is 
violent corruption, when drug traffickers target law enforcement agencies and officers aiming 
to intimidate them and lower the price of bribes. The best manifestation of this type of logic 
was Pablo Escobar’s strategy of plata o plomo mentioned earlier. In addition to these two 
categories, Lessing distinguishes other logics of violence, which arise from turf wars between 
drug traffickers. One is a logic known in Mexico as calentando la plaza, when a cartel attacks 
rival territory in order to attract law enforcement. The other logic consists of competitive and 
internal signaling.254 
Lessing further deduces critical variables and conditions favoring the adoption of 
distinct violent strategies, as well as specific patterns of violence that are likely to emerge under 
each logic. In lobbying there is increased chance for free riding, therefore violent lobbying is 
more common or more likely to occur where cartels cooperate. Similarly, as corruption is more 
particularistic, inter-cartel turf wars should favor the logic of violent corruption. Qualitative 
evidence seems to support the general principles of this theory. In Mexico, where turf wars 
predate cartel–state conflict, violent lobbying is rather unique phenomenon. Whereas in 
Colombia, cartels were at relative peace in the early period and had established mechanisms for 
collective action, which made violent lobbying a salient feature at the early stages. 
Quantitatively, data focused on cartel-related violence in Colombia and Mexico seem to be 
supporting the notion, since occurrence of terror tactics associated with violent lobbying was 
more frequent in Colombia than Mexico. It is appropriate to mention here that turf-war 
dynamics alone are unlikely to produce cartel–state violence, but could be perceived as 
complementary to violent corruption. 
  
                                                          
252 Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, “Civil War,“ Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 1 (March 
2010): 18. 
253 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New‘ and ‘Old‘ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?“, World Politics 54, no. 1 (2001). 





Conceptualizing the Conflict Between PSINs and the State 
Conceptually, drug wars are often perceived as representing the extreme of a continuum 
between ideological and commercial or criminal struggles. Despite the fact such a distinction 
has its merit, for example the fight of the Zapatistas is Mexico is more political than the conflict 
of Los Zetas, its usefulness is limited. First, there is a heavy normative valence since ideological 
motives are widely perceived as morally superior to purely economic ones, which results in 
conceptual contestation.255 Analytically, the debate is similar to that of greed vs. grievance256, 
and practically, the contest is in the fighting and negotiating between armed groups and states 
over the political status. 
Moreover, there is a substantial difference in rent-producing characteristics between 
various categories of criminal activities.257 On one hand, states directly compete with criminal 
groups over rents from natural resource as well as the right to extort populations through 
taxation. On the other hand, state authority may attempt to minimize illicit drug trafficking 
profits but it cannot capture them. Furthermore, criminal activities such as extortion or 
kidnapping require coercive expropriation, which generates a constituency of potential victims 
willing to spend resources on prevention. In contrast, the essential characteristic of illicit drug 
trade is voluntary exchange, which generates a constituency of paying consumers. This demand 
for illicit trafficking underlines a critical fact of the trade: supression or elimination of one PSIN 
generally favours its competition. This fact is what distinguishes drug trade from other illicit 
activities, since the same is unlikely to be valid for kidnapping rings, extortionists, or most 
insurgencies. 
In summary, the political vs. criminal distinction alone does not provide strong guidance 
to cartels’ strategic concerns. This is particularly valid for a conflict between cartel and state. 
Metz helpfully focuses on increasing willingness among non-ideological groups to challenge 
states258 while also exploring key differences in motivations of such groups.259 But the ongoing 
expansion of insurgency-related adjectives, including “commercial insurgency,” “post-Cold 
War insurgency”260, “criminal insurgency”261 or “the new urban insurgency”262, has served 
primarily to expand the concept of insurgency to include organized antistate violence in general, 
and potentially any state-weakening action, irrespective of its strategic objectives or prevalent 
logic. Furthermore, the conceptual overstretching263 is equally valid to related terms such as 
territory, space, or even the state, as scholars seek to rationalize and incorporate new 
phenomena such as gangs, cartels, or terrorists in terms of familiar, older ones. 
Instead of rethinking insurgency to the point where it no longer implies a struggle to 
overthrow a government or secede from a state, Lessing takes a different approach and treats 
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‘proximate aims of fighting’ as a key variable in conflict definition. In this particular case is 
whether particular groups fight for formal political control or not. Lessing thus develops upon 
concepts discussed in civil war scholarship. Kalyvas identifies competitive state building as the 
central goal for insurgents and considers organized and sustained rebellion occuring in civil 
wars distinct from phenomena such as banditry or mafias.264 Fearon and Laitin perceive civil 
wars as conflicts fought simply to change policy.265 Reality might be different, since the aim of 
the rebel side in most civil wars is to overthrow the central government or to take political 
control of a territory. Rebel groups rarely declare that their main objective is to induce the 
government to change its policy on certain issue, and once that is accomplished the will disarm, 
disband and leave politics.266 
Interstingly enough, on some occasions cartels have announced precisely this when 
attacking states or when attacking civilians to exert pressure on state leaders. An example of 
such communique came from Pablo Escobar regarding his campaign of bombings, top-level 
assassinations and systematic extermination of police officers and kidnappings in the 1980s 
when fighting the extradition treaty. In 1986, he publicly promised to lay down arms once 
extradition is suspended. Another example was the greeting from Mexico’s Knights Templar 
to the incoming President Enrique Peña Nieto with narco-banners reading: “If you honor your 
promise [to alter the course of the drug war], we will lay down our arms … otherwise we will 
continue to defend our territory”.267 
In more general terms, in classic insurgency the proximate aim of fighting is conquest, 
in which contestants seek to expropriate from or replace their competition. Combating nation 
states implies competitive state building, even when only a portion of the national territory is 
contested. By contrast, Cartel-state represents a war of constraint, where belligerents seek to 
coerce opponents into changing their behavior or policies. This distinction is intended to 
characterize, not to define: insurgents could engage in wars of constraint but they rarely do just 
as illicit drug cartels could aim to seize formal state power, but they have not yet done so. 
Lessing claims that distinguishing between conflicts based on how they are fought can help us 
theorize about why. 
On a strategic level, conquest versus constraint represents an extension to the distinction 
that Schelling268 defined at the tactical level between brute force and coercion. He argued that 
there is a difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you. 
Similarly, there is a difference between holding what people are trying to take and making them 
afraid to take it. It is the basic difference between defense and deterrence.269 
Contemplating interstate war, Schelling notes that both tactics may be deployed and 
what is coercive at some level of analysis may be part of a larger brute force campaign.270 Such 
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is the case of civil war, where rebels may deploy coercive tactics in pursuit of conquest and 
may occasionally be satisfied with a coerced change in government policy short of outright 
victory. Yet their ultimate goal – taking what they want – remains.  
In comparison, cartels cannot simply take what they want from the state, because 
ultimately what they want is not something in the state’s possession, but rather something they 
would like to prevent the state from doing. Even in areas and territories where cartels wield 
substantial control, they do not aim for a complete removal of a state presence; their main 
interest remains constriction of state repression directed against their illicit economic activities. 
Tactically, cartels can sometimes deploy brute force defensively in order to maintain possession 
of guns, drugs, and money that enforcers intend to seize. Still, deterrence is more effective than 
successful defense; better than defending what the law enforcement authority attempts to seize 
would be making the police afraid to take it. 
Similarly, nation states can neither effectively conquer illicit rents, which the cartels 
obtain from trafficking, nor can authorities realistically secure preferred outcomes by force. 
Nonetheless, states do seek not only constraint, but destruction of cartels. Here, it is important 
to distinguish between states’ tactical goals of dismantling a cartel from larger strategic 
objectives in fighting drug wars. Simple rhetoric is a complicated guide to identifying those 
aims since international drug prohibition treaties keep setting total eradication as presumably 
plausible objective, and authorities frequently label dismantling cartels as victory.271 Yet, 
empirically there are virtually no examples of sustained eradication of viable drug trade.  
Skaperdas holds that “the struggle to control organized crime is a never-ending process, not a 
battle or a war that can be completed within the foreseeable future.”272 In other words, any 
reasonable state authority must recognize its drugwar aims to be constraint instead of total 
elimination of illicit drug markets. 
Relative observability is among advantages of the “conquest versus constraint” 
distinction. Naturally, battle objectives may represent undeclared motives that must ultimately 
be included in order to operationalize the distinction. Yet it is certainly easier to correctly asses 
whether an armed group is seeking to replace the state authority or whether its guiding 
motivation is greed. Among the few points analysts agree on is that drug cartels generally lack 
revolutionary ambitions. In comparison, the greed versus grievance approach has been marked 
by observational equivalence of the two types of motivations.273 
Another observable advantage is that the “conquest versus constraint” distinction 
indicates distinct underlying logics of violence. This holds even if rebels seek to defeat state 
power only to influence policy and could be potentially opened to government concessions 
were it not for commitment problems.274 In these cases, there are low prospects for negotiated 
settlements because rebels assume that the state authorities will not honor their promises once 
they disarm. Therefore, only by seizure of state power can rebels secure their preferred 
outcomes and policies. Generally, when actors face potentially negative shifts in relative power 
during peacetime they may prefer destructive fighting because it secures desirable distribution 
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of benefits while they are relatively strong.275 In lottery models, securing of outcomes occurs 
via a decisive battle since conquest prevents future shifts in the balance of power by eliminating 
competition. In process models, fighting produces permanent results when it is decisive or when 
it diminishes loss of relative power should the rebels surrender their arms.276 Therefore, 
demanding conflict can be preferred alternative to settlement even when there is virtually 
certain prospect for a permanent stalemate.277 
Such approach, however, is not suitable for cartel–state conflict. Within that context, 
decisive victory is likely unrealistic and therefore not a meaningful solution to commitment 
problems. Even decisive military victory over the state authority would not secure desirable 
policy or distribution of rents for cartels. In the existing international system, an explicit narco-
state holding a monopoly on cross-border smuggling is virtually unthinkable. In contrast, 
aspiring insurgencies can reasonably hope for military victory as well as for international 
legitimacy.278 From the nation state perspective destruction of existing cartels simply offers 
market share to competition, dynamic which is highly inlikely for insurgencies. 
Secondly, in cartel–state conflict negative shifts in power during peacetime may be 
significantly smaller or there might none at all. While civil war models assume that rebels 
disarm whenever they cease to fight, there is an expectation for cartels to maintain their capacity 
for violence even in peacetime due to their illicit business model. Therefore, cartels could 
promise not to disarm in response to policy concessions and states could promise to honor those 
concessions. Another reason why cartels are less susceptible to hostile shifts in power during 
peacetime is that they can corrupt state enforcers without direct fighting. In summary, in cartel–
state conflict the strategic dynamic which drives commitment problems as well as the 
mechanism by which fighting resolves them may be less relevant. 
On the other hand, actual negotiation might prove significantly more difficult and often 
frustrating. While negotiating with rebels might be politically challenging, nation states face a 
virtual taboo when it comes to open negotiations with drug cartels and other criminal 
organizations. Furthermore, there is no clear concept how such an agreement would look like. 
Possibly, cartels could promise to end their trafficking business in exchange for amnesty just 
as Escobar did in 1980s Colombia. Although, considering the financial profitability of 
trafficking such promises are hardly credible. Even if state authorities could financially 
motivate opposing cartels, new cartels could later fill the unmet demand on the market and then 
seek to their own deal with the government. In consequence, the most realistic form of a deal 
would likely involve secretly offering cartels greater freedom to continue profiting from their 
criminal activities that states are committed to fight by international treaty, while demanding 
non-violence from the cartels in return. On the rare occasions these politically extremely 
sensitive policies have been attempted, they proved relatively effective but difficult to sustain. 
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For instance, the Calderón’s administration in Mexico publicly ruled them out on various 
occasions.279 
Therefore, theories of cartel–state conflict must clarify how sustained combat can 
represent an optimal response for cartels when neither decisive victory nor a sustainable deal 
are viable options, and where forestalling adverse shifts in power is not a substantial factor. The 
resulting suggestion is to focus on how antistate violence could maximize an ongoing flow of 
profits from illegal activities, with particular attention paid to the coercive use of violence to 
punish opponents, rather than seeking protection from them. 
 
 
Figure 3: Proximate Aims of Fighting by Benjamin Lessing (Benjamin Lessing, “Logics of Violence in 
Criminal War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 8 (2015): 1495. 
 
In the figure above Lessing extends the distinction between conquest and constraint to 
a broader set of conflict and belligerent types. The contents of individual cells provide only 
examples, not exhaustive descriptors. Moreover, real-world historic examples may cross cell 
borders or even shift between them over time. For instance, in the Opium Wars, Britain both 
annexed parts of Chinese territory (conquest) and imposed significant policy concessions 
(constraint). Coups inspired, organized or led from abroad may confuse the line between pure 
conquest and the intention to constrain specific actions of neighbor. Similarly, conflicts may 
also evolve over time and what began as revolutionary insurgency, with both sides truly fighting 
for control of the state, can degrade into a criminal war with rebels hiding in the jungle while 
subsisting on drug profits for decades with no clear ambition to capture the center or secede 
from the state. 
The top rows of Lessing’s chart are of principal interest because they distinguish cartel–
state conflict from revolutionary insurgency as well as from inter-cartel turf war. Especially the 
latter distinction is of vital importance because cartel–state conflict and turf war are seemingly 
interrelated, yet they have each occurred in the absence of the other indicating differing logics 
and motivations. For instance, in Colombia cartels were peacefully allied when cartel–state 
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conflict emerged. Moreover, there is a differing empirical pattern. Turf wars tend to occur in 
all segments of the illicit-narcotics supply chain, anywhere from plantations to retail markets, 
and they involve small street-level gangs as much as transnational corporations. Turf wars also 
vary in intensity and duration. In comparison, cartel–state conflict is far more unique since most 
illicit traffickers in most countries tend to avoid direct confrontation with the state, but in 
Colombia and Mexico it has been a prolonged conflict once it broke out. Lessing’s typology 
offers an explanatory hypothesis that cartel–state conflict erupts only when traffickers view 
sustained armed confrontation as optimal, so existing cases will likely involve only large and 
well-equipped illicit trafficking enterprises. 
In broader terms, this typology clarifies relationship between the nature of the contested 
profits and the dynamics of conflict, which is a connection often obscured by a simplistic 
perception of political versus criminal. Wars of conquest, motivated by either greed or 
grievance, tend to be fought over rivalrous goods that are similarly valued by both sides. It is a 
zero-sum game for both sides and considering that war destroys many of that mutually valued 
goods, in theory there are possible distributions of prize both sides would prefer as alternative 
to war. However, in wars of constraint neither side pursues exactly what the other possesses, 
therefore one side’s loss does not equal the other side’s gain. For instance, a diamond mine 
expropriated by rebel forces is a diamond mine lost to the state. In contrast, an extra dollar in 
cartel profits does not equal a loss of a dollar for the state. The critical difference is that narcotics 
prohibition generates nearly limitless source of profits that criminal entities can compete over, 
but which nation states have no direct access to. Considering the gigantic proportions of the 
world illicit drug trade compared to other criminal activity, the focus on the structure of criminal 
rents is a prospective avenue for future research. 
Logics of Violence: Lobbying versus Corruption 
In the following pages a theory of cartel–state conflict as a war of constraint will be 
explained and defended. In both of the principal logics discussed here, violence is perceived as 
coercive and fighting is not motivated by the prospect of winning a decisive control over 
territory or power. The theory itself is not a logical consequence of the distinction between 
conquest v. constraint, rather it derives from a larger empirical study of the Mexican and 
especially the Colombian cases, which provide the main examples for the principal logics 
discussed subsequently. 
Classification of cartel–state conflict as a war of constraint carries an implicit hypothesis 
that cartels fight governments and states to influence policy. While supporting evidence exists 
from various examples in Colombia, including Escobar’s war against extradition treaty, in 
Mexico public demands by cartels for changes in de jure policy have been rare. Although, 
within this context Scott made an argument that corruption, perceived as bribery in exchange 
for nonenforcement, should also be considered as a mode of influence, with policy outcomes 
as the ultimate interest.280 This is particularly valid for criminal enterprises, who may often find 
it easier to weaken the law enforcement through bribery than to alter the laws themselves. 
Developing on Scott’s insights, Lessing labels attempts to influence the formulation of 
de jure policy as lobbying, an effort usually aimed at leaders such as key executives, legislators, 
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and top tier commanders. At the same time, efforts to influence enforcement, or de facto policy, 
he labels as corruption, which is normally directed at enforcers such as police, soldiers and 
investigators. The distinction outlined is not absolute since some officials have influence over 
both de jure and de facto policy and therefore they might be pressured to change both, as with 
judges represent enforcement when handing down individual sentences that simultaneously set 
policy precedents. Here, Scott’s argument that benefits of corruption are particularistic while 
those of lobbying are more universal can help to make distinction between a corruption effort 
directed at reducing one’s own sentence and a lobbying effort to deliver a favorable 
precedent.281 
 
Figure 4: Levels of Policy Influence by Benjamin Lessing (Benjamin Lessing, “The Logic of Violence in 
Criminal War: Cartel-State Conflict in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia,” (PhD. Diss., University of California, 
Berkeley, 2012), 30.) 
 
Legitimate interest groups may deploy ruthless tactics while lobbying or corrupting, but 
they hardly resort to violence.282 In comparison, cartels already cope with certain levels of 
repression, which provides them with incentives to hide, maintain a low profile and minimize 
confrontation. At the same time, it can make violence perspective as a means to influence if it 
results in little additional state repression. Strategically, the choice between hiding and fighting 
is demanding, since these two alternatives undermine each another. While fighting increases 
leverage over state actors, its cost is the low profile that hiding affords, and vice versa.  
Combination of these individual dimensions produces four differing strategies. Among 
these, hiding strategies represent conventional corruption and lobbying. Violent corruption 
occurs when cartels deploy violence to influence enforcement. Normally, this means for 
enforcers to receive bribes, but there are more options available including pure intimidation, 
pressuring enforcers to inflict repression on rivals, or directly eliminating honest individual 
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enforcers unwilling to comply.. Violent lobbying is represented by cartels deploying violence 
to pressure leaders to implement de jure policy changes. 
 
Figure 5: Strategies of Influence Over Policy Outcomes by Benjamin Lessing (Benjamin Lessing, “Logics of 
Violence in Criminal War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 8 (2015): 1498.) 
 
The two main cartels of Colombia’s narco-violence period of 1984–1993 exemplified 
these strategies. Pablo Escobar’s Medellín cartel was a prime example of the fighting approach 
at both levels. His notorious offers of plata o plomo to politicians, judges, military and police 
officers, threats regularly backed up by hundreds of usually brutal assassinations, truly captured 
the essence of violent corruption. Similarly, his widespread campaigns of terrorist violence 
consisting of bombings, high-profile assassinations and kidnappings, multiplied by public 
demands to abolish extradition, was perhaps the most notorious example of violent lobbying 
witnessed to date. 
In contrast to Medellín, the Cali cartel deliberately minimalized the use of violence, 
avoided public attention and focused on developing a respectable profile. Cali cartel’s leader 
Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela famously rejected Escobar’s notion of violent corruption and 
described his own hiding strategy: “We don’t kill judges (…) we buy them”.283 Naturally, 
Escobar bribed judges as well; only he discovered that violent death threats made the bribery 
process less difficult. At the de jure level, the Cali cartel did not join Escobar’s total war, it 
actually ended up collaborating with state authority to bring him down in 1993.284 
Subsequently, it offered enormous campaign donations to leading presidential candidates in 
exchange for a negotiated amnesty.285 Ernesto Samper agreed to make a deal and honoured his 
promise after he won the presidency. Ultimately, information about cartel donations leaked and 
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subsequent scandal forced Samper to seek capture of the Cali cartel leaders and to dismantle 
their business operation.286 
Various Factors Favoring Violent Corruption and Lobbying  
Violent corruption and violent lobbying are not mutually exclusive as demonstrated in 
the case of the Medellín cartel. Still, there is a variety in conditions under which it is reasonable 
to deploy these strategies. The minimum requirement for success in violent corruption is some 
level of police corruption and the capacity to make credible threats of violence to law enforcers. 
At the same time, cartels have alternative option of nonviolent corruption, which is to offer 
bribes and opt for hiding should law enforcers refuse them. Under equal conditions, offer of 
bribe with accompanying threats of violence should result in lower bribes in equilibrium287; 
cartels must therefore consider this additional leverage against any potential increase in 
repression that antistate violence might bring upon them. The relative advantage of plata o 
plomo style of threats is therefore dependant on the prevalence of corruption and the overall 
levels of repression as well as the degree to which state repression is conditional on the use of 
violence by cartels. Lessing develops a formal model to rigorously explore this trade-off.288  
Lessing’s Model 
The game discussed here has two players: an illicit drug trafficking organization D, and 
a street-level police officer P. It is practicable to perceive a government leader G as a third 
player who defines some of the parameter values prior to the interaction modeled here. Rather 
than explicitly modeling G as a strategic actor, Lessing treats the policy parameters under G’s 
control as exogenously defined, then takes comparative statics to demonstrate how policy 
changes could shift the equilibrium strategies of the players. D chooses first, deciding on a level 
of armament a to spend on weapons and enforcers; these are retrospective costs, so that – a 
appears in D’s payoffs regardless of what branch the game follows. Subsequently, the illicit 
profits y from D’s activities are recognized, where y ~ [ y, y̅ ] is a random variable; D observes 
y, P does not. Realizing that D chooses a before learning y, there is absence of signaling. Then 
P requests a bribe b. D then contemplates three courses of actions: pay the bribe (B), hide (H) 
or fight (F). D’s strategy is a selection of a and a mapping from recognized values of y and P’s 
selection of b to actions: σD : {a;A: {y, b}→∆ { B,H, F }}. P’s strategy is a mapping from a 
and parameter values to bribe demands: σP : {b(a, ∙):{ a, ∙}→b}. The solution concept is 
subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 Payoffs  
If D decides to pay the bribe, he keeps all of the illicit profits y minus the bribe b and 
his retrospective costs a. P obtains the bribe b less the expected cost of corruption d (see below). 
There is an implicit assumption here that P can stop enforcing once he obtains b. 
If D decides to fight or hide, P enforces, causing D to lose a part of realized drug rents. 
To achieve tractability, Lessing models this loss as a contest success function; some of the 
outcomes generalize to a broader class of functional forms. Whether hiding or fighting, D’s loss 
                                                          
286 Rosso José Serrano Cadena, Jaque mate: de cómo la policía le ganó la partida a “El Ajedrecista” ya los 
carteles del narcotráfico (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1999). 
287 Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella, “Plata o Plomo?” 




is dependant in part on the level of repression he faces. Let s represent the overall amount of 
repressive force at state’s disposal, which can be perceived as a combination of manpower, 
technology, equipment and jurisdiction to enforce laws and engage cartels. Then {sh, sf } ≤ s is 
the level of repressive force aimed at D dependant on hiding or fighting respectively. Now, the 
concept of conditionality of repression can be formally defined: repressive policy is conditional 
to the extent that sf > sh . A key assumption here is that P cannot affect these variables, only to 
decide whether to enforce or not. More specifically, Lessing assumes that repression is 
exhausted when D fights, so sf = s, and that sh = s(1 - c), where c ∈ [0, 1] parameterizes 
conditionality of repression. 




If D chooses to hide, then a does not come into play. Instead, D retains  
ɳ
ɳ+sb
 of y, where ɳ is a 
scaling parameter that describes the benefit of hiding relative to fighting. Substantively, ɳ can 
be viewed as an inverse measure of the territoriality of the drug business: when ɳ is low, 
territoriality is high, so that hiding forfeits a substantial portion of rents. 
Lessing normalizes P’s payoff to enforcing when D decides to hide to 0, and says that 
if D chooses to fight, P incurs disutility of ˗ 
𝑎
a+s
 Ø, where Ø is a parameter value describing P’s 
relative reluctance for violence. The fact that, generally, ø ≠ y reflects the notion that in cartel-
state conflict the two sides are not combating for control over the same prize. In situations of 
regularized corruption the police officers are willing to assume the role of rent collectors, but 
they unwilling to physically administer the drug trade, and they would obtain nothing from 
appropriating D’s territory. The figure below represents the game scheme with these generally 
identified payoffs: 
 
Figure 6: Bribe Negotiation Game Tree by Benjamin Lessing (Benjamin Lessing, “The Logic of Violence in 
Criminal War: Cartel-State Conflict in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia,” (PhD. Diss., University of California, 
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)= 0. No bribe is paid, therefore the value of the bribe request b does 
not have any effect on either players’ payoffs to H or F. 






: Regardless of specific parameter values, there exists certain level of 
armament such that by fighting D wins a greater portion of y than by hiding. Fighting when a 
= 0 gains a smaller portion of y than hiding. 
 Drug profits (y)  
The amount of realized profits from illicit drug trafficking represents a random variable 
y, and it is the uncertainty over this particular variable that produces bargaining breakdown in 
equilibrium (for instance, hiding or fighting with positive probability in contrast with always 
paying the equilibrium bribe demand). Although the model is quite robust to different 
specifications for the distribution of y, when the level of uncertainty is low, P often chooses to 
submit a low-ball request that will always be approved. To observe this more clearly, Lessing 
follows Powell and Dal Bó (2009) and specifies y = µ+ ɛ, where µ is fixed and ɛ is a random 
variable with mean zero, distributed over [ɛ, ̅ɛ ]. For tractability, Lessing further assumes that ɛ 
is distributed uniformally, which implies that ɛ = -̅ɛ. Now, the low-ball result mentioned above 
is eliminated each time ̅ɛ > 
µ
ɛ
 . Since the amount of profits is always positive, it is natural to 
assume ̅ɛ < µ  . Therefore, to lock in the model and rule out the low-ball outcome, Lessing 
assumes ̅ɛ > 
µ
2







 Expected sanction from non-enforcement (d)  
From the perspective of the enforcer, the parameter d represents the summary of all 
presumed consequences of non-enforcement net of any bribe accepted. It is a reduced-form way 
of managing the complex dynamics of police corruption. Although not vital for the model’s 
conclusions, Lessing interprets d as generally low when corruption is frequent, and high when 
corruption is rare. The logic is straightforward. First, decompose d thus: d = zd • πd + ψ;   πd = 
f (ed ,ξd ,•)  
where ψ represents the psychological costs of accepting bribe, zd is the punishment P would 
suffer on being caught, and πd is the probability of detainment and successful prosecution. Then, 
πd is a function of anti-corruption effort ed. The government can determine zd and ed directly, 
but a crucial determinant of πd is the number of other enforcers accepting bribes, represented 
here by ξd. From this initial point, various models
289 of corruption and law-enforcement have 
derived multiple equilibria. A desirable equilibrium being the one in which there are few law-
breakers, so that πd and therefore d are high, providing each officer with motivation to comply. 
In contrast, undesirable equilibrium is that in which everyone breaks the law, so that any one 
enforcer faces a low πd and therefore a low d. Empirical evidence further supports the idea that 
corruption is a multiple-equilibrium game.290 From time to time Police units and departments 
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are cleared of corrupted officers, a fact suggesting that enough state pressure, through changes 
in zd and ed, can change the equilibrium results. Nevertheless, corruption continues to represent 
an ongoing problem in many places, and it is not clear that nation states face a simple decision 
choosing whether to have corrupt police or not. Lessing’s model does not address this question 
and considers d as exogenous. On the other hand, the model predicts that once a state succeeds 
in suppressing a culture of corruption, and manages to increase the value of d, it would also 
succed against violent corruption. The more important finding though is that governments can 
directly manipulate parameters under their control, s and c, to eliminate violent corruption 
without any shifts in e or d. 
In summary, once government increases state repression, it provides corrupt enforcers 
with increased leverage to extract larger bribes from illicit traffickers. Such situation can 
motivate traffickers to fight back, deploying increased violence against enforcers, which cartels 
must naturally consider against the increased attention they would bring on themselves should 
they engage in antistate violence. Therefore, low conditionality government crackdowns, in 
which cartels are targeted with similar intensity whether or not they engage in antistate violence, 
can in turn produce violent blowbacks from cartels. Yet, increase in conditionality of repression 
can substantially shift the results as the increased leverage from threatening enforcers is 
outbalanced by the additional repression it provokes, and cartels forego violence to adopt hide-
and-bribe strategies. 
In comparison, conditions favoring violent lobbying are more restrictive. It is pointless 
to try to force a government to the bargaining table without a viable issue to bargain about, 
likely some policy which is to be changed or revoked. The susceptibility of any existing policy 
to violent lobbying is dependant on variety of political factors: international influence, domestic 
moods, public commitments binding political leaders and their vulnerability to electoral and 
other political challenges.291 All of these factors can evolve over time and also in response to 
occuring violence, often with unpredictable results. Politicians may be exposed to public 
humiliation if they surrender to cartels’ demands once the state is attacked. At the same time, 
prolonged periods of extreme violence can move the public opinion toward more reconciliatory 
attitude, as witnessed in Colombia.292 Generally, existing international commitments to drug 
prohibition and eradication result in few negotiable issues for states in terms of de jure drug 
policy. From the variety of contested issues only extradition remained open long enough in the 
1980s Colombia to produce sustained violent lobbying, although lower prominence policy 
questions like prison policy and troop deployment have become subject of occasional violent 
lobbying across Latin America. 
Another condition stems from Scott’s original analysis: violent lobbying represents a 
collective action problem since the benefits from shifting de jure policy are clearly more 
universal than the benefits of corruption and selective nonenforcement.293 Considering the fact 
that benefits from lobbying are nonexcludable, individual cartels would be inclined to take 
advantage of any cartel willing to bear the costs of a violent lobbying campaign. Therefore, 
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mechanisms for costs distribution and deterrence of free riders should help make the lobbying 
efforts efficient, in contrast turf war among cartels should undermine it.294 
Another relevant factor is conditionality of repression, despite the fact it plays a more 
subtle role. From the short-term perspective, cartels will likely face increased levels of 
repression once they launch their campaign of violence. However, cartels seek policy 
concessions which generally involve a certain level of reduction in repression. When cartels are 
confident they can achieve such concessions, they are facing the prospect of lower repressions 
in the future if they carry on the fight long enough. This type a kind of inverse conditionality 
can represent a strong incentive for violence. Although this inverse conditionality is not inherent 
in the policy itself, but rather arises from the state’s inability to credibly commit to sustaining 
it in the face of violent lobbying. 
Ultimately, in both violent corruption and lobbying, there must be a distinction between 
violence off the equilibrium path, that is threats which are effective and therefore never 
executed295, and the actual, realized violence, and finally, a scenario when cartels do not even 
make threats of antistate violence. The latter option shall not be mistaken for coerced peace, in 
which credible threats are made but never executed because in the end some form of agreements 
is always reached, although both scenarios are free of actual fighting taking place. This 
difference is actually what motivates cartels to make threats in the first place. Given that 
executing those threats is costly for all parties involved, actual violence may not be deployed 
without extra factors driving bargaining breakdown. 
Among important drivers of equilibrium violence can be asymmetric information. In the 
case of violent corruption, public officials and illicit traffickers negotiate over the size of a 
bribe, but public officials probably do not completely realize the size of profits earned from 
drug trade, which traffickers have an incentive to conceal. Moreover, both parties have reason 
to inflate their capacity to cause damage to one another, a capacity which can varies over time 
and is difficult to assess without the actual fighting. This combination of private information 
and incentives to misrepresent can result in fighting in equilibrium.296 Specifically, it might be 
ideal for the receiving side to reject smaller offers occasionally to avoid the risk of being 
lowballed297; uncertainty regarding the amount of drug profits drives exactly such an 
equilibrium in Lessing’s model, summarized earlier.298 
The presence of asymmetric information is also responsible for explaining actual 
violence in violent lobbying. The key question here is whether a cartel is able to make enough 
credible threats to inflict enough pain to induce the government to make policy concessions. If 
the answer is known to all parties involved, then no threats are made because the cartel is too 
weak to make credible threats, and both sides know it, or the threats are made but never executed 
because the government would concede, and both sides know it. 
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Predicted Patterns and Observed Outcomes.  
The violent corruption analysis presented by Lessing predicts two different empirical 
patterns.299 With low conditionality of repression and cartels opting for plata o plomo strategy, 
anytime bribe negotiations fail then violence takes place intermittently and is targeted at 
enforcers as punishment. Given that enforcers fear cartel violence more than existing sanctions 
for accepting bribe then unconditional crackdowns make fighting more likely. A distinct pattern 
appears when a crackdown results in higher conditionality, then cartels change promptly into 
nonviolent, ‘‘hide-and-bribe’’ attitudes towards corruption, with a noticeable decrease in 
confrontations and violence targeting enforcers. 
In comparison, in the logic of violent lobbying, cartels aim to inflict damage on policy-
makers instead of enforcers. This results in targeted direct attacks whenever such option is 
feasible. In cases when political leaders take defensive precautions against physical violence, 
cartels can then choose to inflict indirect political damage by deploying excessive violence to 
produce social and economic disruption; terror tactics include car bombings, mass casualty 
attacks or elite kidnappings. Extensive violence often occurs within limited time frame to create 
an impression of crisis; cartels can then make an offer to cease the violent attacks if granted 
policy concessions. Since de jure demands form part of violent lobbying, there is direct albeit 
unilateral communication with policy-makers, potentially formulated as legitimate complaints 
to win public support. 
Available evidence as well as simple observation indicate that violent corruption seems 
to be the more prevalent dynamic. Even in Colombia, Escobar first engaged in violent 
corruption making plata o plomo offers to judges and law enforcement since 1976 and 
continued this practice throughout the subsequent narco-terror period, which if often perceived 
as a prime example of violent lobbying in its mission to fight the extradition treaty.300 In 
contrast, Mexico has not yet witnessed Escobar-style sustained campaign of violent lobbying, 
although bribes in exchange for non-enforcement are deeply embedded and routinized.301 In 
Mexico, the vast majority of targeted killings is directed at local police officers indicating 
enforcer-focused violent corruption. Even violence aimed at higher level state representatives 
in seems to be more associated with police corruption than formal state policy in Mexico.302 
Nevertheless, there were at least some examples of attacks accompanied by public 
demands on policy-makers to alter existing de jure policy in Mexico. For instance, in 2009 the 
Família Michoacana PSIN organized street protests, while simultaneously launching attacks on 
several federal police stations across the state of Michoacán.303 Then, it made a public plea for 
dialogue with the Mexican President demanding withdrawal of the federal police forces from 
Michoacán. 
                                                          
299 Lessing, “The Logic of Violence in Drug Wars”. 
300 Reuter, “Systemic Violence“, 277; Salazar, La parábola de Pablo, 60. 
301 Luiz Eduardo Soares, M. V. Bill, and Celso Athayde, Cabeça de porco (Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2005), 259. 
302 John Bailey and Matthew M. Taylor, “Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil 
and Mexico,“ Journal of Politics in Latin America 1, no. 2 (2009): 3–29. 




The difference between the Colombian and the Mexican case can be partially explained 
by another variable in anti-state violence, the inter-PSIN competition, which will be discussed 
in more detail in the following chapter.  
In 1984, in Colombia, all the essential prerequisites for violent lobbying were present. 
When Escobar declared his war on state, the cartels were cooperating under Muerte a 
Secuestradores (MAS) organization he created, which offered mutual-protection for traffickers, 
but also granted Escobar the authority to collect taxes from members to fund military 
campaigns.304 Colombia’s extradition treaty had not been judicially enforced, not to mention its 
implementation was quite strongly opposed by general public.305 Another relevant factor were 
the lessons learned from ongoing peace negotiations with rebel groups in Colombia, which 
convinced Escobar and his fellow traffickers that war could potentially result in eventual 
reprieve. Had the government defeated the various guerrillas in Colombia, it would not have 
been forced to recognize their political motivation. Here the traffickers felt their opportunity, 
for if the government was not strong enough to defeat them, then it would have no alternative 
than to grant them political status and negotiate.306 
In contrast, intense fighting among local PSINs in Mexico and former president Felipe 
Calderón’s personal identification with the violent crackdown on traffickers he launched within 
few days after he assumed office made prospects for lobbying very low. In the Família 
Michoacana case, its regional scope of operations and virtual hegemony within the state of 
Michoacán may have eliminated the free-rider issue, while its demands for policy change were 
seemingly crafted to boost their public image. Nevertheless, the campaign mostly failed to 
deliver their desired objectives, possibly because they underestimated Calderón’s willingness 
for compromise and policy change, which generally represents one of key factors limiting 
prospects of successfull violent lobbying.  
In the real world, violent lobbying often fails, as demonstrated by the example of 
Calderón’s government rejecting the Família Michoacana’s urges for dialogue or its demands 
to remove the federal police from the state territory. The PSIN’s overconfidence in this 
particular case might have been a factor in the ultimately negative outcome. At the same time, 
is possible, that unsuccessful campaigns may have initially seemed attractive for the PSIN, with 
substantial future gains and potentially limited risks where states already chose to deploy high 
levels of repression.  
Identifying what constitutes success in violent lobbying is also difficult. Similar to 
standard lobbying, violent lobbying tends to be costly and its real impact on usually complex 
outcomes is hard to measure, especially since politicians have strong incentives to conceal 
negotiations with PSINs and possible forced concessions from the public scrutiny. For instance, 
Pablo Escobar was never granted amnesty for his deeds, but he did succeed in negotiating a 
relatively minor penal sentence in a prison he built for himself. These negotiations were 
nevertheless held in secret and politicians denied that any compromise was agreed on.307 The 
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fact that Escobar subsequently waged another war after he fled from his prison suggests that he 
was actually content with outcomes of his first war on the Colombian state; the fact that his 
second campaign resulted in a failure to produce similarly negotiated compromises supports 
the overoptimism hypothesis.  
The Variable of Inter-PSIN Conflict Within the Logics of Anti-state Violence 
Both violent corruption and violent lobbying represent logics of constraint in their 
attempt to alter government policy by means of coercive violence. At the same time it is 
important to realize that PSIN–state conflict often coexists or overlaps with inter–PSIN war for 
territory, influence, market shares and profits. Such turf war represents a war of conquest with 
multitude of parties involved and as such deserves an analysis in its own merit. However, it is 
also relevant for the analysis conducted in this chapter. First, the occurence of a turf war and its 
levels of intensity may influence PSINs’ decision to deploy violent forms of lobbying or 
corruption vis-á-vis the state authority. Second, a turf war itself can produce incentives for 
deployment of anti-state violence. In such situations, violence might be potentially directed 
towards state agents, but its final objective is to conquer a rival territory. Naturally, vast 
majority of turf war violence still targets rival PSIN members and specific cases when PSINs 
may find it useful to attack state actors fall outside the logics of constraint outlined earlier. 
Violence as an instrument can perform various elemental functions, it may distribute 
control over territory or other contested asset308, it may serve to forestall a hostile shift in 
power309, it may weaken an opponent or engage his reserves310, or it can serve no other purpose 
than to simply inflict pain.311 There is one more elemental function of violence, which is 
signalling. From this perspective, acts of violence convey significant information about the 
perpetrator’s operational capacities and capabilities, resolve, internal cohesion, etc.312 
Frequently, a costly signal in form of violence has seemingly irrational objective. For 
instance, when a trafficker’s sister was kidnapped by the M–19 guerrilla group, Colombian 
cartels united under the MAS banner to liberate her. In their first direct action the MAS 
members captured M–19 members, beated them severely and then left them in front of 
newspaper offices tied, wearing signs announcing “I am a kidnapper”.313 Taking the trouble to 
identify and then to capture enemy fighters only to release them might seem wasteful effort, but 
it actually emphasizes the intended message that only an organization with substantial resources 
and high resolve can afford sending such a costly signal.314 Fighting in its own merit can convey 
information because combat experience can raise an opponent’s assessment of one’s strength.315 
In this particular case the tactic worked, soon after the retaliation the hostage was released and 
the M–19 never targeted the traffickers again.316 
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In the particular examples discussed above, neither the intended receiver of the violent 
signal nor its victims were state authorities. Alternatively, violence targeting state actors, such 
as high-level political assassinations, may be perceived as signals whose intended recipients 
also belong among state authorities. In such cases, signaling represents only a part of larger 
violent corruption or violent lobbying strategy designed to influence policy at either the de jure 
or de facto level. 
There is another possibility, a case in which violence directed against state authorities 
is meant as a signal to members of the drug trade itself and not to the state. Assassinations of 
police and judicial officers, attacks on police and military outposts, killings of regional public 
officials, these can all be perceived as a signal demonstrating willingness and ability for 
violence while the driving logic here derives from inter–cartel wars, not cartel–state conflict. 
The ultimate purpose of this violence is to expand existing market share or claimed territory, as 
opposed to altering official state policies. 
In this regard, Reuter recognizes two subtypes of violent signaling.317 In most cases, 
signaling represents a component of a competitive strategy designed to intimidate rival PSINs. 
However, larger and more complex enterprises such as the Mexican PSINs may experience 
significant internal information asymmetries, especially in cases when the death or 
apprehension of leaders results in power vacuums and wars of succession.318 In such 
circumstanaces, violent signals may be directed towards the PSIN’s own members to establish 
authority. In a related matter, Gambetta discusses the use of violent signals to establish a 
criminal’s bona fides to other illicit actos with whom he intends to cooperate.319 Although such 
considerations are probably more frequent in cases where infiltration by undercover agents is 
among primary concerns. 
Contemplating available options, it seems rather unlikely that a cartel would choose to 
attack state authorities exclusively to communicate its power to competitors or challengers 
within its organization. At the same time it is important to realize that antistate violence is rare, 
logistically demanding, and quite certainly more costly than inter-cartel violence, it would 
therefore send a powerful signal to other PSINs. If a cartel sees any such positive value in 
sending such signals, it would contribute to the larger decision to adopt a violent strategy 
towards the state. This channel could therefore contribute to the onset of cartel–state conflict. 
It is pointless to send signals unless there is private information to be conveyed. Reuter 
notes that internal signaling is not expected to occur in market sectors where enterprises are too 
small for any substantial internal information asymmetries to arise. In comparison, signaling 
violence should take place rarely when the drug markets industrial organization is stable, since 
informative signals need to be sent only once. In contrast, state suppressive campaigns that 
fragment PSINs and result in uncertainty concerning the strength of rivals are likely to enhance 
this kind of violence. 
Generally speaking, the costlier the signal, the stronger resolve it communicates, be it a 
high-profile political assassinations or tactically ambitious and logistically demanding attacks 
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against state authorities and police or military forces. Powerful signals on their own represent 
publicly displayed brutally murdered civilian victims and their mutilated bodies in the streets 
of Mexico. Stability of existing operational environment seems to be correlated with the 
frequency and urgency of signals transmitted, the less stable the environment the more signals 
will occur. 
Attracting Government Repression to a Region Under Rival’s Control  
Calentar the plaza (that is to heat up the local drug trade turf), refers to the idea of using 
violence, specifically violence against local and state authorities, to deliberately attract 
government repression to a territory under a rival’s control, in order to interfere with their profit-
generating activities. This category also includes the so called “black flag” operations, which 
are purposefully designed to create the false impression that an attack was carried out by another 
party, but it also extends to cases where it is sufficient to generate doubt or a sense of urgency 
that will later attract a response in a form of a strong government repression. Inevitably, this 
tactic in deploying violence may result in false claims and public disputes about the true 
perpetrators of violent events. For instance, such disputes occurred in 2009 after the grenade 
attack in Morelia, Michoacán, on a crowd celebrating Mexican independence. La Família 
Michoacana, the dominant PSIN in the area at that time, immediately fell under suspicion as 
the likely perpetrator of the attack. The organization ardently denied responsibility, while 
blaming their rivals Los Zetas for the act. They were also sending messages to journalists and 
hanging narcomantas pleading “Don’t let them fool you: La Família of Michoacán is with you 
and does not agree with acts of genocide”.320 
Quite obviously such logic is driven by turf war among PSINs. One of its prerequisites 
is that the target PSIN suffers from lesser than maximum repression, possibly because it has 
forged a pact with the government or is actively pursuing a modus vivendi with the authorities. 
Alternatively, the reason could be that the government applies repression conditionally and the 
PSIN has previously limited its use of violence. The attacking PSIN must find itself in a position 
to gain by exposing the target rival to additional repression, while not being excessively 
troubled by exposing itself.  
The predicted empirical footprint is conveniently illustrated by the example mentioned 
above: since the goal of this violent tactic is to attract attention both from the public and from 
the state authorities, it is logical to target civilians with terror attacks. It could also make sense 
to target the state forces, assuming that authorities would not be able to discover the identity of 
the perpetrator from the attack. Additionally, black flag violence is likely to result in subsequent 
propagandistic campaigns in which responsibility for the violence is disputed. 
Such follow up disputes make calentar la plaza type of violence more difficult to 
identify in practice, although those rather restrictive conditions which make this tactic sensible 
make it relatively rare. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that this particular channel, in 
comparison to others, could be augmented by conditional crackdowns. For instance, if the 
government’s policy is to increase repression against any PSIN that engages in antistate 
violence, then thw PSINs are incentivized to try to frame their rivals in order to expose them to 
                                                          






additional state repression. For this particular reason, appeals for more conditional approaches 
to PSIN repression should emphasize the prerequisite of improved police intelligence collection 
capabilities. 
3.2. Critical Assessments of Existing Strategies 
With the previous chapters shedding light on the strategic nature and systemic context 
of the drug war, this section will first provide a critical assessment of existing policies and 
counter-strategies. Subsequently, I will outline additional angles and venues, which, in my 
opinion, represent viable expansions of existing approaches designed to disrupt the PSINs 
operations and limiting their power. The suggestions provided will mostly focus on offensive 
military and law inforcement operations directed at disrupting PSINs. By no means these 
recommendations list is presumed to be an exhaustive analysis of all possible approaches, I will 
only mention those I deem both viable and feasible.  
In contrast, I will only discuss civilian components of a disruptive strategy, such as drug 
user rehabilitation or legalization, in the chapter below. These aspects have been extensively 
addressed in numerous scholarly works and in public debates, which makes there key arguments 
and proposition widely known, and therefore I believe only their critical evaluation is of 
essence. 
Three underlining assumptions need to be introduced and recognized in contemplating 
counter-strategies: (1) there will always be people willing to take drugs for variety of motives, 
which makes the root causes behind drug-consumption persistent even at varying degree of 
intensity; (2) there will always be people willing to engage in illicit profit-generating business 
activities, in other words, illicit activities will always represent and economically viable option; 
and (3) due a to a complex agenda states manage they will never be able to allocate all their 
resources and attention exclusively to counter-strategies aimed at profit-seeking illicit 
networks, which, in turn, can focus all of their attention on survival and market success – in this 
regard, strategic initiative will always be with the latter. This general logic will be the guiding 
principle in formulating assessments in the chapters to follow.  
Contemplating strategic implications of the above mentioned assumptions, in the drug 
trafficking industry manageable order is all we can reasonably strive to achieve. Order, where 
drug traffickers and their commercial activities will be tamed to the point that the whole issue 
reaches below the noise level. The key question here is how to achieve this outcome, what 
strategy to deploy. Personally, I believe there are are two key and interconnected centers of 
gravity in the drug industry: financial profit or simply money, the single most important 
motivation behind these illicit enterprises, and the supportive logistic infrastructure able to 
legitimize illegal gains and channel them into licit economic endeavors to gain and spread 
influence. The following pages will be dedicated to analyses and critical assessments of existing 
counter-narcotics strategies and with their successes and failures evaluated with regard to the 
above mentioned centers of gravity. The resulting conclusions will provide basis for postulating 
further and hopefully more effective disruptive strategies.  
One of the key assumptions driving my assessments of existing policies is that 
individuals responsible for formulating strategy of the drug war often seem to demonstrate a 
selective understanding of economics. It may be the case that most politicians, military and law 




the following paragraphs I will try to provide an economic assessment of the most common 
counter-narcotics policies deployed to date with the ambition to demonstrate that the world has 
plenty to learn from analyzing illicit activities as business instead of a war or a moral crusade.  
The similarity between legitimate and illicit entrpreneurs is striking, from their troubles 
with human resources to the threat posed by online retailers. Equally noticeable is the frequency 
with which policies aimed at stifling the drug trade seem to be misdirected. Regulatory 
approaches that in the legitimate business world would be discarded for their obvious 
ineffectiveness have been allowed to endure for years, or probably decades, in the counter-
narcotics world. From a thorough examination of exisiting attempts to disrupt the illicit drug 
industry four major mistakes emerged hampering the mission. 
Prevailing Obsession With the Supply Side  
Ever since the Nixon’s declaration of war on drugs, the relentless focus has been on the 
supply side of the industry, that is the traffickers, despite the fact there is an overhelming case 
for prioritizing the demand side instead, that is the drug consumers.  
The multinational effort to disrupt the supply of coca leaves in the Andes by spraying 
the region with herbicides has achieved remarkably little to alter the prices of cocaine, in spite 
of decades of investments and even violence deployed in the process. One of the reasons for 
this limited success is that the PSINs have used their buying power to force farmers to absorb 
any increase in costs, just as Walmart squeezes its suppliers in the legitimate business world. 
More significant, the cost of the cocaine’s raw material, the coca leaf, is simply too low to have 
much impact on the final price of cocaine. The amount of leaves required to produce a kilogram 
of cocaine powder costs only a few hundred of dollars. Even doubling the cost of growing coca 
adds less than one percent to the price of the final product, which at some places in the United 
States sells for as high as $80,000-100,000 for a kilogram. Should the supply side be attacked 
properly, it would be at the end of the production and distribution chain, in the consumer 
countries, where the market value of the product is much higher and its confiscation can actually 
cause some economic damages to its sellers.  
There is another reason why almost exclusive focus on the supply side is misdirected, 
although such an approach may yield limited positive results. When the price of a product 
increases, the amount consumed generally decreases, although the size of the drop in 
consumption varies. For some goods, the demand is elastic, in other words, it falls substantially 
in response to even a minor increase in price. In contrast, demand for some products is inelastic, 
which means that customers continue buying fairly the same amount as befire, despite the raise 
in price. Naturally, measuring elasticity in the drug markets represents a challenge, because the 
data on both prices and levels of consumption are extremely hard to verify. Nevertheless, 
available evidence suggests that demand for narcotics is inelastic. One of the surveys quoted 
studies suggesting that the elasticity of demand for marihuana in the United State was roughly 
-0.33, which means that a 10% raise in price would result in only a 3.3% fall in demand. 




arrested individuals and there was even a weaker relationship observed, specifically -0.17 for 
cocaine and -0.09 for heroin.321 
The notion that demand for drugs is inelastic fits with intuition, especially in cases of 
substances which are addictive. For instance, heroin addicts are unlikely to give up consumption 
of their drug simply because the price increased a little. Similar logic applies for other illicit 
activities, the PSINs have been diversifying into over the recent years, namely the smuggling 
of people. Despite the fact that stricter patrolling of the U.S. border has increased the costs of 
crossing illegally, the increase in price has not been substantial enough to make impact on 
demand for passage into the United States. The demand for people smugglers seems to be just 
as inelastic as the demand for narcotics. Once again, such observation has logical background. 
Motivated by prospects of reunification with their families, finding employment with higher 
wages, etc., illegal migrants will not be discouraged by relatively minor increase in price of the 
crossing.  
The inelasticity observed in demand for illicit goods and services has some important 
implications for supply side driven policies. It means that even substantial success in increasing 
the cost of narcotics, or illegal border crossing for that matter, will produce only modest results 
in lowering the number of customers purchasing drugs or planning to cross the U.S. border 
illegally. In other words, national governments are spending large amounts of resources to 
achieve only minor gains. Another factor worth considering is even more interesting. 
Significant increase in prices, together with only minor decrease in demand, which might be 
presented by the law enforcement as a successful outcome actually means that the value of the 
market grows. To provide an example, marihuana dealer sells one kilogram of his product every 
week, for a retail price of $10, that is $10,000 total. After increase in law enforcement and 
policing in his area of operations he is forced to increase the price by 10% to $11. Considering 
the elasticity calculation mentioned earlier, this increase in price by 10% should produce a 3.3% 
drop in demand. In consequence, the dealer will now sell only 967 grams of marihuana weekly, 
for $11 per gram, with the new total of his sales rising to $10,637 per week. In other words, 
increase in law enforcement noticeably increased prices, but consumption lowered only 
modestly and the profit of illicit economy grew larger. 
Contemplation of a demand side driven policy provides an interesting comparison. 
Instead of focusing on more law enforcement and better policing, the local authorities in the 
above mentioned scenario would try to discourage people from taking drugs by launching 
public health campaigns, building leisure facilities for teenagers, improving rehabilitation 
programs for addicts, etc. With lower number of customers, the demand decreases. The likely 
response from the dealers would be to lower the prices in order to gain advantage against their 
illicit business rivals, who all compete for a smaller pool of consumers. In consequence, both 
the number of customers and the value of illicit market is reduced, which represents a success 
on two fronts. Similar logic could be applied to other illegal markets as well. For instance, 
instead of focusing exclusively on people smugglers running the supply side of the illegal 
migration, it might prove useful to actually focus on diminish the demand for illegal border 
crossings. For example, a positive measure could represent more visas issued to interested 
parties so they do not have to seek illegal means of crossing and a negative measure could make 
                                                          





the United States a more difficult place to live without proper visa and other legal 
documentation. One way or another, reduction in number of people wanting to cross borders 
illegally would lower the number of clandestine crossings as much as the prices charged by 
people smuggling groups.  
Regardless of illicit activity under discussion, even beyond narcotics and illegal border 
crossings, the key observation remains the same. While attacking the supply side can only 
reduce consumption by increasing prices, and in process the illicit revenues as well, attacking 
demand can produce both. 
Ineffective Resources Allocation 
In many countries, when it comes to crime fighting, money is not a problem as long as 
it is spent on enforcement rather than prevention. Hoping to increase their popularity with 
general public, politicians often claim that public security is priceless. With political support, 
many law enforcement agencies and units enjoy generous budgets, which enable them to supply 
their officers with advanced weaponry a sophisticated military technologies. The militarization 
of police forces across the Western countries, at least in terms of weapons and equipment, is 
particularly visible in the United States, where the Department of Homeland Security disbursed 
some $35 billion to state and local police forces between 2002 and 2011. In consequence, it is 
not unusual even for police departments in smaller towns with low crime rates to enjoy assault 
rifles and armoured personnel carriers. In Mexico, substantial amount of financial assistance 
provided under the Merida plan was also used towards a purchase of sophisticated weaponry 
from the U.S. companies.  
In contrast, money spent on prevention is audited with great care. In times when overall 
funds become scarce, prisoners, drug addicts and other offenders tend to be among the first to 
feel the lack of funding. To some extent, it is understandable that the general public will be 
more inclined to see a drop in money spent on these individuals than on other social programs. 
But, in the long term perspective this principle is would prove expensive to uphold.  
Cutting funds for education and rehabilitation programs in prisons can save several 
thousand dollars. What is often times an underappreciated fact is that this short term cut in 
funding may results in few inmates failing to learn to read or achieve some degree of education 
while incarcerated, in consequence their likelihood of finding a decent employment diminishes, 
they can resume their drug addiction, all of which can result in additional future offenses. The 
point here is not to argue sympathy for legal offenders, the point is economic one, because in 
the end, the initial saving of a few thousand dollars has proportionatelly larger costs later. One 
RAND Corporation study attempted to calculate how much cocaine consumption could be 
prevented by different government interventions.322 In its estimate every $1 million dedicated 
to controlling supply in source countries of Latin America could produce a reduction of some 
10 kilograms in the total amount of cocaine consumed in the United States. In comparison, 
prevention programs in school would achieve higher efficiency, with some 25 kilograms per $1 
million, and treatment programs for drug addicts would mark even larger success averting up 
to 100 kilograms of cocaine. In other words, treatment might be as much as ten times more cost 
effective than enforcement, possibly because it addresses demand rather than supply. The 
                                                          





seemingly unattractive truth is that it is cheaper to cure people from a drug addiction than to 
chase them down in a armoured personnel carrier.   
There are many more examples available to demonstrate that diverting funds towards a 
problem early may save expensive cures later. These cases of relatively cheap prevention 
include for governments across the Carribean countries to spend more money on providing 
security for inmates in their prisons so these individuals do not run to cartels for protection 
making themselves available for recruitment. In Colombia and later Mexico drug traffickers 
have long engaged in sort of corporate responsibility programs winning hearts and minds of 
low income individuals in their areas of operation. If the Mexican government spend less on 
modern weaponry and more on inclusion of its poorer citizens, it might yet again limit the 
influence of PSINs in this regard. Similarly, it might prove to be financially more beneficial for 
the Andean governments to subsidize their farmers to motivate them to grow tomatoes instead 
of coca, not to mention the funds saved on destruction of coca fields by force later on. It would 
also be cheaper to design and implement programs assisting youth in securing a viable income 
through sustainable employment than to chase them down once they decide their career 
prospect is connected to local gang. In the United States, helping painkiller addicts with their 
rehabilitation would be certainly cheaper and lot easier than dealing with these individuals once 
they fall for heroin. All these are merely random suggestions and only some ideas from a larger 
pool of cost effective cheap prevention options. 
It became popular to call for more spending as a solution to every other social problem 
in the world. When it comes to illicit narcotics, there is more than enough money being spent 
already, the funding is just focused on the wrong area. 
Thinking Globally, Acting Locally 
Illicit drug traffickers have embraced all the benefits globalization had to offer and 
expanded the volume and quality of their activities to build borderless enterprises spanning 
across several countries and various continents. In comparison, vast majority of attempts aimed 
to disrupt the PSINs remained mostly national in focus and scope. This approach resulted in 
many examples of relative success in one country, while at the same time there was a 
proportionate failure in another. In Latin America this phenomenon is known as the cockroach 
effect and it refers to a situation when a drug business driven out from one place soon emerges 
in some other location. For instance, in 1990s, coca cultivation was pushed out of Peru, which 
was presented as remarkable success for counter-narcotics struggle, only to appear in Colombia 
soon after.323 Some decade later, another success was declared when coca cultivation was 
forced out of Colombia, re-appearing again in Peru.324 Despite these two achievements the UN 
vocally promoted, remarkably little had actually changed.   
The very same kind of dynamic appears on the trafficking side of the business. Once the 
smuggling routes through the Caribbean were closed by law enforcement in the 1980s, cocaine 
shipments shifted towards Mexico. Increased counter-narcotics effort there persuaded the 
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PSINs to direct there transportation operations towards weaker states in Central America. 
Nowadays, when Central America is attracting more attention from counter-narcotics agencies, 
shipments might very well find their way to the Caribbean soon again.  
PSINs have also demonstrated their flexibility in addressing the proper retail markets. 
In the early 2000s, cocaine consumption in the United States decreased notably while at the 
same time it became more popular in Europe. Overall, when it comes to production, 
transportation or retail distribution, the only partial success has been witnessed on the national 
level while the global situation does not change much. Therefore, from the national level 
perspective, solving your problem practically means making it someone else’s problem.  
To some extent it is understandable that national governments do not concern 
themselves that much with affairs beyond their state borders. The main trouble here is the 
asymmetry, that in contrast to national governments, PSINs are multinational enterprises 
without any multinational counterpart with a mission to suppress them. The United Nations 
office of Drugs and Crime comes closest. Unfortunately, it seems to be deeply committed to 
promote the supply-side suppression strategy while largely neglecting the policy’s 
shortcomings and very modest aggregate results. In the legitimate corporate business 
environment, if a multinational company tried to do the same, that is to highlight strong results 
in one market while displaying a tendency to underplay the disappointing results in others, it 
would not get away with it for long.  
The reason why a faulty strategy remains in effect is that the most influential UN 
stakeholders are reasonably satisfied with the way the drug war is being faught. Wealthy 
countries, which also represent majority of world’s narcotics consumers, are happy as long as 
the violent fighting takes place as far as possible from their own populations.  
Disruptions to narcotics-supply networks are most effective when they happen at the 
end of the supply chain, when the product has its highest value and its confiscation is therefore 
most damaging to the illicit entrepreneurs. In contrast to this logic, the United States and other 
wealthy consumer countries seem to take more pragmatical approach while waging the counter-
drug war on its soil as compared to efforts abroad. Allegedly, four in ten Americans have 
admitted to their experience with illicit narcotics, a ratio which suggests certain level of 
tolerance for drugs, as long as it comes without violence. In comparison, foreign countries that 
fail to meet drug consumption and trafficking with resolute denouncement are often times 
singled out for punishment in shape of public shaming, back-channel punitive use of American 
influence with international agencies like the IMF of the World Bank. 325  
To some extent, the structure of the global drug market has made the political deadlock 
inevitable. Most countries have fallen into one of the following categories: the drug producing 
countries, like Peru or Colombia; the drug trafficking countries, like Mexico; and the consumer 
countries, such as the United States or Europe. In consequence, individual governments and 
their voters, have seen only certain aspects of the illicit drug trade. The end consumer countries, 
hoping to limit the influx of illicit narcotics, have argued for a strong attack against the supply 
chain of narcotics since its early stages, despite the fact that such approach has proven 
                                                          




ineffective. In comparison, drug producing and trafficking countries do not see the logic of 
violently engaging a phenomenon which is taking its toll mostly outside of their borders.  
These perception angles have been changing though, as the two main global trends 
began to push all the countries involved to realize the complexities of global drug trade. On one 
hand, the categories of producing and consuimg countries are becoming more blurred as the 
interests of both are aligning. Narcotics are mostly consumed by middle-class customers, as 
developing countries become richer, the economic status of many of its citizens improves, 
which makes consumer goods more affordable, among them illicit narcotics. At the same time, 
countries that have been historically on the consumer side have seen growth of their domestic 
drug production, mostly marihuana and systetic drugs. This changing experience has impacted 
the host countries’ perception and they came to realize that attacking supply side is truly 
ineffective. Facing this new experience on its soil, the United States, for instance, have opted 
for legalization of marihuana instead of crops eradication, which it promoted across Latin 
America earlier.    
The other significant trend in global politics of counter-narcotics is a shifting balance of 
power. Historically poorer countries that have been the hosts for producers as well as traffickers 
are becoming richer and their voice is gaining importance. From the perspective of UN’s 
Officer of Drugs and Crime, growing portion of its funding is now coming from emerging donor 
countries, which often display different attitudes towards counter-narcotics than traditionally 
large donors such as the United States. Many of these new donors, such as Russia or China, 
have demonstrated rather hawkish attitude by strongly supporting punitive anti-drug policies at 
home. On the other hand, countries like Colombia or Brazil have been long frustrated with 
existing approach to drug control relying on enforcement-focued approach. The resulting 
observation is that international drug-control regime is in play much more than it has been in 
the last century. 
Prohibition v. Control 
Despite decades of drug prohibition enforced across the Western countries with more 
than $1 trillion spent by governments worldwide, and decades since the United States declared 
their war on drugs, the current world seems to be everything, but a drug-free environment.  
For many years, the main promoters of drug legalization had been the marihuana 
smokers, who argued that society is already tolerating other and often more dangerous 
substances than marihuana. Despite the fact that this argument has its merits, it failed to gain 
universal public support. Likely, because most countries have been already dealing with enough 
issues on their own and legalization of drugs could bring even more problems. Yet, in recent 
years this attitude seems to be changing. Not that the public would change its opinion about 
negative effects of drug consumption, but in light of the Mexican drug war and other drug-
related violence, many people are developing an opinion, that bringing the drugs within the 
legal system offers at least some degree of control as well as an opportunity to limit the power 
of drug trafficking PSINs.  
The recent example of Colorado might provide an example how legally regulated drug 
market would look like. Since marihuana was legalized there, drugs are tested for their strength 
and safety. They are clearly labeled in safe containers and sold in limited quantities to 




from taxation and licensing, while saving money on drug-related arrests. Some $700 million 
worth of sales have been taken away from PSINs and other trafficking entities. The impact n 
consumption is yet difficult to assess, since there are many out-of-state visitors and consumers, 
but legalization does not seem to provoke massive consumption. Many other US states followed 
Colorado’s example and the tendency to legalize has its examples across the Americas with 
Uruguay implementing full legalization of marihuana in 2014 and Jamaica allowing 
consumption for medical and religious purposes.  
Surprisingly enough, even for the most dangerous drugs some form of legalization might 
provide unexpectedly positive results. The driving motivation is not that drugs are safe, but a 
full recognition that they are extremely dangerous. Although these particular case have not been 
widely publicized, Switzerland, Netherlands and the UK have already legalized heroin in a very 
limited way. Their programs are not involving drug sales like Colorado, but they allow 
specialized physicians to prescribe free heroin to addicts. The key assumption is that through 
managed, rationed use, addicts are gradually able to overcome their addiction. In Switzerland, 
where the program has been most established, doctors prescribed heroin to some 3,000 addicts, 
who represented some 10-15% of country’s users, but their collective consumption accounted 
for some 60% of Switzerland’s total consumption of heroin. Providing them with free heroin in 
controlled and supervised conditions, the number of robberies these addicts committed 
decreased by 90%.326   
Removing heavy users from the market takes away the industry’s most valuable 
customers, which makes the heroin market far less viable from the perspective of demand. 
Dramatic drop in demand naturally results in heavy impact on supply. Considering that most of 
the heavy heroin addicts were also engaged in trafficking of heroin and its distribution in order 
to gain funds for their addiction, removing them from the market also heavily limits the local 
dealership network. In Zurich, there were 850 new addicts registered in 1990, in 2005, it was 
150.327 Interestingly enough, legalizing heroin through a strictly limited medically supervised 
program has made the drug harder to access than prohibition ever did.  
3.3. Towards Complex Counter-strategy and Beyond  
In previous sections of this dissertation both subjective and objective analyses of the 
illicit trafficking has been conducted in order to provide key insights upon which an effective 
complex disruption strategy can be formulated. In the last chapter existing policies were 
evaluated. Besides positive systemic economic assessments there is one more aspect which 
deserves to be included so that complex disruptive strategies can be propetly outlined, which is 
the role and importance of individuals in PSINs as well as their larger organizational 
assessments. Many of the following recommendations are much more hardline approach to the 
illicit narcotics and networks problem and should be perceived as complimentary to 
constructive and economically viable suggestions provided in the previous chapter. 
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Social Network Analysis  
The key ambition of this chapter is to analyze a illicit drug trafficking enterprise as a 
network using social network analysis (SNA) and various of its metrics (i.e., centrality, and 
brokerage) that would be helpful in identifying strategies for disrupting its operations. Any 
attempt to disrupt and undermine an illicit network must begin with a strategy that identifies 
key vulnerabilities (e.g., actors) within the network that can become targets and SNA can be 
particularly helpful in this regard. Normally, the actors identified by SNA are positioned in key 
places within the network that connect various segments of the network and facilitate the flow 
of information and other resources. This chapter draws on some of these metrics to identify 
members of the Sinaloa cartel who occupy these important positions within the PSIN. These 
individual metrics can later be visualized in a sociogram where nodes represent the actors and 
ties represent the lines between them. The Sinaloa cartel was selected due to its prominent status 
it seemingly achieved in public perception as one of the most powerful illicit drug trafficking 
enterprises in Mexico during the Calderón administration. It is not meant to provide exhaustive 
analysis of all PSINs across the region, but to illustrate the key points and features using a prime 
example among illicit enteprises in Latin America.  
Centrality and key player metrics are practical to the study of transactional PSINs, such 
as the Sinaloa cartel, which are not tied to a single specific location and which are not dependant 
on a single commodity in their business portfolio.328 If necessary, the Sinaloa cartel can 
organize for a particular operation and then disperse rapidly without attachment to any man, 
weapon, or equipment left behind. For this particular reason, it is of critical importance to apply 
the appropriate form of network analysis and to understand what makes each member different 
a unique is. Centrality metric is convenient in identifying high-value targets, but a thorough and 
complex analysis should be not limited to using only one centrality or key player measure nor 
propose a single strategy. Instead it should draw on various metrics and formulate a wide array 
of strategies, especially when tackling resilient and flexible entities, such as the Sinaloa 
cartel.329 Indeed, because the Sinaloa cartel has a proven resiliency, flexibility, and fluidity in 
its network – qualities that stem from the ways in which ties are constantly formed and 
strengthened, or weakened and broken330 – an  aggressive disruption strategy is desirable, with 
its tactical components being capable of a simultaneous, omni-directional attack.331 Identifying 
key leadership figures and other central players is a vantage point for unraveling the Sinaloa 
cartel’s organizational structure.332 With tools, such as UCINET, and ORA, it is possible to 
map its organizational structure and then use this knowledge to formulate disruptive strategies. 
Data  
Analyzing the the Sinaloa cartel network, operational ties were used to extract 
information from open sources, such as newspapers, Internet websites, blogs, books, journals, 
government reports, court documents, and Spanish as well as English press reports. One of the 
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advantages of open source data is its timeliness. On the other hand, contents and accuracy are 
often among its weaknesses. The information collected must be questioned and corroborated to 
prevent the risk of using misleading or false information. I am confident that the data used here 
are both accurate and appropriate for analysis. Nevertheless, the network illustrated in this 
chapter is only a snapshot in time, but it should provide a valid operational picture of the Sinaloa 
cartel network towards the end of Felipe Calderón’s administration.  
Operational Ties 
In Klerk’s argument, in order to achieve an understanding of an illicit enterprise, it is 
vital to pay attention to social phenomena, such as schools attendance, individual roles played 
by key actors, their internal communication, etc.333 This chapter later uses operational 
relationships to assess, analyze and formulate counter strategies to disrupt the Sinaloa cartel’s 
illicit network. Initially, the operations relationship data of the 171 actors of the network was 
coded. Out of these, 104 isolates, that is actors with minimal or no ties, were then removed due 
to the assumption that the probability of an isolate having a strong relationship with the main 
network was minimal. Therefore, it was possible to focus on the network’s most prominent 
actors and not waste resources on monitoring non-essential individuals. It is assumed that the 
Sinaloa cartel relies on ties of trust among its members and management, which represent 
potential lines of communication, coordination, and control. Moreover, such ties are 
occasionaly presumed as latent ones, but they can be activated promptly when needed. 
Software Tools 
The coding work of the Sinaloa cartel relationship network was initially prepared in 
Palantir Government,334 a software for integrating, integrating, and visualizing different types 
of data, including unstructured, structured, temporal, relational and geospatial information. 
Palantir Government can analyze friendly, threat, neutral and clandestine human terrain in a 
multi-dimensional environment. The data initially structured in Palantir were later exported to 
a social network analysis program UCINET.335 The network drawing program NetDraw, which 
is integrated with UCINET336, was used to visualize the Sinaloa cartel network. Sociogram 1 
below represents a sociogram of the Sinaloa cartel operational network. 
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Sociogram 1: the Sinaloa Cartel Network 
Centrality Metrics 
Among the oldest concepts in SNA is actor centrality, which is deployed substantially 
in the following analysis of the Sinaloa cartel. There is a number of different measures of 
centrality, each with its own assumptions of what constitutes a central actor. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, four types of centrality are considered: closeness, degree, betweenness, and 
eigenvector centrality. Each of these type is discussed below as the Sinaloa cartel network is 
analyzed. 
Closeness Centrality 
A member is considered central if it can quickly interact with all others. In the context 
of a communication relation, such members do not depend on other members for the relaying 
of information and can be very productive in communicating information to others, a capability 
vital for the cartel’s problem solving and management.337 Table 2 below highlights the top 
ranked Sinaloa cartel network members in terms of closeness centrality. 
 
Rank Node Closeness 
1 Joaquín "EL CHAPO" Guzmán Loera 0.641 
2 Ismael "EL MAYO" Zambada García  0.629 
3 Juan José "EL AZUL" Esparragoza Moreno 0.579 
4 Gonzalo "EL MACHO PRIETO" Inzunza Inzunza 0.462 
5 Cenobio Flores Pacheco 0.462 
6 Armando López Aispuro 0.462 
7 Guillermo Nieblas Nava 0.462 
8 Felipe De Jesús Sosa Canisales  0.462 
9 José Javier Rascón Ramírez 0.462 
10 Jesús Alfredo Salazar Ramírez 0.462 
11 Ramón Ignacio Páez Soto 0.462 
12 Raúl Sabori Cisneros 0.462 
 
Table 2: Closeness (Freeman) Centrality Top Members of the Sinaloa Cartel 
 
                                                          




Joaquín “EL CHAPO“ Guzmán Loera and Ismael “EL MAYO“ Zambada García, two 
of the four founders of the organization, are the most central members in the network. They 
both yield similar power in management and communication with others. Juan José “EL 
AZUL“ Esparragoza Moreno manages large money laundering operations for the Cartel. 
Gonzalo “EL MACHO PRIETO“ Inzunza Inzunza is the chief assassin for the two Cartel 
leaders, operating in northern Mexico. Remaining members are local leaders supervising 
trafficking operations in the border region, from Baja California to Sonora. 
Degree Centrality 
A member with a high centrality level, as measured by its degree, is “where the action 
is” in the network. Thus, this measure focuses on the most visible actors in the network. An 
actor with a large degree is in direct contact or is adjacent to many other actors.338 Table 3 
indicates the count of the number of the Sinaloa cartel network node’s ties. 
Rank   
 
Node Degree 
1 Joaquín "EL CHAPO" Guzmán Loera 0.43939 
2 Ismael "EL MAYO" Zambada García 0.42424 
3 Juan José "EL AZUL" Esparragoza Moreno 0.31818 
4 Gonzalo "EL MACHO PRIETO" Inzunza Inzunza 0.15152 
5 Cenobio Flores Pacheco 0.15152 
6 Armando López Aispuro 0.15152 
7 Guillermo Nieblas Nava 0.15152 
8 Felipe De Jesús Sosa Canisales 0.15152 
9 José Javier Rascón Ramírez 0.15152 
10 Jesús Alfredo Salazar Ramírez 0.15152 
11 Ramón Ignacio Páez Soto  0.15152 
12 Raúl Sabori Cisneros 0.15152 
 
Table 3: Degree Centrality Top Members of the Sinaloa Cartel 
 
High scores marked by Joaquín “EL CHAPO“ Guzmán Loera and Ismael “EL MAYO“ 
Zambada García indicate they are making strategic decisions, supervising operations and giving 
orders without significant use of proxies. Lower scores observed in the remaining positions 
suggest these members take decisions with limited impact, mostly localy or within their 
particular areas. In terms of lower scoring individuals another measure would be needed as a 
discriminator for target prioritizing.  
Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality assumes that an actor has a power over any two other actors 
when it lies on the shortest path between them in a given network.339 Table 4 identifies actors 
in a network who are in a position of brokerage, possessing the power to control the flow of 
resources through the network, actors with more interpersonal influence.340 
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Rank Node Betweenness 
1 Joaquín "EL CHAPO" Guzmán Loera  0.21895 
2 Ismael "EL MAYO" Zambada García  0.20270 
3 Juan José "EL AZUL" Esparragoza Moreno  0.20215 
4 Alejandro Flores Cacho  0.02560 
5 Augustín "DON PILO" Reyes Garza  0.02610 
 
Table 4: Betweenness (Freeman) Centrality Top Members of the Sinaloa Cartel 
 
Neither Alejandro Flores Cacho nor Augustín “DON PILO“ Reyes Garza appeared in 
the previous listings. Alejandro Flores Cacho manages large distribution network affiliated with 
the Cartel, hence his accessibility to external resources. Augustín “DON PILO“ Reyes Garza 
manages some of the Cartel’s contacts in Colombia, particularly with Jorge Luis Llanos Gazia 
in Cali. 
Eigenvector Centrality 
Eigenvector centrality assumes that ties to highly central actors are more important than 
ties to peripheral actors, so it weights an actor’s summed ties by the centrality of the actors with 
whom ties exist.341 From the perspective of the Sinaloa cartel, table 5 below suggests who has 
direct connections to the center of gravity within the network, to high ranking figures giving 
orders and who might be then considered important through his direct participation in the chain 
of command and operational structure of the cartel. 
 
Rank Node Eigenvector 
1 Ismael "EL MAYO" Zambada García  0.375 
2 Joaquín "EL CHAPO" Guzmán Loera  0.327 
3 Gonzalo "EL MACHO PRIETO" Inzunza Inzunza  0.261 
4 Cenobio Flores Pacheco  0.261 
5 Armando López Aispuro  0.261 
6 Guillermo Nieblas Nava  0.261 
7 Felipe De Jesús Sosa Canisales  0.261 
8 José Javier Rascón Ramírez  0.261 
9 Jesús Alfredo Salazar Ramírez  0.261 
10 Ramón Ignacio Páez Soto  0.261 
11 Raúl Sabori Cisneros  0.261 
12 Ismael "EL MAYITO" Zambada García  0.102 
Table 5: Eigenvector Centrality Top Members of the Sinaloa Cartel 
 
Gonzalo “EL MACHO PRIETO“ Inzunza Inzunza’s position right below the top 
suggests his key position as high ranking operative acting on direct orders from the Cartel 
leaders. Remaining members score high because they assume operational command in their 
area of operations, which links them to the decision makers. Ismael “EL MAYITO“ Zambada 
García’s score is a result of the connection to his father.  
                                                          





Social network analysis, using four centrality measures, was used to analyze the Sinaloa 
cartel’s network as a backdrop for development of a disruption strategy. Results suggest there 
is quite a small group of high ranking members within the Cartel structure indispensable for 
successful performance of the organization, namely Joaquín “EL CHAPO” Guzmán Loera, 
Ismael “EL MAYO” Zambada and Juan José “EL AZUL“ Esparragoza Moreno.  
Nevertheless, centrality metrics do not always completely capture a network’s 
vulnerabilities. For instance, both Joaquín “EL CHAPO” Guzmán Loera and Ismael “EL 
MAYO” Zambada score high in all of the centrality measures, but, observing the sociogram of 
the Cartel network, their removal, although critical, would not totally fragment the network. 
This hypothesis has been seemingly confirmed with the arrest of Joaquín Guzmán in January 
2016. His arrest weakened the Sinaloa cartel, but did not result in its total fragmentation. The 
clusters would still be intact and the Sinaloa cartel would most likely continue to operate. The 
organization has lost its high ranking members before, and many of Cartel’s associates are dead 
or in prison, but it has continued to live on, an indication of its resiliency. Available research 
suggests that targeting the most central actors for removal or isolations is not always the optimal 
solution, especially considering the relative strength of upper-level management, such as 
Gonzalo “EL MACHO PRIETO“ Inzunza Inzunza and others who can rise to assume leading 
positions.  
The use of social network analysis offers an additional optic to illuminate the Sinaloa 
cartel organizational structure. It provides the necessary magnification of the network to 
identify key individuals and their locations to enable targeted operations. But these don’t have 
to be always kinetic in nature, such as removal by arrest or killing, but non-kinetic, such as 
deception campaigns against individuals rated with high connection to the power centers.342 
These individuals provide the optimal platform to inject misinformation into the network and 
produce the greatest disruptive effects such as friction to force preemptive attacks against other 
members causing a fragmentation or weakening of the organizational structure. In case of the 
Sinaloa cartel a suggestion shall be explored to target the upper-level management, the 
lieutenants managing specific territory or trafficking routes.  
Among the weaknesses of centrality metrics is that it focuses to quantifying the 
structural importance of individuals within a network, but not inevitably, which actors are 
important for the whole network. This weakness could prove problematic when attempting to 
neutralize members of the Sinaloa cartel to disrupt the network’s operational cabilities or to 
identify optimally positioned actors to disseminate information and disinformation, attitudes, 
and behaviors rapidly to undermine the network’s effectiveness. Fortunately, a set of key player 
metrics has been developed to address this important limitation.343 
As noted earlier, a high degree of correlation exists concerning degree, closeness, and 
eigenvector centrality. However, they do differ substantially from the optimal set of key players 
identified in terms of fragmentation; indeed, more overlap occurs between the key player 
fragmentation metrics and the betweenness centrality scores. In terms of a deception operation, 
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it can be seen that some overlap exists between the key player diffusion algorithm and the other 
rankings. All of this suggests that before any final decisions are made, additional data mining 
and information gathering on the Sinaloa cartel network is probably in order. The next chapter 
discusses strategies and recommendations for the disruption of PSINs, including the Sinaloa 
cartel. 
Formulating Additional Strategic Counter-approaches 
Building upon insights provided by the social network analysis, there are two basic 
counter–approaches to apply, each of them offering a variety of strategies. The kinetic route 
mostly consists of directing brute force at the problem, potentially in a form of highly 
professional surgical strikes of special forces of the police or military targeting illicit networks 
and their individual members. Despite the fact that such direct action has been extensively 
deployed to date and can effectively contribute to diminishing threats, it is certainly not the only 
tool available. Especially, considering the fact it may be detrimental to achieving more 
pervasive results. Certainly, elimination of a key member within an illicit network creates an 
immediate gap. Nevertheless, this gap is usually only temporary, and the network is likely to 
exhibit more fervor in response.344 Therefore, when contemplating an effective counter-PSIN 
strategy, it is essential to consider a complementary combination of kinetic and non-kinetic 
measures that would allow authorities the greatest level of control. The indirect route strategies 
might include information operations, reconciliation and reintegration operations. 
The ultimate objective of a counter-strategy goes beyond a simple disruption of illicit 
network. Among the advantages of a decentralized network is that disruption or elimination of 
some of its hubs or other internal ties does not disrupt the operation. 
Policy recommendations 
 
The previously mentioned analytical tools are all interdependent of each other. 
Formulating and developing an efficient disruption strategy will require deployment of all 
elements of national power. The following recommendations are based on the exploration of 
the PSINs financial practices and geospatial, temporal, and SNA of its organization.  
Social Network Analysis: Kinetic Options 
In the field of SNA, the recommendation for kinetic approach centers on the elimination 
of key nodes and links within the network, between individuals, groups, and organizations.345 
The recommendation is based on the results of identification of key actors in terms of closeness, 
betweenness, eigenvector, and degree centrality measures. Based on these measures, I contend 
that the individuals listed in the previously displayed SNA must be captured, killed, or 
neutralized in other way. 
Neutralization is not designed exclusively for PSIN leadership, it is vital component of 
disrupting PSIN‘s money flows as well. It is important to continue aggressively targeting the 
PSIN‘s financiers and accountants. Through the apprehension of its financiers the illicit 
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network is deprived of specialized skill labour not easily replaced, which in turn, degrades the 
network‘s ability to sustain its operations. 
Removal of the top key players results in fracturing of the illicit network by breaking 
communications and splitting it into smaller clusters. In consequence, key players should be 
taken into consideration when contemplating decapitation and kill/capture strategy. In 
contemplating apprehension as preferable alternative to killing, it is important to realize that 
PSIN’s leading individuals detained in Mexico usually preserve their control and influence over 
operations in their organization organization.346 Therefore, to limit the detainees in exercising 
their influence remotely over the illicit network, it is necessary to extradite them into the United 
States and seek their complete isolation.  
Other considerations 
There are two important factors worth considering when executing the kinetic approach 
against individuals with high closeness centrality in any given PSIN. First, individuals with a 
high closeness centrality are strongly embedded in the network’s core and would not be 
susceptible to rehabilitation or counter-ideology tactics.347 Second, some illicit networks 
possess the ability to effectively replace individuals from the top tier management quickly and 
thus they remain highly resilient against hostile attempts to disrupt the network.348 For instance, 
the individuals with high eigenvector centrality are among most suitable candidates as they are 
members of the network with close ties to highly central members and therefore may be in a 
position to replace existing management figures. Moreover, they may have in-depth knowledge 
of the inner workings within the illicit network mostly due to their close proximity to current 
leadership.  Thus, it may be worth considering to also target those network members who do 
not rank as present leaders, but more as emerging or future leaders because of their close 
relationship with current leaders. Nevertheless, a disruption strategy relying exclusively on a 
kinetic approach will produce only limited results. 
Social Network Analysis: Non-Kinetic Options 
In contrast to kinetic options, non-kinetic approaches take longer to implement, but once 
effectively deployed, these can substantially contribute to a disruption strategy. Non-kinetic 
options directed against PSINs would primarily focus on deploying a deception strategy against 
network members rated with high betweenness centrality.349 The contention is that these actors 
would provide the optimal platform to inject pieces of misinformation into the illicit network 
and produce the maximum disruptive results. The desirable end state with this approach is to 
provoke implosion or fragmentation within the illicit network. 
Actor within the network who display high rates of betweenness centrality are those 
who exercise leverage among clusters and groups within the illicit network due to their positions 
of brokerage. Presumably, the misinformation inserted will provoke enough friction to motivate 
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preemptive attacks against other network members, which in turn causes a fragmentation and 
weakening of the network’s organizational structure. 
In summary, the use of SNA provides additional perspective in analysis of the PSIN‘s 
organizational structure. It provides the desirable insights into the network identifying key 
actors and their respective locations to enable purposeful targeted operations. At the same time, 
it highlights critical venues to employ non-kinetic approaches. It is vital to realize that in 
developing disruptive strategy, the metrics and graphs on PSINs should be used concurrently, 
since the failure to do so can prospectively produce a faulty strategy. Another important fact 
worth considering is that the elimination of highly central actors may have only temporary 
disruptive effect on the network.350 Mexican PSINs often proved themselves as highly flexible 
organizations, which demonstrated high levels of resilience multiplied with the ability to 
replace leadership figures in a relatively short periods of time. Therefore, the approach 
suggested here promotes tactics to affect both individuals central to the network and actors on 
its periphery. Undoubtedly, targeting the PSIN‘s organizational structure is a vital prerequsite 
in debilitating its operational capacity. 
Other Available Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Approaches: 
Capacity Building and Targeting 
The persistent strategy of the Mexican government relies on counter-leadership 
targeting, which has produced limited results thus far. Nevertheless, it is vital for the targeting 
at this level to continue against the PSIN‘s infrastructure. Additional effort, complementing the 
leadership elimination, should include the targeting of the PSIN‘s white-collar supporting 
infrastructure. All the lawyers, accountants, and politicians working for the Sinaloa cartel must 
be pursued with the same intensity as the network’s leadership. This approach should 
substantially degrade the network by targeting affiliated actors who have specialized skills and 
who are not easily replaceable. 
A likely improvement to the current strategy would be to shift to a simultaneous 
multidirectional offensive. Such a strategy requires a substantial increase in the nation state‘s 
security capacity. On behalf of the largest drug consuming as well as neighbouring countries, 
the United States can assist with the capacity building efforts by supplying training and logistics 
to facilitate the execution of multiple targets simultaneously. Additional support may take form 
of providing airlift assets, weapons systems and ammunition, etc. It is plausible to assume that 
the U.S. training personnel on Mexican soil may not be politically feasible course of action and 
therefore more of a nontraditional methodology is desirable. 
The government of Mexico currently limits the presence of U.S. troops on its territory, 
which partly hinders the ability of U.S. military to train and provide assistance to Mexican 
forces. In such an instance, two possible courses of action may be contemplated. The first option 
is to bring Mexican troops into the United States for training and to increase its operational size. 
The second option is to involve a partner force that would be able to operate in Mexico without 
the restrictions imposed on U.S. forces. In recent past, the National police of Colombian 
                                                          
350 Sean F. Everton, Network Topography, Key Players and Terrorist Networks (Monterey, CA: Naval 




supplied their Mexican counterparts with training.351 Prospectively, Colombians could continue 
or potentially even expand their training role in Mexico. 
Mexican Legal System and Extradition Treaty 
At this time, the United States and Mexican governments have a formal bilateral 
extradition treaty.352 Unfortunately, the process is mostly formal and very unproductive in 
practice as demonstrated by the fact it took four years to extradite the former leader of the Gulf 
Cartel.353 Moreover, the current extradition process allows for only limited access to timely 
intelligence products, which in turn reduces the effectiveness of existing operations. The 
obvious recommendation would be to amend the current extradition framework to expedite the 
process. 
By expediting extradition process into the United States, negotiations could develop 
under different legal circumstance and actionable intelligence can be obtained. Another 
important aspect of the Mexican judicial system is the absence of capital punishment.354 
Potential threat of capital punishment imposed on individuals committing mass attrocities, or 
crimes against humanity in general, may serve as deterrence for potential PSIN recruits. 
Infiltrating the PSIN 
In general, the Mexican PSIN‘s approach to illicit activities has demonstrated 
innovation and adaptability.355 The same approach must be adopted in order to defeat them. A 
strategy which includes penetration of a PSIN can substantially degrade its illicit capacities. 
One of the methods to penetrate a network’s organizational infrastructure is to try to 
ideologically turn some selected detainees against the PSIN and then allow them to return 
before their position is compromised. Once the selected actors are persuaded to cooperate,  
responsible authorities must ensure that these individuals remain under their control and that 
they are willing to attend rehabilitation. Then, maximum effort should be mustered to exploit 
their access to their respective networks. Once they supply the dsirable information, there 
should be an effort to rehabilitate them. In ideal circumstance, this method would be directed 
against financiers and logisticians since these individuals have access to other members of the 
network and can be potentially persuaded with offering of rewards. 
Another method suggested follows up directly on the apprehension of network’s 
financiers and logisticians. Targeting financiers and seizing large amounts of profits should 
weaken the network significantly, and drive a PSIN to increase already established relationships 
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with corrupt law enforcement and government officials to protect its assets and the use of 
intelligence collection.356 In consequence, this larger demand for corrupt officers and 
intelligence on law enforcement operations will make a PSIN vulnerable to further penetration 
attempts. By using a reversed penetration methodology, law enforcement agents can 
prospectively hope to gain access to the network. 
Finally, the Mexican armed forces and law enforcement units experience a significant 
number of desertions,357 which generates recruitment opportunities for PSINs. Turning a 
problem into an opportunity, dessertions might provide another venue for penetrating the 
organization. The intent here would be to equip an intruder with the essential and attractive 
skills to infiltrate a PSIN. 
Operations Countering the Public Perception 
In comparison a more subtle, but very important, approach consists of disruption of the 
PSINs‘ image. Over the last number of years, illicit networks in Mexico enjoy certain degree 
of popularity and glorification of their criminal image among general population. It is not 
unusual for young males to identify themselves with some of the most notorious PSINs, like 
the Sinaloa cartel. Unfortunately, this greater-than-life image projection provides trafficking 
networks with a recruitment advantage. It is plausible to assume that the distortion of PSINs’ 
public image can decrease their recruitment ability. Among possible procedures to distort the 
image is to empower some of the many emerging vigilante groups. These groups usually enjoy 
support of  local population and therefore have unlimited access to specific areas. Arguably, 
providing military organization and resources to vigilante groups could serve as a deterrent to 
PSINs‘ presence within their local areas. For the law enforcement effort organizing and 
equipping these groups would generate force multipliers to deny PSINs their operational space 
and safe havens. 
Moreover, with a smaller group delivering a notable blow against the illicit network 
may generate a substantial positive psychological impact against the PSINs. Along with such 
an offensive action a corresponding extensive information operations campaign must develop. 
Ultimatly, the objective would be to replace the current strong image of the Sinaloa cartel and 
other PSINs with a much fragile alternative, as well as to formulate the message to convince 
the general population that submission to PSIN control is not the only available option. 
Improving Intelligence Cooperation 
The operational tentacles of many Mexican PSINs reach into several countries in Central 
America, South America, and the United States.358 A more extensive intelligence fusion effort 
is essential prerequisite to optimize the disruption strategy. Increase and improvement in 
collaboration among law enforcement entities internationally would supply the desired 
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actionable intelligence flow between various elements interested in disrupting the illicit 
network. 
Among possible options is to create a joint cyber-platform for all key law enforcement 
and state security agencies in the different countries affected by the PSINs’ presence and enable 
them to optimize the sharing of mutually useful information. For example, the use of an 
intelligence-friendly software such as Palantir Government could provide a connection to 
national law enforcement entities in Central America with a task forces in the United States and 
Mexico. Such platform will promote and improve intelligence fusion by sharing information of 
recent operations against particular illicit network. 
Areas for Further Research 
The study presented in this dissertation only scratches the surface of the Sinaloa cartel 
network and provides a snapshot in time of this illicit enterprise. Significant time restrictions 
led to the narrowing of the focus on the Sinaloa cartel‘s activities in Mexico. To expand the 
understanding of this trafficking enterprise, research should be conducted outside Mexico’s 
boundaries as well. The Sinaloa cartel has both regional and international connections in several 
countries across continents, such as Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Belize, Colombia and 
the United States. They also expanded their market reach into Western Africa and Europe by 
establishing strong contacts with European criminal organizations.359 Undoubtedly, the 
employment of SNA as discussed in this thesis will continue to represent indispensable tool in 















                                                          






Until the beginning of the 20th century narcotics were simply a commodity, then cultural 
shifts in the West made drugs synonymous with deviancy, moral degeneration and evil. Today, 
global illicit drug trafficking is a complex and in many aspects fascinating phenomenon not 
only morally, but also socially, economically, legally, politically, culturally and even militarily.  
From the strategic counter-narcotics perspective, illicit drug trafficking has been a 
source of serious frustration, since there has been very little success over the last five decades 
in combating the phenomenon. In the grand scheme, the War on Drugs has failed to deliver its 
intended objectives and existing counter-narcotics policies have had very limited effect on 
reducing drug use, despite the fact it is costing the taxpayers across the Americas a fortune. 
Nowadays, drug use is rampant with illicit narcotics set to become more available and be better 
quality than ever before and drug-related violence becoming ever more brutal and widespread. 
In general public’s perception, brutal and excessive violence has become the most fascinating 
of all the salient features of illicit drug trafficking with the overall number of victims reaching 
well into hundreds of thousands, be it drug users, traffickers, law enforcement officers or mere 
civilians.  
Albeit a prominent feature, brutal violence is merely a symptom and the real genius of 
drug traffickers is not in their capacity to inflict pain upon their enemies and competitors, it is 
in their business acumen. As I repeated on several occasions throughout the thesis, illicit 
trafficking is a profit-seeking enterprise and from strategic economic perspective it is indeed 
admirable that in relatively short period, low level local smugglers built international illicit 
empires, whose most powerful representatives today can compete with Fortune 500 companies 
in terms of their corporate success. Business models of illicit enterprises have proven viable, 
efficient, flexible and resilient. Traffickers have demonstrated impressive creativity in adapting 
to changing conditions within the global operational environment, taking advantage of 
opportunities offered by globalization, and ultimately using their circumstances to help their 
business grown exponentially. 
As much as this corporate success is admirable, the immeasurable levels of related 
suffering are still infuriating. People across the Americas suffer from illicit drug trafficking on 
daily basis, be it economic, social or security exposure both individually and collectively. 
Indeed, as long as there will be demand for drugs, there will entrepreneurs supplying the product 
to the market. While eradication of illicit drug market is illusory, it is unacceptable to let the 
traffickers to continue operating with relative impunity from law and law enforcement across 
many countries in the Americas, while wielding the power to succumb individuals, 
governments and countries to their will by means of corruption or violence. Hence the ultimate 
ambition of this thesis to provide viable counter-strategy. 
The first prerequisite is to recognize the prevalent hypocrisy in the conversation about 
illicit trade, not only in narcotics. The general notion is that it represents a moral problem, issue 
of bad values, that these are acts performed by unscrupulous people. In other words, it is a moral 
concern and as such it should be dealt with at courts, churches, and in classrooms. The courts 
deliver rightful legal rulings and punishments, the churches teach essential moral values, and 
the proper education in classrooms prevents children from becoming drug users, traffickers or 
criminals. It is still quite uncommon to hear the notion that illicit drug trade, and illicit trade in 




economic forces at work here are touching very basic human instincts, be it the need to consume 
narcotics to deal with world’s problems or buying a famous brand purse for a tenth or more of 
its store price. Expecting governments to intervene where there are millions of customers eager 
to do either of those is a difficult request. 
On the other hand, there are measures that can be and should be adopted. The first is to 
provide national governments with suitable tools to deal with illicit drug trade and illicit trade 
in general. To equip governments to deal with this trade, two steps are required. First step is to 
defragment governments and second is to unburden them. The case of the United States might 
serve as a suitable example to illustrate defragmentation. In the United States there are several 
public agencies with drug trafficking related jurisdictions. Department of Treasury is in charge 
of controlling money laundering; Department of Commerce and Revenue is in charge of 
controlling counterfeiting; Drug Enforcement Agency is responsible for narcotics; Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms controls firearms; Immigration and Customs Enforcement deals 
with human trafficking. Naturally, all these federal agencies communicate but it is very hard to 
achieve good coordination and efficiency. 
In comparison, the traffickers are not exclusively specialized in any single activity, but 
they are experts in transportation. Yesterday the smuggled cocaine, today it is people, tomorrow 
it can be weapons. They are experts in logistics. Illicit trade in is not market-specific or product-
specific, it is function-specific. Governments must develop a more integrated view that mirrors 
in many ways the approach of those criminals they are supposed to be fighting. But that is 
impossible because now everything is criminalized. 
The notion of unburdening of governments refers to relieving them from pursuing 
crimes that are extremely difficult to deal with and focusing on what is important. In other 
words, governments should focus on making sure that women and children are not traded 
internationally, rather than have limited government resources wasted on ensuring that block 
buster movie or a famous writer’s book will not be released on internet a week before their 
premiere. Let the entertainment and other industries to develop protective technologies and 
mechanisms on their own and let governments to focus on the narcotics, weapons trade, 
trafficking in humans. All these trades are much more serious threats to our security and 
individual well-being than copied movies and music DVDs. 
While recognizing and emphasizing the value of intelligence work and surgical military 
strikes removing key figures in the management of illicit enterprises in order to disrupt their 
operations, my key recommendation would be to put economists, not soldiers, in charge of 
formulating and executing complex omnidirectional offensive strategies targeting actual not 
presumed centers of gravity in illicit drug trafficking. That is if the War on Drugs is finally to 
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